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In light of developing a nascent gas industry, present multiple 
challenges in restructuring, regulations and meeting infrastructure investments 
requirements. To identify an appropriate industry structure and provide suitable 
regulatory framework to attract adequate infrastructure investments are the 
requirement to maintain a viable nascent gas industry. The purpose of the study 
is to examine the conditions required for developing a viable nascent gas 
industry in Ghana. The study develops an analytical framework by combining 
the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm and the Transaction Cost 
Economics theory with stakeholder consultation in an integrated cash flow 
model, which identified inappropriate industry structure, ineffective regulation 
and high risk as challenges in the gas industry in Ghana. 
The current gas industry structure and regulatory framework in Ghana 
is identified as state control monopoly. To strengthen the analysis of the study 
alternative gas industry structural models were reviewed. The Single Buyer 
Model (SBM) is suggested as an initial stage structure for Ghana National 
Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) to commercialize upstream natural gas 
resources and ease transactions cost. However, the SBM is constrained by the 
Volta River Authority (VRA) and Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) 
inefficiencies. The Multiple Buyer Model (MBM) is considered as a transitional 
structure to solve the existing hold-up and lock-in inefficiencies of Ghana 
National Petroleum Corporation-Ghana National Gas Company-Volta River 
Authority (GNPC-GNGC-VRA) firm structure. Enforcing open access 
xvi 
 
regulations to essential infrastructure is required in the long run.  
Developing an integrated gas-to-power project in Ghana is a viable 
business. Nevertheless, non-associated gas production from the Sankofa Gas 
Project is risky and requires higher gas prices and alternative downstream 
consumers to be viable. The Gas Processing Plant and transmission pipeline 
tariffs are inappropriately set and requires regulations. Providing effective 
regulations and governance arrangements by establishing an independent 
regulator through a gas sector law are important in protecting the interest of 





















The management of the natural gas industry in the developed world 
(USA & UK), faces major challenges in industry restructuring, regulation and 
infrastructure investment decisions. These issues have been on the global policy 
agenda since the 1970s, and the main concerns are restructuring, re-examination 
of traditional incentive regulation and new understanding of risk in 
infrastructure investment (von Hirschhausen, 2008).  
The major constraints identified from the developed world’s gas sector 
include effects of restructuring and regulations on infrastructure investments 
and supply security in the UK and the US. Rapid declines in domestic gas 
production and increasing reliance on trans-interconnected pipelines and 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) in the UK and problems in the implementation of 
the new gas sector directives (e.g. European Union directives) (von 
Hirschhausen, 2008; Joskow, 2005). 
Additionally, the USA is becoming self-sufficient in gas production 
because of the shale gas boom (Wang et al., 2015). This will have impact on the 
global gas market (Hilaire et al., 2015) since this indicates the drying up of a 
major LNG importer. Besides, there is fierce global competition from coal and 
renewable energy (Wood, 2016). Pledges from the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change in 2015 saw countries shifting to the consumption of environmentally 
sustainable energies. It is projected that by 2040, 60% of electricity generated 
will come from renewable energy (IEA, 2016).  
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The non-existence of a major gas importer (US), competition from 
renewable energies and the slow growth in global demand due to economic 
crisis since 2008 mean the era of the “golden age of gas” as IEA (2012) 
predicted has not materialised. However, fossil fuels such as oil and gas and 
especially gas will continue to be the bedrock of the global energy system. 
While the developed countries, with their well-established gas markets, 
are trying to negotiate these challenges, the case of nascent gas producers of 
Sub-Saharan Africa is different.  Ghana, Tanzania and Mozambique have found 
commercial quantities of gas in recent times but, unlike, their predecessors like 
Nigeria who have relied on gas exports to the developed countries’ markets, 
these new entrants are seriously constrained by the loss of export market and a 
lack of competitiveness.  
These nascent1 gas producers (Ghana, Tanzania and Mozambique) are 
facing constraints in their commercialisation efforts due to lack of 
infrastructure, environmental concerns and lack of financing of projects 
(Ledesma, 2013; Fruhauf, 2014). Gas master plans which recommend 
government infrastructure investments, support in ownership structure, 
appropriate regulatory framework that gives investors security, suitable gas 
pricing structure with acceptable returns, non-discriminatory access to 
infrastructure and regulatory governance through a regulatory authority have 
                                                          
1 Nascent natural gas industries require completely new gas industry development from 




been developed (Ledesma, 2013; Fruhauf, 2014). 
Fortunately, these countries’ own economies are growing so their 
demand for energy is rapidly increasing. For example, Ghana is growing at 8.9% 
per annum (Ministry of Finance-Ghana, 2017); therefore, the power sector is 
unable to meet the growing electricity needs. The domestic use of gas for power 
generation offers an opportunity for these countries. Natural gas will be a strong 
“prime mover” for broad economic and social development in Africa (Ernest 
and Young, 2013). The use of natural gas in power generation has been a partner 
in energy diversification and can facilitate the transition to renewable energy 
development (IEA, 2012).  
These opportunities, however, come with risks and challenges (Ernest 
&Young, 2013). The power sector remains financially weak due to government 
interventions and poor organisational effectiveness. In addition, as new entrants 
to the gas industry, infrastructure is lacking and capital intensive. Hence, will 
require a supportive business environment for investments. Nevertheless, such 
an environment is lacking due to regulatory weaknesses and weak policies. 
Ghana joined the League of Nations in West Africa which discovered 
oil and gas resources in commercial quantities in 2007 and started producing in 
2010 (Adusah-Karikari, 2015; Ablo, 2015; Cuba et al., 2014). This led to the 
possibility of developing a nascent gas industry. Integrated analyses of gas-to-
power development in Ghana were carried-out by several agencies (Ministry of 
Energy-Gas Master Plan, 2015; World Bank, 2013 & 2015; Nexant, 2010) and 
academics (Fitsch and Poundineh, 2015; Fitsch and Poundineh, 2016) which 
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identified gas-to-power utilisation as an economically superior strategy 
compared to gas export-oriented utilisation.  
However, domestic gas use has remained a major problem in the 
region. For instance, Nigeria flares about 10% and re-injects 30% of all 
associated gas produced (Nwaoho and Wood, 2014; Peng and Poundineh, 2017) 
whilst faced with significant domestic power deficit. Lack of adequate 
structures and regulations have resulted in the poor development of domestic 
markets and inadequate infrastructure to develop these gas resources.  
Developing a nascent gas industry in Ghana faces several tensions in 
deciding between integrated or liberalised structures, pricing and sector viability 
challenges, cost recovery from the power sector, inappropriate regulatory 
framework for investments, ineffective structural arrangements and weak 
institutions. Solving these require a thorough analysis of the entire supply chain. 
1.1.0. The Research Knowledge Gap 
The general trend in the nascent gas industry in Ghana is identifying 
appropriate structural and regulatory frameworks, sustaining and attracting 
sufficient infrastructure investments to balance demand and supply adequacies 
and meeting national development needs and investor interest whilst delivering 
low-cost energy to consumers. Adequate and reliable supply of gas is a 
fundamental requirement for improving power supply in Ghana (World Bank, 
2013). The Ministry of Energy commissioned several studies on how Ghana can 
benefit from her gas resources and develop utilisation options. The Ministry, 
through consultants and international organisations, initiated studies to capture 
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the ongoing thinking on gas utilization options in the country.  
The Ministry of Energy initially conceived an overall gas industry 
development plan. Nexant (2010) set the tone for a Gas Sector Master Plan to 
develop a framework for the monetisation of Ghana’s natural gas resources to 
avoid flaring. A World Bank (2013) report prioritised the power sector as the 
major off-taker for downstream consumption of gas and recommend providing 
appropriate institutional arrangements. An existing gas pricing policy by the 
Ministry of Energy (2012) stated the structure of the gas industry as a state-
owned integrated monopoly but could not explain further. 
The Economic Consultancy Associates (ECA) and Petroleum 
Development Consultants (PDC) developed another Gas Master Plan (GMP) 
(2014) which recommended gas utilisation options based on netback pricing 
and prioritised the power sector as the main off-taker. They recommended that 
a gas sector policy, regulatory framework and institutional arrangements are 
required for Ghana. They, as well, described the current industry structure as 
wholly state-owned and vertically integrated.  
A recent World Bank Report (2015) on providing financial guarantees 
for the Sankofa Gas Project in Ghana succinctly captured the on-going thinking 
in the gas industry by providing comprehensive financial analysis and linking 
gas production to power plants for electricity generation and provided risk 
identification and mitigation measures.  
A final Gas Master Plan (2015) developed by the Ministry of Energy 
encompasses all previous consultants’ reports and provided an updated version 
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of current developments in the gas industry in Ghana. A Gas Sector Act was 
envisaged; in it, a monopolist industry structure was identified for early stage 
infrastructure development and a new Natural Gas Pricing Policy (NGPP) was 
to be established. An independent gas regulator was recommended and so was 
a National Gas Policy Act to be promulgated leading to a Gas Sector Act.  
Empirical evidence on Ghana’s nascent gas industry is limited to reports 
prepared by consultants and international agencies, which are mainly to support 
the government in planning and project financing. Nevertheless, these reports 
did not take a system-wide view of the gas industry as stakeholder views and 
concerns were not widely reflected.  
Three important issues were absent in these empirical studies. Firstly, 
whether the current state-dominated structure or an alternative liberalised 
industry structure is appropriate for a nascent gas industry. Secondly, which 
regulatory and governance arrangement is capable of incentivising business 
activities? Finally, what conditions are required for attracting infrastructure 
investments into the gas industry in Ghana?  
Fritsch and Poudineh (2016), provided the only academic work on the 
natural gas industry development in Ghana, which emphasised on the utilisation 
options of gas, suggesting a gas-to-power market as a superior strategy. The 
lack of an effective regulatory framework for investments and the weak 
institutional framework were identified as major constraints.  
Other than Fritsch and Poundineh’s (2016) study on gas-to-power 
development in Ghana, there is hardly any academic work on the Ghana gas 
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industry. This study provides a systematic analysis of structure, business 
viability and regulation to identify enabling conditions required to support the 
development of the nascent gas industry in Ghana. 
1.2.0. Problem Statement 
Nascent gas industries such as Mozambique (100TCF), Tanzania 
(70TCF) (Demierre et al., 2015) and Ghana (6.4TCF) face similar challenges in 
limited gas infrastructure investments: lack of local markets and limited 
domestic demand. Monetising gas resources in the best way possible in these 
Sub-Saharan African countries is considered challenging (Deierre et al., 2015).  
The World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction initiative is making 
efforts to tie associated gas into export projects and to develop local 
infrastructure to support domestic usage in countries such as Cameroon, Gabon, 
Equatorial Guinea and Ghana (Ernest and Young, 2013). Nigeria is the fifth 
largest LNG exporter with vast gas resources but frustrating is the slow pace of 
exploiting them to meet their domestic energy requirements (Wood, 2016). 
Destination LNG markets for West African gas such as the USA are also 
becoming gas independent due to shale gas production. Consequently, available 
LNG producers tend to look for alternative markets. Local gas markets and 
infrastructure in these West African countries with gas resources are emerging 
to monetize this important resource (Nwaoha and Wood, 2014; Wood, 2016).  
However, these gas monetisation efforts are bedevilled with challenges 
including attracting adequate investments for infrastructure development in 
domestic gas production and import (LNG) and developing diversified domestic 
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end-user base for gas utilisation which is challenged with unwillingness to pay 
due to accumulated debt of major off-takers (power sector). The power sector 
is not financially viable due to tariff control problems and may be unable to 
honour contractual obligations for gas supply due to their poor financial and 
technical performance.  
Ghana initiated the development of a local gas industry through building 
midstream and downstream infrastructure to utilise associated gas from the 
Jubilee Field. Other gas fields such as Tweneboa, Enyenra and Ntomme (TEN) 
Project and the Sankofa Gas Project were accelerated to meet increasing 
demand. Inadequate and weak institutional arrangements, lack of regulatory 
framework for investments, inefficient local pricing (downstream gas and 
electricity prices) and high risk of infrastructure investments are identified as 
major problems in the development of Ghana’s nascent gas industry.  
The power sector is identified as the priority area for the utilisation of 
Ghana’s domestic gas but the power sector faces several challenges of 
accumulated debt (World Bank, 2013; World Bank, 2015) which is most likely 
to be transferred into the gas industry. This is a major problem to investors on 
the viability of the gas industry.  
Furthermore, the entire gas value chain in Ghana is state-controlled: 
dominated by the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), which is 
selected to be the national gas aggregator, and the Ghana National Gas 
Company (GNGC), which operates the Gas Processing Plant (GPP) and the 
114KM transmission pipeline supplying gas to the Volta River Authority 
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(VRA) as the consumer. The gas industry value chain, thus, is a GNPC-GNGC-
VRA affair, which to the private sector does not provide a fair and a level 
playing ground and has placed their investments at risk.  
The downstream gas industry regulator, Energy Commission has 
awarded exclusive license to the Bulk Oil Storage and Transportation Company 
(BOST) as gas transporter and operator of the 114KM transmission pipeline 
built by GNGC. This has raised several institutional capacity problems among 
industry players, with BOST and GNGC in a pipeline operation conflict. There 
is a dilemma between producers, sellers and users of gas in Ghana in who is 
operating where and what.   
Adding to the issues of industry structuring are the problem of a lack of 
an effective regulatory framework to attract investment and the conflicting roles 
and responsibilities between state agencies in the gas industry value chain. The 
Petroleum Commission regulates upstream oil and gas operations through a 
regulatory framework. However, there are absolutely no regulations for 
midstream and downstream activities. Midstream infrastructure usage is not 
regulated and tariffs for the pipeline and GPP usage are not properly formulated.  
The quasi-monopoly of the state and the multiple regulatory agencies 
cause confusion and risk to private investors. This is because the private sector 
is of the view that the current structure will not be economically and technically 
efficient for their operations since this structure is directly tied to a debt-ridden 
electricity sector subject to state inefficiencies.  
The crux of the problem therefore, is how Ghana can develop the gas 
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sector while allowing the power sector to meet its needs and where both 
industries can grow together mutually.  Moreover, there is a question of how 
Ghana can formulate regulatory arrangements that best fit the gas industry and 
provide a viable business environment for infrastructure investment. In the end, 
there should be a win-win solution between the state, investors and consumers 
in developing the nascent gas industry. This leads to the main and specific 
objectives of the study. 
1.3.0. Objectives of the Study 
The main aim of the study is to explore the structural and regulatory 
arrangements required for developing a viable natural gas industry in Ghana. 
1.3.1. Specific Objectives 
The specific objectives of the study are to:  
 Evaluate possible gas industry structures in Ghana.  
 Assess the business viability of each component of the gas supply chain.  
 Develop suitable regulatory and governance arrangements for the 
nascent natural gas industry in Ghana.    
1.4.0. Contributions of the Study 
The study contributes to the existing thinking in the development of 
the nascent gas industry in Ghana in three ways. Firstly, stakeholder interactions 
have indicated contrasting perspectives of industry structuring in the state’s 
support for a Single Buyer Model (SBM) compared to more liberalised 
structures such as Multiple Buyer Models (MBM). These two perspectives are 
11 
 
examined to come out with the best-fit industry structure for Ghana. For the 
downstream segments, an integrated structure at the initial stage is suitable to 
reduce risks but a transparent regulatory arrangement is required. Nevertheless, 
once the industry matures a more competitive arrangement may be adopted. 
Secondly, the integrated cash flow analysis of the supply components 
of the gas industry in Ghana exposed irrational tariff systems for the Gas 
Processing Plant and transmission pipelines and the possibility of lowering 
these tariffs, which will lead to a much lower downstream gas price. Non-
associated gas production is risky in Ghana since it requires the need to maintain 
a delicate balance in upstream natural gas production prices and government 
fiscal policy to achieve financial viability.  
Thirdly, inconsistencies in regulatory and governance arrangements 
have been uncovered from the empirical evidence and stakeholder 
consultations. Alternative regulatory and governance arrangement framework 
are being explored and developed for the nascent gas industry in Ghana. An 
independent gas regulatory authority is recommended to solve the challenges 
associated with the duplication and conflicting roles in the gas industry. 
Finally, developing a viable nascent gas industry in Ghana can serve 
as a suitable template for other nascent gas industries such as those of 
Mozambique and Tanzania, which discovered commercially viable quantities 




1.5.0. Structure of the Thesis 
The balance of the thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter Two 
gives an overview of the development of the nascent gas industry in Ghana. 
Chapter Three presents the literature review focusing mainly on combining two 
theories: Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (SCP) and the Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) to develop an analytical framework. Chapter Four 
focuses on the methodology, how the analytical framework is developed with 
stakeholder engagement using semi-structured guided interviews and the 
integrated cash flow model.  
Chapter Five to Seven are the main thrust of the study, with Chapter 
Five discussing the first objective of the study: structuring the gas industry. 
Chapter Six follows with the second objective: business viability of the supply 
components of the gas industry while Chapter Seven considers the third 
objective of the study: regulations and governance arrangements. The final 
chapter, Chapter Eight, provides conclusions based on the analyses and makes 
recommendations.  
1.6.0. Chapter Summary 
This chapter, Chapter One, provided the background of the study by 
introducing the subject of discussion and the on-going thinking in the nascent 
gas industry in Ghana. The chapter, also, presents the problem statement, the 






DEVELOPMENT OF THE NASCENT GAS INDUSTRY IN GHANA 
2.0. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the development of the nascent 
gas industry in relations to other sectors of the economy in Ghana. The first 
section looks at economic development with focus on three main sectors 
(agriculture, services and industry). The second section considers the energy 
sector and the emerging gas industry and finally, the conclusion provides a 
summary. 
2.1.0. The Ghana Context 
Ghana is located in West Africa with a total land area of 238,540km2 
and shares borders with the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean to the south, 
a few degrees north of the equator, with Togo to the east, Cote d’Ivoire to the 
west and Burkina Faso to the north (Siakwah, 2017; AQUASTAT, 2005). The 
country has a population of 28.21million and a growth rate of 2.2% per annum 
(Ghana Statistical Service, 2017).  Ghana has 10 administrative regions with 
45% of the population living in rural areas (UNICEF, 2016). 
Ghana practices a multiparty democracy and is noted for a stable 
political and social environment. In 2017, for instance, Ghana demonstrated her 
political credentials in a smooth change of power from the National Democratic 
Party (NDC) to the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Before this feat, Ghana had 
received praises from international bodies for experiencing a strong, inclusive 
and sustained economic growth over the past two decades (International 
14 
 
Monetary Fund, 2014; World Bank, 2015).  
2.1.1. Economic Development in Ghana 
Ghana is a low middle-income country with a Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of US$117.16 billion in purchasing power parity and a per capita income 
of US$4,150, well above other low middle-income countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (IMF, 2017; World Bank, 2017). About 24.2% of the population live 
below the poverty line implying that 6.4million Ghanaians are poor (Ghana 
Statistical Services, 2014).  
The average GDP growth rate for Ghana from 2008-2017 is 7.1% as 
indicated on Figure 1. The overall economy of Ghana is projected to grow at an 
annual rate of 7.9% in the medium-term from 2017 to 2019 (Ministry of 
Finance, 2017) assuming restoration of energy supply and recovery of oil and 
gas production and crude oil prices (African Development Bank, 2017). 
Figure 1: Annual Real GDP Growth Rate for Ghana (%) 2008-2017 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2017).  
GDP growth rate in the medium term in Ghana is favourable, with an 
average growth rate of 5.3% expected to peak at 8.9% in 2018 (See Table 1) 
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because of the additional oil and gas production volumes from the TEN Project 
and the Sankofa Gas Project (SGP). Non-oil GDP is expected to grow on 
average of 5% per annum and increase from 4% in 2014 to 6% in 2018 within 
the medium term, resulting in a growth rate of 6% in the long-run (IMF, 2017). 
Table 1: Annual growth rate of selected economic indicators in Ghana 
  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 
GDP (%) 4 3.8 3.5 5.9 8.9 5.9 5.1 5.2 5.4 
Non-oil GDP (%) 4 4 4.8 4 5 6 6 6 6 
Oil and Gas GDP 
(%) 
4.5 0.9 -16.9 42.5 64.9 5.5 -3.1 -2.7 -1.7 
Real GDP per 
capita (%) 
1.4 1.2 0.9 3.3 6.1 3.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 
Source:  IMF, (2017). 
Inflation in 2016 reached 15.4% but declined to 12.1% in 2017 and 
projected to decline further within the 8±2% band in early 2018 and expected 
to remain unchanged in the medium term.  This is due to exchange rate stability 
and increases in the monetary policy rates (IMF, 2017). Ghana’s budget deficit 
on cash basis as percentage of GDP was 8.7% in 2016 has reduced to 4.5% in 
2017 and expected to remain stable in the medium-term. However, Ghana 
continues to struggle with a high fiscal deficit, which widens public debt, 
weakens exchange rates and results in higher financing cost and inflation.  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) extended a US$918million 
credit facility and technical support to the government of Ghana from 2015-
20192. This is expected to help maintain strict fiscal discipline and manage the 
                                                          
2 IMF signed an Extended Credit Facility with Ghana in 2015 and extended till 2019 aimed to 
restore debt sustainability and macroeconomic stability and foster high grow and job creation 
whilst protecting social spending. 
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increasing budget deficit. Other economic challenges in Ghana include high 
youth unemployment, high electricity cost, and uncertainties from markets of 
global commodities and the risk exposure to the overreliance on three major 
exports (gold, cocoa and oil). 
Ghana loses between US$320million to US$920million per annum in 
productivity (Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, 2014); 
equivalent to 2% to 6% loss of gross economic growth due to inadequate fuel 
and unreliable power supply (Power Systems Energy Consulting and Ghana 
Grid Company, 2010) resulting in power crisis. Inadequate and unreliable fuel 
supply is identified as the cause of the power crisis (Energy Commission, 2017). 
The Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda II3 was 
introduced as an economic intervention program aimed at ensuring 
macroeconomic stability in the medium-term and to achieve an average real 
GDP growth target of at least 10.6% and a non-Oil GDP growth target of at least 
9.6% per annum. The industrial, services and agriculture sectors are identified 
to lead the projected growth with average annual growth rates of 13.2%, 10% 
and 6% respectively. It is believed that maintaining debt sustainability, ensuring 
adequate and reliable power supply and realignment of government expenditure 
to more productive areas are required for macroeconomic stability in Ghana 
(IMF, 2017).  
                                                          
3 The Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda II is set to provide a medium to long-




2.2.0. Structure of the Ghanaian Economy 
The composition of the Ghanaian economy is made-up of the services, 
agriculture, and industrial sectors. The Ghanaian economy shows a positive 
outlook for all the three major sectors growing consistently over the past decade 
(2006-2016) as indicated on Table 2. 
Table 2: Structure of Ghana’s Major Economic Sectors (%) 
Item 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Agriculture 30.4 29.1 31 31.8 29.8 25.3 22.9 22.4 21.5 20.3 18.9 
Industry 20.8 20.7 20.4 19 19.1 25.6 28 27.8 26.6 25.1 24.3 
Services 48.8 50.2 48.6 49.2 51.1 49.1 49.1 49.8 51.9 54.6 56.8 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2017). 
The agriculture and the industry sectors have the potentials of 
increasing in growth capacities. The services sector has consistently contributed 
significantly to more than half of the GDP growth in Ghana being 56.8%; the 
industry sector, 24.3% and agriculture, 18.9%.  
2.2.1. Service Sector Development 
The service sector continues to be the leading contributor to economic 
growth, increasing to 56.8% in 2016 and employs 31% of the economically 
active population (UNIDO, 2013; Ministry of Finance, 2017).  The service 
sector is composed of finance and insurance; trade, repair of vehicles and 
household goods; hotels and restaurants; information and communication; 
education, health and social work; transport and storage; government services, 
defence and social security and producers of private non-profit services 
(UNIDO, 2013; Ministry of Finance, 2017).  
18 
 
The leading contributors to the growth of the service sector in 2016 are 
Transport and storage (13.3%); Financial and insurance activities (9.4%); 
Trade, Repair of Vehicles, Household Goods (6.4%) and Public Administration 
and Defence; Social Security (5.4%) as indicated on Table 3. Transport and 
storage sub-sector is the leading contributor to the services sector growth. 
The oil and gas industry can be aligned with the services sector in 
providing stable, reliable and cheap electricity to most of the services sub-
sectors; for example, financial services and insurance; education; health and 
social work; real estates and support services and public administration, defence 
and security. The transport and storage sub-sector can benefit from using natural 
gas to produce methanol and auto-gas as alternative transport fuels. Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (LPG) from the gas processing plant is used as cooking fuel in 
households, hotels and restaurants as well as health facilities such as hospitals. 
The tourism industry will benefit immensely when hotels and restaurants have 
a stable and cheap power supply. 
The financial and insurance sub-sector is insulated from providing 
letters of credit (LC’s) to the Volta River Authority (VRA) for the purchase of 
Light Crude Oil (LCO) if the gas industry can function properly in providing 
sufficient quantities of fuel to thermal plants. This, in the long-run, will reduce 
the debt burden of VRA on financial services with reserved capital being 





Table 3: Services subsector contribution to GDP (%) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
SERVICES 48.8 50.2 48.6 49.2 51.1 49.1 49.1 49.8 51.9 54.6 56.8 




6.4 6.1 6 5.9 6.2 5.9 5.6 5.8 5.6 6.1 6.4 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 
5 5.6 6 6.2 6 5.4 4.8 5.8 5.6 5.8 5.9 
Transport and 
Storage 
13.2 13.1 11.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 11 11.2 12.3 13 13.3 
Information and 
Communication 




2.7 3.4 3.8 4.3 5.2 4.4 4.7 6.5 8.4 8.9 9.4 









4.8 5.9 6.3 7 7 7 6.8 5.9 5.4 5.3 5.4 
Education 3.7 3.9 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.3 3.6 3.6 3.7 4 
Health and 
Social Work 





3.7 3.7 3.6 3.7 4 3.9 3.7 4.3 4.1 3.8 3.7 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2017). 
2.2.2. Agricultural Sector Development 
The agriculture sector comprises five sub-sectors, namely, crops, 
livestock, cocoa, fisheries and forestry/logging. The agriculture sector accounts 
for about 44.7% employed population largely dominated by women (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2015).  The sector contributed about 18.9% to Ghana's GDP 
in 2016, a significant decline from 30.4% in 2006 (See Table 2). The crops sub-
sector has been the major contributor to the sector’s GDP growth followed by 
forestry/logging and cocoa with 14.5% and 2.1% respectively in 2016.  
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The agriculture development policy of Ghana focuses on the 
modernisation of agriculture and increasing productivity of farmers. The policy 
intends among other items to accelerate the development of selected food crops, 
improve access to mechanisation and enhance access to inputs (Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture, 2007). 
Table 4: Agriculture subsector contribution to GDP (%) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AGRICULTURE  30.4 29.1 31 31.8 29.8 25.3 22.9 22.4 21.5 20.3 18.9 
Crops 21.3 20.3 22.4 23.6 21.7 19.1 17.2 17.4 16.8 15.7 14.5 
o.w. Cocoa 3 2.7 2.5 2.5 3.2 3.6 2.6 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.7 
Livestock 2.5 2.3 2.1 2 2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Forestry and 
Logging 
4.1 4.2 3.7 3.7 3.7 2.8 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.1 
Fishing 2.5 2.3 2.7 2.5 2.3 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2017). 
The crops and livestock subsectors are expected to lead the sector’s 
growth agenda with an annual projected growth rate of 6% (Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture, 2007). Programs such as fertilizer subsidies, agriculture 
mechanisation and irrigation development programs are intended to lead the 
agenda (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2015). The fertilizer subsidy 
program covers 50% of fertilizer prices to farmers and the government of Ghana 
spends about US$ 63 million yearly on this program (Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 2015).  
The crops (cereals, rice, maize, millet, etc.) subsector and cocoa 
production are the main areas that require the intensive application of fertilizers 
to lead the mechanisation agenda. The main fertilizers imported into the country 
include Nitrogen-Phosphorus-Potassium (NPK), Urea, Potash, Nitrate and 
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Sulphate. Total fertilizer imports in 2016 stood at about 239,886metric tonnes 
(AfricaFertilizer.org, 2017).  
There is a complementary relationship between the oil and gas industry 
and the agriculture sector as both sectors can be strategically aligned for mutual 
benefits especially in the production of fertilizers where natural gas can be used 
as feedstock for the development of a fertilizer manufacturing plant and 
indirectly in agro-processing industries. This comes in the form of an integrated 
gas-to-fertilizer development whereby upstream natural gas production is linked 
to a downstream ammonia/urea production plant and make available cheap and 
reliable electricity to agro-processing industries. 
Additionally, electricity demand for agro-processing, for instance, in 
fish, fruits and vegetable processing and storage, livestock processing and 
storage and value addition to cash crops such as cocoa, palm oil and other cereal 
crops before export may increase.   
Adequate, cheap and reliable natural gas supplies are required in the 
long-run as feedstock to the fertilizer plant and to thermal plants to produce 
electricity at competitive tariffs and reliably to make the agro-processing 
industries in Ghana globally competitive. In the long-run, if the gas industry and 
the agriculture sector are well integrated, this can transform the agriculture 
sector into a high-value addition sector through an agro-processing industrial 
development agenda. These activities can accelerate the agriculture sub-sector’s 
contribution to GDP and help maintain the long-term economic growth and 
macroeconomic stability of Ghana. 
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2.2.3. Industrial Sector Development 
The composition of the industrial sector in Ghana includes Mining and 
Quarry, Oil and Gas, Manufacturing, Electricity, Water and Sewerage and 
Construction. The industry sector contributed about 24.3% to GDP in 2016, a 
decline from the past four years’ of 28% in 2012 (See Table 2). The Industrial 
sector employs about 7.5% of the population and steady growth from 20% to 
24.3% over the past decade (2006 to 2016).  
The Construction subsector has been the leading contributor of growth 
of the Industrial sectors, contributing 13.7% to GDP growth in 2016. The 
introduction of the Oil and Gas subsector in 2010 saw the industrial sector 
contribution to GDP increasing from 19% in 2010 to about 27.8% in 2013.  The 
Oil and Gas industry even though emerging displayed consistent growth 
patterns until between 2015 to 2016 where the sector experienced contraction 









                                                          
4 Crude oil prices experienced sharp falls from US$115/barrel in June 2014 to under 
US$35/barrel in February 2016 and this has been attributed largely to supply-demand 
imbalances (World Economic Forum, 2016). 
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Table 5: Industry subsectors contributions to GDP (%) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
INDUSTRY 20.8 20.7 20.4 19 19.1 25.6 28 27.8 26.6 25.1 24.3 
Mining and 
Quarrying 
2.8 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.3 8.4 9.5 9.4 8 5.3 4.2 
o.w. Oil 0 0 0 0 0.4 6.7 7.7 8.2 7.2 4.1 2.1 
Manufacturing 10.2 9.1 7.9 6.9 6.8 6.9 5.8 5.3 4.9 4.8 4.6 
Electricity 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.1 
Water and 
Sewerage 
1.3 1 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 
Construction 5.7 7.2 8.7 8.8 8.5 8.9 11.5 12 12.7 13.5 13.7 
Source: Ghana Statistical Services (2017). 
The Electricity subsector experienced sudden growth in 2015 from a 
marginal 0.9% to 1.1% in 2016 due to the availability of domestic natural gas 
as fuel to existing thermal plants. Natural gas from the Oil and Gas subsector 
can be used to further accelerate the growth of the electricity sector by providing 
reliable and cheap fuel to thermal plants.  
Ghana’s industrial policy as approved by parliamentary cabinet in 
2010 is set on transforming the country into an industrial development model 
capable of delivering widespread jobs, equity, growth and poverty reduction and 
a vision aimed at supporting Ghana to become a leading agro-industrial country 
(Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2011; UNIDO, 2013). The policy aims at 
tackling several challenges confronting the Manufacturing sector such as 
increasing production capacity and product quality and enhancing global 
competitiveness (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2010). 
The industrialisation policy of Ghana can complement the gas industry 
to develop a policy that serves as a catalyst to provide reliable and lower cost 
energy directly to support the Manufacturing and Electricity subsectors and as 
a feedstock to develop a new growth pole of petrochemical industries. There are 
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possibilities of linking the gas industry to the Manufacturing subsector through 
an integrated aluminium production, petrochemical processes, direct salt-driven 
health and food industries, caustic soda based industries, feedstock for fertilizer 
production, lower cost energy to small industries and agro-processing 
industries. Gas-driven energy can support large-scale industries for growth and 
development in Ghana (Emos, 2010). 
2.3.0. Overview of the Energy Sector in Ghana 
The energy balance5 in Ghana is multifaceted and composed of crude 
oil, oil products, natural gas, biofuels and waste, hydro, and electricity (IEA, 
2017). The main primary energy sources in Ghana are petroleum and biofuel 
waste, which account for 46.7% and 37.2% respectively. Hydro remains at 5.2% 
and natural gas contribute 10.6% (IEA, 2017).  
The petroleum subsector in crude oil production, oil products and 
natural gas are the main source of energy in Ghana. Thousands of tonnes of oil 
equivalent (ktoe) of 5659ktoe crude oil is produced domestically with majority 
of 5303ktoe exported and only 356ktoe remaining while additional 317ktoe is 
imported. Majority of the crude oil is transferred to electricity generators 
(253ktoe) and to oil refineries (112ktoe). Oil products in Ghana are imported 
(4063ktoe) and (130ktoe) exported to neighbouring land lock countries 
(Burkina Faso and Niger). Part of the oil is also used for international marine 
bunkering (128ktoe) while the remaining (3763ktoe) is used for domestic 
                                                          
5 Energy balance of a country is the overall patterns of energy supply and use (IEA, 2017). 
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consumption mostly in transportation (2619ktoe), industry (583ktoe) and others 
as indicated on Table 6. 
Natural gas is produced locally (468ktoe) and imported (596ktoe) 
which are transferred to electricity production. Hydropower generation 
(503ktoe) is constant. Crude oil, gas and hydro are the main sources of energy 
transfers for electricity generation in Ghana. Crude oil produced in Ghana is 
exported with only small volumes remaining to be supplemented with imports 
for power generation and refinery’s operations. Gas remains the most viable 
energy source transferred to electricity plants in Ghana as all domestically 
produced and imported gas are transferred to power generation (see Table 6).   
An estimated 3617ktoe of biofuels and waste are produced in Ghana. 
Biofuels and waste energy are consumed as fuels in the residential sector 
(1885ktoe) and for other purposes (2018ktoe). About 1195ktoe of biofuels and 
waste are transferred to other forms of energy.  Much as it is a source of indirect 
livelihood for over 3million Ghanaians, especially women (65%), its adverse 




Table 6: Energy Balance of Ghana for 2015 (ktoe)  
Source: International Energy Agency (2015).










Waste Electricity Heat Total 
Production 0 5659 0 468 0 503 0 3617 0 0 10247 
Imports 0 317 4063 596 0 0 0 0 19 0 4995 
Exports 0 -5303 -130 0 0 0 0 0 -47 0 -5480 
International Marine Bunkers 0 0 -128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -128 
Stock changes 0 0 62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 
TYPES 0 673 3868 1064 0 503 0 3617 -28 0 9696 
Transfers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Statistical differences 0 -307 -196 0 0 0 0 0 -5 0 -508 
Electricity Plants 0 -253 0 -1064 0 -503 0 0 988 0 -832 
CHP plants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Heat plants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas works 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oil refineries 0 -112 97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -15 
Coal Transformation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquefaction plants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other transformation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1195 0 0 -1195 
Energy Industry own use 0 0 -5 0 0 0 0 0 -6 0 -11 
Losses 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -205 0 -205 
Total Final Consumption 0 0 3763 0 0 0 0 2422 744 0 6929 
Industry 0 0 583 0 0 0 0 407 356 0 1347 
Transport 0 0 2619 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2619 
Other  0 0 395 0 0 0 0 2015 387 0 2797 
Residential 0 0 281 0 0 0 0 1885 210 0 2376 
Commercial and Public Service 0 0 36 0 0 0 0 128 178 0 342 
Agriculture/forestry 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 72 
Fishing 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Non-specified 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Non-energy use 0 0 166 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 166 




The Electricity subsector constitutes activities related to electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution and efficiency/conservation. 
Electricity accounts for 47% of total energy consumed in households and 65.6% 
of modern energy to the Industrial and Service sectors in Ghana (Ministry of 
Energy, 2010). The leading electricity consuming sectors in Ghana include the 
‘Other sectors’ (residential, commercial, public service, agriculture/forestry, 
fishing and non-specified) (387ktoe), Industrial sector (356ktoe), the 
Residential sector (210ktoe) and Commercial and Public services (178ktoe) and 
about 205ktoe of electricity, however, is lost during transmission. 
Transmission losses occur when power is transferred from generators 
to loads and there are two types of losses: technical and commercial. Technical 
losses are largely caused by energy dissipated as heat in the resistive conductors 
and equipment used for transmission, transformation and distribution of power. 
Commercial losses include pilferage, defective meters and errors in accounting 
for electricity consumption (Power Systems Energy Consulting and Ghana Grid 
Company Limited, 2010). 
The Energy Commission (2017) estimated on average 607.38GWh 
transmission losses per year under a review period between 2014-2016 
representing 4.4% as indicated on Table 7, compared to PURC 4% requirements 
and far below the industry rule-of-thumb of 3% (PSEC and GRIDCo, 2010). 
International Energy Agency (2014) noted that Sub-Saharan African countries 
electricity transmission and distribution losses are twice the global average of 




of 6%. UK and U.S recorded 8% and 6% respectively. Ghana on the other hand 
records 23% of transmission and distribution losses (World Bank, 2018). 
Table 7: Transmission Losses in Ghana (2014-2016) 
Year 2014 2015 2016 
Transmission Losses % 4.22 3.79 4.4 
Sources: Energy Commission (2017). 
The increase in transmission losses were mainly due to lack of 
adequate generation to allow for geographical balance in generation in operation 
at all times and due to congestion. High transmission losses in Ghana are mainly 
because of heavy power flows due to limited transmission capacity (PSEC and 
GRIDCo, 2010). Distribution losses in Ghana accounts for approximately 24% 
of demand driven largely by technical and commercial losses compared to the 
US, losses of only 6.5% of demand (PSEC and GRIDCo, 2010). The World 
Bank (2013) report estimated Ghana’s largest electricity distributors- Electricity 
Company of Ghana (ECG) distribution losses of 27% (technical and non-
technical) of which 16% are non-technical. 
Access, availability and affordability related issues are cited as 
underlying reasons for the dominance of fuel usage in Ghana. The Oil and Gas, 
Electricity and Renewable energy subsectors are strongly supplementary given 
the dependence of the power sector on oil and gas for fuel and solar Photovoltaic 
(PV) for power generation. The commercialisation of gas resources in Ghana is 
driven by the power sector’s need for a less expensive alternative fuel. The Oil 
and Gas sector in Ghana can be integrated into the Electricity sector where both 




interrelationship between the gas industry and electricity subsector explained in 
the following section. 
2.3.1. Electricity Sector Institutions in Ghana 
Ghana unbundled its Electricity sector into generation, transmission 
and distribution and was one of the first countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to 
attract private investment through Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in 
electricity generation (PSEC and GRIDCo, 2010). The institutional setting of 
the electricity subsector in Ghana includes as indicated on Table 8, the Ministry 
of Energy has policy, monitoring and regulatory oversight responsibilities. The 
Volta River Authority (VRA), a state-owned utility is the dominant electricity 
producer responsible for 2,456MegaWatts (MW) of installed generation 
capacity which represents (56%) from hydro, solar and thermal sources.  
There are several other IPPs accounting for the remaining 1,927MW 
(43.9%) of installed generation capacity from thermal and solar sources (VRA, 
2015). Several other upcoming IPPs are planning to add generation capacity of 
2025MW, which will shift Ghana’s electricity generation capacity towards 
reliance on IPPs. The State-owned Grid Company Limited (GRIDCo) is the sole 
transmission company. The Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) and Northern 
Electricity Distribution Company (NEDCo) are the electricity distribution 
companies for South and Northern zones of Ghana respectively. The Public 
Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC), is the economic/financial regulator 




Table 8: Electricity Subsector Institutions in Ghana 
Institutions Responsibilities Sector 
Ministry of  Energy -responsible for formulating, implementing, 
monitoring and evaluating energy sector policies 
Energy Sector 
Energy Commission (EC) -Technical Regulator Energy Sector  
Public Utilities and Regulatory 
Commission (PURC) 
-Economic/Financial Regulator Utilities sector 
Volta River Authority (VRA) -manages hydropower, thermal and solar PV 
assets generation capacity 
Power Sector 
Ghana Grid Company (GRIDCo) -Owns and operates the High Voltage 
transmission system  
Power sector 
Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) -controls 70% of retailing electricity sales in the 
Southern Zone of Ghana 
Power sector 
Northern Electricity Distribution 
Company (NEDCo) 
-a subsidiary of VRA which handles power 
retailing in the Northern Zone of Ghana 
Power sector 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) - Thermal power and Solar PV generation  Power sector 




2.4.0. Overview of the Electricity Subsector in Ghana 
Ghana’s electricity generation mix is made-up of hydropower, thermal 
and renewable energy (solar PV). Installed capacity in 2017 stands at 4,577MW 
and dependable capacity is 3,944MW. The dependable capacity generation mix 
has hydropower, 1,380MW (34.9%), thermal 2,564MW (65%) which indicates 
the increasing role of thermal generation in providing dependable electricity. 
Electricity access in Ghana stands at 83.24% and consumption per capita is 
estimated at 344 kilowatts hours (kWh) whilst peak demand has increased from 
1,933MW in 2015 to 2,386MW in 2017 (Ministry of Finance, 2017). 
 The main feature of electricity generation in Ghana is its dependence 
on hydropower for base-load generation capacity, which makes it vulnerable to 
unreliable supply due to rainfall shortfalls. The introduction of liquid fuel based 
thermal power as a short-term measure has increased the cost of supply and 
reduced sector viability. The sector has not seen major capacity growth in the 
past two decades due to the poor financial condition of the main utilities (VRA 
and ECG) as discussed further. The deregulation of the sector has not been able 
to resolve the sector’s problems. The lack of reliable electricity supply has 
negative implications for the economy as it causes nearly 2% to 6% per annum 
reduction in GDP growth rate in 2012 to 2016 (Ministry of Finance, 2017). 
Light Crude Oil (LCO) was imported as fuel for thermal power 
generation. Liquid fuels proved expensive and reduce the viability of these 
thermal plants especially when crude oil prices are above US$85/barrel. The 




as heavy fuel oil, distillate fuel oil and natural gas. On one hand, about 
US$1.2billion is required annually to procure fuel for all the thermal plants in 
Ghana (Energy Commission, 2017). This increasing cost affected the viability 
of the Volta River Authority (VRA) resulting in lower thermal capacity growth. 
In the medium term (up to 2022), total electricity demand in Ghana is 
projected to peak at 3,828MW and total supply required (demand + reserve 
margin) is projected at 4,784MW. Hydro generation is limited to dependable 
generation capacity estimated at 1,120MW as indicated on Table 9. Thermal 
and solar generation are the key supply options to meet the remaining electricity 
demand, with solar generating a marginal 22.5MW up to year 2022.  
Table 9: Medium Term Electricity Projections 
Year   2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 
 Projected Demand (MW)  2646 3128 3462 3712 3828 
 Total Supply Required 
(Demand + Reserved)  
3308 3910 4327 4640 4784 
 Total Existing Hydro Capacity 
(MW)  
1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 
 Total Existing Thermal 
Capacity (MW)  
2360 2462 2462 2462 2462 
 Total Existing Renewables  22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 
 Expected Total Generation 
(MW)  
4326.5 4704.5 4804.5 4805 4804.5 
 Surplus (MW)  1019 794 477 165 20 
Sources: Energy Commission et al. (2017). 
Thermal generation is the immediate option to meet the increasing 
demand, which is projected to increase from 2,360MW in 2018 to 2,462MW in 
2022.  Additional fuel (Light Crude Oil, Distillate Fuel Oil (DFO), Heavy Fuel 
Oil (HFO) and natural gas) will be required. Additionally, about 2025MW of 




on Table 10. These planned capacities are thermal plants and emergency power 
barges, which will also require LCO, HFO, DFO and gas. This will lead to 
increased LCO/HFO/DFO importation, additional domestic gas production, 
increased WAGP supplies or additional gas supply capacities.  
Table 10: Planned/New Power Generations Projects in Ghana 
Planned/Developer Power Generation 
(MW) type of capacity 
Assumed Start 
Date 
Amandi 240 2018 
Jacobsen 360 2018 
EDF/VRA 200 2017 
Ghana1000 375 2018/19 
Globeleg 375 2019 
Karpower 2 225 2016 
APR Emergency Power Rental 250 2015/16 
Total 2025MW   
Source: Volta River Authority, (2016). 
Majority of these thermal plants are combined cycle plants using either 
LCO or natural gas as indicated on Table 11. The power sector presents a major 
market for both domestic LCO and gas production. The petroleum sector can 
provide a mutually beneficial relationship with the power sector in supplying 
LCO instead of exports (see Table 6) and gas to thermal power plants in Ghana. 


















Type Fuel Type 
Volta River Authority         
Akosombo 1020 900 Hydro Water 
Kpong 160 140 Hydro Water 
VRA Solar 2.5   Solar Sun 
TAPCO(T1) 330 300 Thermal  LCO/Gas 
TICO(T2) 330 320 Thermal  LCO/Gas 
T3 132 120 Thermal  LCO/Gas 
TTIPP 110 100 Thermal  LCO/Gas 
TT2PP 49.5 45 Thermal  DFO/Gas 
Tema Thermal 2 Expansion TT2-PPX 22 19 Thermal Gas 
Kpong Thermal Power Plant – KTPP 220 200 Thermal Gas/DCF 
MRP 80 70 Thermal  DFO/Gas 
Independent Power Producers         
Bui HEP 400 340 Hydro Water 
AMERI 250 230 Thermal Gas 
Karpower Barge 1 225 220 Thermal HFO 
Sunon Asogli Phase 1 200 180 Thermal  Gas 
Sunon Asogli Phase 2 Stage 1 180 160 Thermal Gas 
Sunon Asogli Phase 2 Stage 2 180 160 Thermal Gas 
CENIT 110 100 Thermal  LCO 
AKSA 360 340 Thermal HFO 
BXC Solar  22     Sunlight 
Total Installed Capacity 4383       
Planned Capacity 2025       
Total Dependable Capacity   3944     
Source: VRA (2017). LCO-light crude oil, HFO-heavy fuel oil, DFO-distillate fuel oil 
How much gas can be made available to existing and planned thermal 
plants in Ghana? In addition, how much additional natural gas capacity is 
required? For the electricity sector to be able to respond to the gas industry, the 
sector should be able to pay for the gas consumed through economically 
efficient tariffs. The next section throws lights on the challenges of the 




2.4.1. Challenges in the Electricity Sector in Ghana 
The power sector faces two main challenges arising from forces external 
to the sector: the lack of adequate and secured quantities of reasonably priced 
fuel for power generation and the lack of adequate public funds to finance the 
sector investments requirements (World Bank, 2013). The challenges are 
exacerbated by several constraints, principally in poor technical and financial 
performance of the main utilities (VRA and ECG) due to accumulated debt 
burdens, high cost of operations and higher levels of inefficiencies. 
Additionally, the sector faces poor tariff collection by ECG. 
About US$4billion, investments in power sector infrastructure are 
required in Ghana over the next 10years to make up for the current deficit and 
upgrade existing infrastructure. IPPs are key sources of generation sector 
investments in Ghana but are constraint by lack of reliable gas supply, poor 
regulatory and governance frameworks, lack of credible off-takers, lack of 
credible regulatory procedures to ensure payments increasing investments risk 
(World Bank, 2015). 
ECG and NEDCo suffered from subsidised electricity tariffs to 
consumers over the years in their tariff collection responsibilities. ECG is a large 
centralized state entity with serious weaknesses in its management, corporate 
governance and institutional culture. Residential and commercial tariffs 
collections are low in Ghana mainly due to technical and non-technical reasons 
(transmission and distribution losses, pilfery, poor economic tariffs, poor tariffs 




revenues from non-residential consumers who account for 56% of sales 
revenues even though they account for 12% of ECG sales unit. PURC failed 
attempts to increase retails tariffs resulted in ECG recording losses of 
US$44million in 2012 and US$60million in 2013(World Bank, 2013). 
Table 12: ECG Income Statement 2010 - 2014 
In Ghana Cedis Millions 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total Revenues  975  1,207  
         
1,422  1,939  
         
3,114  
        
Power purchases (591)  (693)  (817)  (1,189)  (1,826)  
Transmission Costs (119)  (171)  (198)  (218)  (329)  
Distribution, operation 
and maintenance (67)  (100)  (126)  (184)  (210)  
Transport costs (11)  (16)  (21)  (31)  (32)  
Overhead costs (mostly 
staff costs) (73)  (118)  (156)  (203)  (239)  
EBITDA 115  109  
            
105  114  
            
478  
Depreciation and 
Amortization (76)  (150)  (199)  (237)  (285)  
EBIT 39  (40)  (94)  (123)  
            
193  
Net Interest 1  (2)  
                
3  (12)  (66)  
Foreign Exchange 
Difference 11  (15)  (17)  (78)  (215)  
Tax Credit/Expense (46)  34  (28)  (40)  (2)  
        
Net Income 6  (24)  
      
(136)  (254)  (90)  
Source: World Bank, (2015). 
Revenues for ECG more than tripled US$690million, which are mainly 
due to increases of about 45% volumes, billed and 112% tariffs increments. 
Increased receivables from public sector also increased to US$256million in 




US$1.1billion at the end of 2014 as ECG failed to pay VRA for power 
deliveries. ECG made losses from 2011 to 2014 as indicated on Table 12. 
VRA makes twice as much profits when they sale electricity to the 
mining companies compared to sales to ECG. VRA profitability is linked to 
sales to the mining sector. VRA operating expenses are linked to hydrological 
factors: water levels in the hydro dams, VRA buys more LCO for the thermal 
plants and the lower crude oil prices, the lower VRA operating expenses. 
Table 13: VRA Income Statements 2010-2014 
In Ghana Cedis Millions 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total Revenues 
      
1,114  
         
1,159  
         
1,357  
         
1,516  
         
2,207  
        
Hydro expenses (10)  (15)  (19)  (24)  (31)  
Thermal expenses (752)  (618)  (796)  (979)  (973)  
Electricity purchases 
            
-    
               
-    (634)  (608)  (569)  
Admin expenses (166)  (202)  (208)  (217)  (436)  
Other (55)  (72)  
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
EBITDA 
         
131  
            
252  (300)  (311)  
           
198  
Depreciation  (78)  (112)  (75)  (105)  (158)  
EBIT 
           
53  
            
140  (375)  (416)  
              
40  
Net Interest (30)  (35)  (49)  (75)  (320)  
Foreign Exchange Difference 
         
17  (22)  
                
2  (121)  (481)  
Tax Credit/Expense 
            
-    
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
Net Income before 
Government subsidy 
           
41  
              
83  (421)  (612)  (761)  
Government subsidy 
            
-    
               
-    
            
361  
            
664  
            
298  
Net Income 
           
41  
              
83  (61)  
              
52  (462)  




VRA has historically been in low debt, but in 2014 due to ECG non-
payments VRA has gone for short and long-term debts to offsets their fuel 
liabilities. VRA cash flows suffers from late payments by ECG. By the end of 
2014 VRAs, receivables from ECG reached US$0.9billion of revenues. The 
increases in these receivables resulted to VRA negative cash flows from 
operations since 2011, including Ghana Government subsidies. VRAs debt by 
the end of 2014 stood at US$1.1billion of which half are short-term debts. VRA 
viability and profitability are unstable and inconsistent as indicated on Table 13 
and ECG is the single largest company indebted to VRA.  
IPPs are exposed to the risk of the inefficiencies of both VRA and 
ECG. IPPs are as well exposed to the risk accumulated debt between VRA and 
ECG since VRA is the purchaser of IPPs generated electricity. Alternatively 
electricity generated from the IPPs can be channelled to the mining companies 
which are having the ability and willingness to pay for secured power. This will 
also serve as a guarantee for IPPs power and therefore reduce the risk of non-
payments of IPPs power generated in Ghana and this could be a solution to 
attracting more power sector investments. 
VRA and ECG are increasingly becoming non-creditworthy off-takers 
of wholesale electricity and gas supply in Ghana, which is a major obstacle for 
VRA to reach financial closure with new IPPs for power generation and gas 
suppliers (World Bank, 2015). Table 14 indicates the debt accumulated in the 
Electricity sector as this hampers guaranteed and timely payments for power 




Table 14: Accumulated Debt in the Power Sector in Ghana 
Debt Description 
1. US$1.1billion Public sector liabilities of electricity bills to ECG 
2. ECG owes 60% liabilities  To power suppliers: IPPs and GRIDCO  
3. US$330million and   
    US$180million 
VRA owes to three major banks (Ecobank, 
Stanbic Bank and Standard Charted Bank) 
4. US$162million  VRA owes N-Gas and WAGPCo for gas supply 
5. US$250million  Sunon Asogli owes VRA for gas supply  
6. US$306.10million  VRA owes Ghana National Gas Company for gas 
Source: Ministry of Finance-Ghana (2017); Ministry of Energy (2015).  
Inefficiencies in state Institutions such as ECG and VRA, PURC, 
Ministry of Energy and Energy Commission and the public sector delays in 
electricity tariffs non-payment as well contributes to the power sector 
challenges. Electricity is considered a public good6, provided by the state, the 
public sector is unable to pay economic tariffs or delaying electricity tariffs 
payments. Alternative arrangements can be made to supply electricity from less 
expensive sources such as hydrodams to the public sector and the residential 
sectors. Whilst the more expensive thermal plants can be offered to the mining 
companies and otherss who are willing and able to pay the more expensive 
electricity tariffs.Government can as well offer subsidies to rural communities 
and urban poor communities through off-grid solar PVs or direct subsidizes of 
lower electricity tariffs.  
The gas industry is hit severely by this accumulated debt from VRA, 
which is the monopsony buyer of domestically produced gas and is unable to 
                                                          
6 Public Good (nonrival and nonexclusive): economist regards goods or service as having public 
good characteristics if onces they are created they are available to all consumers and cannot be 
withheld from one individual without withholding it from all. Nonrival is when additional 
consumers do not add to cost. Nonexclusive is when people cannot be excluded from consuming 




pay West Africa Gas Pipeline Company (WAPGCo), Nigerian-Gas (N-Gas) and 
Ghana Gas Company Limited (GNGC) for gas purchases. Additional natural 
gas capacities from the Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU) for 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) importation are required. The constraints in the 
electricity sector need to be reduced for the sector to be viable. 
The Government of Ghana through the IMF credit facility in 2015 and 
the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Compact II agreed to reduce the 
short-term payment arrears of ECG and introduce reforms into electricity 
retailing in Ghana. This will enable ECG to reduce its debt to major suppliers 
particularly VRA (World Bank, 2015). This is an important signal to the current 
situation in the natural gas industry and the pathway to restoring credibility and 
eliminating the risk of non-payments and debt accumulation.  
Therefore, the financial viability of the major state utilities in the 
downstream electricity sector is required for the viability of the gas industry. 
Additionally, the downstream segment is the main source of revenue 
mobilisation for the electricity and gas industries. Unless economic tariffs for 
power are charged with full cost recovery for the private sector, attracting 
additional IPPs and sustaining adequate and reliable natural gas supplies will be 
problematic in Ghana. 
On the other hand, Ghana has one of the highest retail electricity tariffs 
US$0.15/kWh far above the average price US$0.04/kWh in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(African Centre for Energy Policy, 2017). This makes industrial development 




in tariffs to economic levels.  
This high cost of electricity tariffs comes from short-term power 
generation facilities through emergency power barges, which depend on liquid 
fuels and the inefficiencies in state power utilities causing high technical and 
non-technical losses. An abundant supply of domestic natural gas resources in 
Ghana is seen as among other solutions a panacea to restoring stability and 
delivering lower cost energy in Ghana. The next section throws more light on 
the emerging gas industry in Ghana. 
2.5.0. Natural Gas Industry Investment Outlook in Ghana 
The total natural gas reserves in Ghana are estimated at 6.4Trillion Cubic 
Feet (TCF), made up of 2.2TCF of associated gas and 4.2TCF of non-associated 
gas (Ministry of Energy, 2012). Since 2010, Ghana has been in the process of 
developing a local gas industry through building midstream and downstream 
infrastructure to utilise associated gas from the Jubilee Field. Other gas fields 
such as the TEN and the Sankofa Gas Projects (SGP) are accelerated to meet 
local demand for power generation. 
Within a short spectrum (2010-2017), the gas industry in Ghana 
witnessed massive investments in US$7.9billion from World Bank and ENI-
Ghana investment into SGP; over US$1billion Chinese Development Bank loan 
facility into the construction of the “Ghana Gas Infrastructure Project”, a 
150,000MMBtu/d processing plant and a 114KM transmission pipeline (Ghana 
National Gas Company, 2015). Additionally, Quantum Power Ltd and the 




construction of a Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU). Also, a total of 
US$4.9billion was invested into the expansion of the Jubilee Fields and 
developments of the TEN projects (Tullow plc, 2015). Meanwhile, US$1billion 
is committed to building a 400MW Bridge Power Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
(LPG) fired project as indicated on Table 15. In sum, an estimated 
US$18.5billion is invested in developing the nascent gas industry in Ghana. 
Table 15: Total Natural Gas Industry Investments Cost in Ghana  
Natural Gas Projects in Ghana Estimated Investment Cost (US$ 
billion) 
Jubilee Fields 3.15 
TEN Project 4.9 
Sankofa Gas Project 7.9 
Ghana Gas Project 1 
FSRU 0.55 
LPG Power Plant 1 
Total 18.5 
Source: Ministry of Finance-Ghana, (2017). 
The entire natural gas value chain in Ghana is state-controlled and the 
private sector argues that the current structure will not be economically and 
technically efficient for operations since this structure is tied to a debt-ridden 
electricity sector, which is subject to state inefficiencies. Additionally, 
inadequate and weak institutional arrangements, lack of a regulatory framework 
for investments, an inefficient local gas/electricity pricing system, 
unwillingness to pay and the high risk in infrastructure investments are 





2.5.1. Natural Gas Supply Outlook in Ghana 
Ghana’s domestic natural gas supply comes from four confirmed oil 
and gas projects: Jubilee fields, Greater Jubilee, TEN, SGP and WAGP. Gas 
production from the Jubilee fields is estimated at 100MMscf/d, TEN is expected 
to produce 50MMsf/d beginning in 2018 and expected to remain unchanged for 
six years (Tullow PLC, 2015). SGP is expected to produce at peak of 
180MMscf/d of non-associated gas and will remain so beyond 2020. The erratic 
gas deliveries from Nigeria through the WAGP are between 60MMscf/d and 
30MMscfd and prospecting for attaining 120MMscfd contractual deliveries in 
the future remains uncertain due to gas shortages and infrastructure constraints 
in Nigeria (World Bank, 2015).  
However, an average 30MMscf/d of gas supplies from WAGP is 
projected, with the potential to be ramped up to 120MMscf/d or more if, for 
example, all debts accrued are paid. FSRUs are constructed and projected to 
deliver 250MMscf/d of gas to power 230MW VRA thermal plant (GNPC, 
2017). The total expected domestic gas supplies as indicated on Table 16 are 
estimated to ramp up to about 599MMscf/day in 2020 (World Bank, 2015). 
Table 16: Projected Gas Supply in Ghana up to 2020 (MMscf/d) 
 Natural Gas Supply Sources 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Jubilee Fields - 83 104 104 104 103 98 
TEN - - - - 50 50 50 
Sankofa - - - - 158 171 171 
Total of Domestic Production - 83 104 104 312 324 319 
WAGP Imports 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
FSRU-LNG Importation         250 250 250 
Total Natural Gas Supply  30 196 134 134 592 604 599 




2.5.2. Natural Gas Demand Outlook in Ghana 
Thermal electricity generation capacity currently installed in Ghana 
stands at 65% of the current generation mix estimated at 2,974.5MW. Sunon 
Asogli Phase 1 and Asia Middle East Resource Investments (AMERI) IPP are 
the only “gas-only” 360MW and 220MW plants respectively. Other IPPs 
include Mines Reserve Plant (MRP) (80MW), Tema Thermal 2 Power Plant 
(TT2PP) (110MW), Kpong Thermal Power Plant (KTPP) (200MW), Sunon 
Asogoli Phase 2 (180MW) and about 76.5% (1550MW) of the planned capacity 
of 2025MW are combined cycle gas turbines. 
 An estimated 2,700MW thermal capacity depends on either gas or LCO 
as fuel in Ghana. Whilst about 580MW (AMERI and Sunnon Asogli IPP 1) are 
“gas only” plants, total gas demand in the medium term up to 2020 for the “gas 
only” plants is 370MMscf/d. The World Bank (2015) projected a persistent gas 
supply deficit to 2020 with a maximum deficit of 165MMscf/d in 2017. 
Therefore, current gas demand requirements in Ghana is estimated at 
535MMscf/day (370MMscf/d medium-term demand plus the projected deficit 
of 165MMscf/d).  
Medium-term gas supply is estimated at 599MMscf/day while demand 
is at 535MMscf/d indicating a 64MMscf/d of gas surplus from 2017. The 
64MMscf/d gas surplus projected in the medium term can be committed to 
developing alternative large-scale consumers and these are sufficient volumes 
to build an integrated gas-to-fertilizer plant. However, actual gas demand in the 




stream of the committed thermal plants capacities’ gas requirements as 
feedstock for industries such as fertilizer plants, petrochemical industries, 
small-scale industrial consumers and other industrial purposes.  
The demand for gas in Ghana will outpace supply in the long-run after 
2023 when domestic gas production begins to decline. Ghana will probably 
need to depend extensively on imported gas from Nigeria and LNG or transit to 
renewable energies for electricity generation. However, due to the intermittency 
and unreliability of renewable energy supply in providing base-load electricity, 
the gas industry will continue to be the fuel bedrock of Ghana’s energy sector. 
2.5.3. Gas Industry Institutional Arrangements in Ghana 
There are several International Oil Companies (IOCs) (Kosmos 
Energy, Tullow Plc, Anardako, Petro SA, ENI, ExxonMobil, Vitol, and Hess) 
investing in upstream infrastructure and financing of oil and gas projects in 
Ghana. Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) through joint venture 
agreement with these IOCs is the National Oil Company (NOC) and upstream 
gas aggregator. 
Public sector players such as the Ministry of Energy is responsible for 
setting policies, monitoring and oversees all petroleum activities. The 
Petroleum Commission (PC) is responsible for the regulation of upstream 
production of oil and gas and grants licenses. The Ghana National Gas Company 
Limited (GNGC) is incorporated in midstream to build and operate a Gas 
Processing Plant (GPP) and transmission pipelines and is now a subsidiary of 




technical gas infrastructure regulator.  
The Bulk Oil Storage and Transportation Company (BOST) is engaged 
in the transportation and storage of oil and gas. Energy Commission issued 
BOST the National Gas Transmission Utility (NGTU) License to operate all gas 
transmission pipelines in an open access and non-discriminatory basis. 
However, in practice, this is yet to be applied due to regulatory and structural 
constraints. The Public Utilities and Regulatory Commission (PURC) is the 
economic/financial regulator of gas, responsible for setting tariffs using the 
Automatic Tariff Adjustment Formulae, and sets transmission pipeline tariffs. 
The West African Gas Pipeline Company operates the West African Gas 
Pipeline to transmit gas from Nigeria to Ghana. Two Independent Power Plants, 
Sunon Asogli Power Plant and the Takoradi International Company (TICO) are 
connected to WAGP. Figure 2 indicates both state and private sector and 











    




The private sector sees severe structural constraints in the gas industry, 
in that, there is a single upstream gas buyer (GNPC), selling to a single 
downstream buyer (VRA) and restricting participation to state entities i.e. state 
monopoly. There is lack of regulatory framework for the entire gas industry. 
There are, too many governmental institutions and regulatory agencies in the 
gas industry. 
2.6.0. Chapter Summary 
The development and efficient management of the nascent gas industry 
will lead to stability in electricity generation and promote a harmonised energy 
sector, which will propel economic development in Ghana.  A stable gas supply 
condition would promote the industrialisation agenda of Ghana.  With a stable 
energy sector, reliable and cheap electricity, the Ghanaian economy is likely to 
return to its usual growth rates and sustained development. This, in effect, will 
lead to the realisation of the long-term aim of attaining a higher middle-income 













Chapter three (3) focuses on the review of literature relating to the 
development of the nascent gas industry in Ghana. This chapter is divided into 
three main parts. The first section discusses the theoretical literature and the 
second section, the empirical literature. The final section discusses the three 
strands of the study, which relate to the three study objectives. 
3.1.0. Theoretical Underpinning of the Study 
In recent times, attempts have been made to define the relationship 
between industry structure, regulation and infrastructure investment decisions 
in the gas industry, especially with the current debates on market liberalisation. 
These have led to scholars relying on various theories to help explain current 
occurrences such as the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm and 
the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory.  
3.1.1. Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and the Gas Industry 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm is designed to analyse 
and contextualise the competitive condition of industries by examining how the 
underlying structure (the factors that determine market competitiveness) of an 
industry are related to and affects the conduct (behaviour) and performance of 
firms (Bain, 1956; Klint and Sjoberg, 2003). SCP emphasises the interrelation 
between industry structure, regulation and performance (Panagiotou, 2006; 




The SCP paradigm states that market structure and the number and 
relative sizes of firms in an industry drive conduct like output decisions and 
pricing behaviour. Such firm conducts subsequently yield an industry overall 
economic performance such as efficiency and profitability (Spanjer, 2009; 
Panagiotou, 2013). The SCP framework supports policies for structuring 
industries in developing competitive markets (Panagiotou, 2006; Akher and 
Barcellors, 2013). There is a strong connection between investment decisions, 
regulation and structure (Klint and Sjoberg, 2003). Moreover, there is a stable 
and casual relationship between industry structure7, regulations8 and 
investments. In essence, once industry structure is determined, regulations can 
be defined, which, in turn stimulates investments decisions (Panagiotou, 2006).  
Slaba (2008) employed the SCP model to analyse the liberalisation of 
European Union natural gas markets vision versus its realities. The gas industry 
exhibits features of market failure in scope and scale economies, inspiring the 
application of the theory of natural monopoly. Vertical integration (VI) of gas 
companies was considered the optimal gas market structure to enable the 
realisation of scope economies. The traditional VI are contested due to their 
ineffectiveness and suggestions were made for liberalised structures.  
                                                          
7 Industry structure is described as the total number of buyers and sellers, degree of vertical 
integration, homogeneity of the products, and the cost components in a particular industry 
(Klint and Sjobert, 2003). 
8 Regulation means government impose control on particular aspect of business related to 
economic regulations which includes control over tariff structure, quality of service standards, 
access conditions to networks, entry and exit conditions for participants and investment 





To introduce new market structures such as competition, there was the 
need to change market regulations and industry performance. Among the reform 
suggestions were laws to break the monopoly in the commercial activities of 
gas supply and imports and enforce third party access to gas networks.  
The SCP paradigm is used by Slaba (2008) to explain the on-going 
occurrences in the gas sector reforms as basic conditions in the gas market 
influence market structure.  Basic conditions and market structure influence the 
conduct of market players; thus, further determining sector performance. The 
consequences run in the reverse (performance influences market structure and 
conduct) as indicated on Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Basic scheme of the Structure-Conduct-Performance Model 
 
 
Source: Slaba (2008).  
The basic conditions are related to regulations and the economic 
framework within which the gas industry operates (vertical integration or 
competition). Gradually, the gas market is opened and gas customers are eligible 
to choose gas suppliers. There is a fair access to competing infrastructure subject 
to regulations and support for infrastructure integration. In addition, there are 
independent regulatory bodies to harmonise and supervise fair access to 
infrastructure and transparent setting of access tariffs.  
Market structure is the number and size of firms in the industry, i.e. 




suppliers, shippers, traders’ ability to enter the market, a decrease in 
concentration of one national company, customer’s eligibility to choose 
suppliers and the independent regulatory body with sufficient competencies. 
With Conduct, network operators compete for gas suppliers and invest in new 
interconnections, secure fair Third Party Access (TPA), diversify gas sources 
and transport routes and customers are able to choose suppliers with suitable 
products, services and prices. There are, also, harmonised and effective network 
access regulations and price setting. 
Industry performance, on the other hand, relates to the objectives set for 
the industry: effective competition in gas supply, lower gas prices, higher 
quality and diversity of services and products offered, higher security of supply, 
transparent network tariffs, fair access to network and effective competition in 
the area of network. Peng and Poudineh (2015) developed an analytical 
framework based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance-Regulation (SCPR) 
paradigm, which aligns the interconnection of gas-to-power development in the 
UK for thorough identification and discussion of sector structure, infrastructure, 
market and regulatory drivers. Two structures in the gas-to-power industry were 
identified: complete centralisation and decentralisation.  
Centralisation involves the state-owned vertical integration where a state 
entity controls gas production, imports/exports, assets and downstream 
consumption. In contrast, complete decentralisation, involves all non-networks 
such as production, imports/exports, storage and power generation segments 




distribution networks are owned by regulated monopolies. The regulatory 
bodies include the ministry concerned and a regulatory authority more or less 
independent from the ministry.  
The regulatory authority is responsible for the day-to-day monitoring of 
the structure of the industry ensuring that it is perfectly decentralised to promote 
competition, coordination occurring within markets especially ensuring cost 
recovery, promoting investments, and ensuring that governments and investor 
expectations are met. 
Infrastructure Investments recognised that domestic gas/power 
production generates higher risk and to proceed with infrastructure investment 
requires cost recovery for network investments integrated into the overall 
gas/electricity tariff payable by end-users. Three lessons are learned from the 
use of the SCP in interrelated gas-to-power studies. Firstly, Gas-to-power is an 
interdependent environment and any weak link can cancel out performance 
improvements in other segments. Secondly, liberalisation is not an end but a 
means to increase operational efficiency and investments in infrastructure 
development. Finally, political conditions greatly influence the energy policy of 
a country, including the natural gas industry policy.  
The SCP framework confirms the interaction between industry 
structure, regulations and infrastructure investments in the gas-to-power sector 
development. The SCP framework is not a fully specified theory but its value 
lies in establishing the interaction of structure, regulations and investments in 




theory, described as a less analytical and a more descriptive theory (Lopez, 
1999; Maskin and Tirole, 1988).  
3.1.2. Transaction Cost Economics and the Natural Gas Industry 
A New Institutional Economics Theory, Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) gives importance to transactions and institutions that govern the 
performance of industries (Coase, 1937; Coase 1988; Williamson, 1992; 
Buchanan, 2001). A transaction is said to take place whenever a good or service 
passes from one party to another (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 2010). TCE takes 
a broader perspective to determine the performance of an industry considering 
the institutional environment and regulatory governance (Williamson, 2000). 
The most powerful extension and development of TCE9 has been that of 
Williamson (1975, 1986, 1996, 2007 and 2010). TCE has been extensively used 
for analysis of vertical integration decisions, networks and governance forms in 
the natural gas industry and to provide understanding of the structure, conduct 
and performance of transmission networks (Martins et al., 2010; Glachant et al., 
2014; von Hirshhausen et al., 2012; Arora, 2012). TCE provides both theoretical 
and dynamic context of institutional specifics, framework of analysis and 
regulatory actions for the natural gas industry (Correlje and Groenewegena, 
2006). TCE is an empirical success story (Williamson, 1996) and seems to be 
                                                          
9 Correlje and Groenewegena (2006) describe transaction cost to include the direct cost of 
writing, monitoring and enforcing contracts, plus the costs associated with the risk if ex ante 
investments having an ex post performance that is lower than anticipated, as a consequence of 





the most suitable theoretical framework for analysing the natural gas industry 
(Arora, 2012; Crocker and Masten, 1996; Williansom, 2005).  
Williamson (1981; 2007) identified three basic units of TCE: asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency of transactions responsive to bounded 
rationality and opportunism as explained on Table 17. Asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and frequency of transactions are the main drivers influencing the 
extent of transaction cost in the gas industry (Williamson, 1998; Ruster and 
Newmann, 2006). Williamson (2011) posited that, under the conditions that the 
assumptions hold, asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency determines what 
kind of transaction cost would be generated. When a transaction cost will be 
carried out in a market and if an asset is very specific to a particular transaction 














Table 17: Transaction Cost Attributes and Description 
TCE Attributes Description 
Asset Specificity Refers to the extent to which assets are specialised to a specific transaction 
and can be used only at lower value to the alternative application. Or these 
are durable investments that are undertaken in support of a particular 
transaction, the opportunity cost of which investment is much lower in best 
alternative uses or by alternative users should the original transaction be 
prematurely terminated. These assets cannot be redeployed to alternative 
uses without loss of productive value. Example; physical, human, site 
specific, dedicated, brand name, capital, and temporal (episodic) forms. 
Uncertainty Information about the past, current and future states is not perfectly known 
for various reasons. Uncertainty arises from not knowing about future 




Relates to behaviour that is intendedly rational but only limitedly so; which 
is protected through vertical integration.  
Opportunism When individuals (companies) seek self-interest with guile, fragility of 
motive and these activities are both subtly and overtly deceitful ex ante 
and ex post to agreeing on contracts. The incompleteness of contracts 
attracts opportunism and were it not for opportunism all behaviour could 
be rule governed. Without opportunistic behaviour, contracts would have 




A larger frequency or larger volumes of transactions, gives rise to 
justification for alternative governance structures and the degree of 
frequency should range from occasional to recurrent. 
Source: Adapted from Williamson (2010); Spanjer (2009). 
3.1.3. The TCE Framework  
The concept of TCE is adapted for the study of the nascent gas industry 
in Ghana in understanding why a particular industry structure, regulatory 
governance arrangement and infrastructure investments decisions are 
considered. TCE allows the identification of the most economically efficient 
governance structure10 based on regulatory arrangements and investments 
attributes (Williamson 1979). Williamson noted that, a simple governance 
structure should be used for simple transactions and complex governance 
                                                          
10 Governance structure: is the institutional matrix within which transactions are negotiated 




structures should be used for complex transactions. The use of complex 
structures for simple transactions incurs unwanted cost and the use of a simple 
structure, for complex transactions results in a strain. The three most important 
characteristics of TCE are asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of 
transactions and their interaction determines the governance structure and 
regulatory arrangements in the industry. 
Gas transactions are asset specific and cannot be redeployed without 
losing value, and when a buyer and seller enters into a transaction, the suppliers 
are effectively “locked-into” that specific transaction to a significant degree. 
The buyer, thus, cannot turn to alternative suppliers to obtain the product on 
more favourable terms since the cost of supply from unspecified sources is 
considered great (Williamson, 1979) and the buyer is “locked-in” (committed 
to) the transaction.  
Transaction idiosyncrasies evolved between the buyer and seller in cost 
savings, economics of scale and scope. Specialised language develops as 
communication and experiences are accumulated. As nuances are signalled and 
received in a sensitive way, institutional and personal trust relations evolve. 
These idiosyncratic relationships are transformed into bilateral monopoly 
relationships. Frequent spot trading is possible when these transactions become 
standardised. By assumption, cost economies in production are realised in these 
idiosyncratic relationships only if the supplier invests in special purpose plants 




the contract execution. The assurance of continuous transactions from both 
parties encourages investments (Williamson, 1979). 
These bilateral relationships result in long-term contracts, which are 
considered incomplete due to bounded rationality. Maintaining consistency 
poses challenges, which may require appropriate specified state-contingencies 
in regulations though the absence of the hazard of opportunism would have 
eliminated the difficulties through faultless adaptation of sequence by both 
parties (Williamson, 1979). Given, however, the unenforceability of terms in 
these long-term contracts and bilateral monopoly transactions efficient 
adaptation, options are given to both contracting parties to benefit from 
incremental gains outside the contracts to prevent self-interest seeking and 
opportunism. Therefore, governance structures that provide these flexibilities 
are needed (Willaimson, 1979).  
In developing alternative governance structures, it is important to 
consider the cost economisation of these transactions, and this essentially takes 
two forms: economising production expenses and economising transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1979). To the extent that transaction costs are negligible buying 
(competition) rather than self-production, vertical integration is the most cost 
effective means of procurement to benefit from economies of scale and ensure 
collective pooling and full-realisation of resources. A shift in one governance 
structure to another is likely to result in challenges. Figure 4 indicates the two-
three matrix, which describes the six types of transactions to which governance 




On governance structures: three structures are considered: non-
transaction specific, semi-specific and highly specific. For the non-specific, 
faceless buyers and sellers meet for instant exchange of standardised goods and 
services at equilibrium prices and by contrast, highly specified structures are 
tailored to the special needs of the transactions. The semi-structured fall in 
between (Williamson, 1979) and several propositions are drawn:   
1. Highly standardised transactions do not require specialised 
governance structures. 
2. Only recurrent transactions will support highly specialised 
governance structures. 
3. Occasional transactions of a non-standardised kind will not support 
transaction specific governance structures and require attention. 
In the absence of standardised markets, the parties can design 
alternative patterns of future relationships based on different governance 
arrangements. The assumption is that recurrent and discrete transactions are 
well suited for more competitive market structures. Different governance 
structures are what protects each party against the opportunism of the opposite 
party (Williamson, 1979).  
The investments characteristics (nonspecific, mixed and idiosyncratic) 
of transactions in the gas industry will determine the type of structures and 
regulations to use. For instance, in trilateral governance structures, there are 
occasional transactions to mix to a highly idiosyncratic kind. Once parties enter 




through to completion.  
Figure 4: Basic scheme of the TCE Framework 
Source: Adapted from Williamson (1979). 
Special investments are kept in place in case the opportunity cost is 
lower in alternative uses and transfers to others causes inordinate difficulties.  
Transactions conducted under certainty are relatively easy to manage except 
when there are time differences in reaching their equilibrium; any governance 
structure is suitable. The uncertainty of intermediate or high degree is relevant 
in transactions, as occasional and nonstandard transactions are considered 
significant in access uncertainty. Bilateral governance structures will need to 
give way for unified structures as uncertainty increases for recurrent 
transactions (Williamson, 1979).  
On regulations, special governance structures are needed to the degree 
efficient supply is necessary to maintain transactions between buyers and sellers 




1. Protect the interest of prospective parties and  
2. Adapt the relationship to changing circumstances. 
 Regulations are mostly needed when the governance structure adapted 
has more natural monopoly features to protect investors (sellers) and buyers’ 
security of expectations provide adaptive sequential decision-making processes 
(Willaimson, 1979). In addition, Rate-of-return regulations have these periodic 
review features.  
The TCE framework for the gas industry as adapted from Williamson 
(1979; 1995) has two complementary parts: first, dealing with background 
conditions of industry development in Ghana and the second, with governance 
mechanisms. The institutional environment is the set of fundamental, political, 
social and legal ground rules that establish the basis for production, exchange 
and distribution activities of gas. Institutional arrangements between economic 
units that govern the ways in which these units can corporate and/or compete 
provide a structure within which its members can corporate or a mechanism that 
can effect change in laws and property rights (Williamson, 1995). 
This is usually a bottom-up approach to economic organisation, where 
the interest of individual firms in the industry influences the institutional 
structures and governance arrangements in the gas industry. Individual firms, 
the governance structure and the institutional environment relate to each other 
as shown on Figure 5. The solid arrows show the main effects and the dashed 




The institutional environment comprises of the rules of the game as a 
vital component of the gas industry. It is easy to assign too much weight to the 
institutional environment and too little to the institutions of governance. TCE 
also concerns regulations and it is an interdisciplinary undertaking that joins 
law, economics and organisation.  
The law defines the rules of the game; organisational theories are 
implicated in behavioural assumptions and relates to the behaviour of 
organisations. Organisations have a life of their own and undergo inter-temporal 
transformations that need to be identified and factored into the analysis. 
Economics provides the core logic, in that, the analysis works out of the 
“rational spirit” and the objective is to examine “incomplete” contracts in their 
entirety (Williamson, 1995). 
The individual firm: the pressing need for the individuals are to be 
described in workable realistic terms and bounded rationally, where the firms 
seek their own interest with guile and fragility of motive and reason, which TCE 
terms as opportunism. The firms in the gas industry seek profit motives. TCE 
avers that there are different dimensions of frequency with which transactions 
recur, the uncertainties they are subject to, the degree of asset specificity and 
the ease of measurements. These are important to the governance of contractual 
relationships (Williamson, 1995).  
The performance of these individual firms send a feedback signal to the 
institutional environment to inform the governance structure to adopt. TCE is 




more feasible forms of governance structures (Willaimson, 1995). TCE is more 
microanalytical, self-conscious of behavioural assumptions, introduces the 
economic importance of asset specificity, regards the firms as a governance 
structure rather than a production function and places more weight on ex post 
institutions of contracts.  








Source: Adapted from Williamson (1979). 
Ex post,11 safeguards can take several forms of which the most obvious 
is common ownership. If faced with difficulties from contracting parties, this 
may be substituted for the internal organisation of the market. Ex ante 
safeguards, as well, can be fashioned to signal credible commitments and restore 
integrity to transactions (Willaimson, 1985). Further, Klein (1999) observed 
that the probability of observing a more integrated governance structure 
                                                          
11 Ex post cost contracting include: the maladaptation cost incurred when transactions draft out 
of alignment in relations to the ‘shifting contract curve’; the haggling cost incurred if bilateral 
efforts are made to correct ex post misalignment; the set up and running cost associate with 
governance structures to which disputes are referred and the bonding cost of effecting secure 




depends positively on the amount or value of the relationship-specific assets 
involved. These include the significant levels of asset specificity, the degree of 
uncertainty about the future of the relationship, the complexity of the transaction 
and the frequency of trade. In this instance, governance structure is the 
dependent variable whilst asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity and 
frequency are the independent variables. 
Investment hold-up or investment obstruction relates to relationship-
specific investments (Klein, 1999). This is where the investor is tied to a specific 
transaction with limited options into the near future, which is the best-known 
example of an ex-post contractual hazard (Spanjer, 2009). A governance 
structure capable of eliminating this investment hold-up problem is vertical or 
lateral integration (Klein, 1999; Spanjer, 2009). Less extreme governance 
structures include long-term contracting, partial ownership agreements for both 
parties to invest in offsetting relationship-specific investments and several other 
governance structures may be applied (Klein, 1999). 
TCE holds that parties tend to choose the governance structure that best 
controls underinvestment and protect their relationship-specific investments at 
least-cost given the particulars of the interactions (Klein, 1999). And the 
preferable arrangements of governance structures are those that best fit the 
character of the transactions involved and the broader context in which they take 
place (CIEP, 2006) such as the extent to which parties are lock-in as a 




The interplay of regulation with investments, irreversibility, uncertainty 
and risk determines whether a regulatory regime will create a governance 
structure that will sufficiently attract investments (Spanjer, 2009). The choice 
between competitive and integrated structures are influenced by these 
interplays. TCE takes into account ex-post adaptation problems and potential 
inefficiencies in ex ante investments risk, which provides a comparative 
institutional choice approach in analysing alternative governance arrangements 
(Joskow, 2010). 
Gas network infrastructures are dedicated and site-specific assets and 
because of the existence of economics of scope and scale, they are considered 
common pool resources12 (Hallack and Vazguez, 2014). The use of these 
infrastructures raises challenges on how to coordinate different users. Allowing 
third party access to these infrastructures can enable redeployeability of access 
capacity (Ruster and Newmann, 2006), as these infrastructures such as 
transmission pipelines and FSRUs are excludable13 and subtractable14 (Hallack 
and Vazguez, 2014).  
The characteristics of network infrastructure in the gas industry are a 
source of severe transaction cost (Hallack and Vazguez, 2014). TCE is used to 
deploy efficient market regulations. The risk attributes of specific infrastructure 
investments and the ex post risk profile of different markets may suggest the 
                                                          
12 Common pool resource theory is applied to understanding of natural gas networks which 
explains the use of the same infrastructure by different users (Hallack and Vazguez, 2014). 
13 Excludable: as it is physically relatively easy to exclude individuals to use gas infrastructure  
14 Subtractible: As the use of gas, network infrastructure decreases the available capacity 




use of a mix regulatory approach and competitive policy (Correlje and 
Groenewegen, 2006). 
Arora (2012) stated that, the TCE approach seems more applicable to 
the gas industry as compared to Agency theory or the property rights theory. 
TCE provides a comprehensive theoretical underpinning for institutional 
analysis, the determination of firm boundaries as well as the interrelation of 
industry structure, regulatory framework and governance arrangements in the 
gas chain analysis (Joskow, 2000; Tadelis and Williamson, 2010). The TCE 
framework is adapted for this study and seen an appropriate theoretical basis for 
the analysis of investment and risk decisions, analysis of network operations, 
setting open access rules, coordination of industry structures and regulatory 
governance in the nascent gas industry in Ghana. 
3.2.0. Empirical Review of the Development of Gas Industries 
The empirical review is structured into three sections: the first section 
considers gas industry development experiences from developed countries’ 
perspective; the second, from the African countries’ perspective and the final 
section, Ghana. The purpose of the empirical review is to:  
 Supplement the theoretical review with evidence from the gas 
industry; 
  Help identify the methodological trends and to select the most 
appropriate research methods (sampling, data collection and 
analytical techniques) and 




3.2.1. Gas Industry Development: Developed Countries Perspectives 
This section reviews empirical literature of the integrated studies of 
structural, regulatory and infrastructure investment decisions of the gas industry 
from developed countries’ perspectives. von Hirschausen (2008) and Peng and 
Poundineh (2015) recognised the need for integrated studies between 
restructuring, regulations, infrastructure investment decisions and supply 
security in the gas industry to provide a holistic framework analysis for USA 
and UK gas industries respectively. 
Structurally15, in the past 25years (see Box 1 & 2), the developed world 
witnessed the gas industry go through series of liberalisation in breaking-up 
monopolistic, vertically integrated structures into competitive markets and the 
introduction of sector-specific regulations. State-controlled utilities were used 
to facilitate the necessary investments in the industry (Spanjer, 2008). However, 
monopolistic structures, over time, lost their purpose so the industry was 
deregulated16. Some segments (production/supply and consumption) were open 
to competition whilst transmission and distribution sectors were maintained as 
a monopoly subjected to regulation (Andrade, 2014).  
Aguilera et al. (2014) succinctly capture the structural arrangements of 
the developed gas industries saying North America has a relatively highly 
                                                          
15 The objective of structural change in the energy sector is to allow competition in production, 
services and retail segments and regulate essential facilities (Correlje and Groenewegen, 2006). 
16 Deregulation was typically the separation of potentially competitive segments from, the 
characteristic segments of natural monopoly which continue to be subjected to regulatory 




competitive market structure while Europe is better described as more 
oligopolistic with considerable state participation at all the stages of the supply 
chain. The Asia Pacific is only slowly evolving from a structure of several 
bilateral monopolies to competition. 
Box 1: The North American Liberalised Gas Markets 
US wellhead gas price regulation was passed in 1954 with a Supreme court Philip Decision, which 
implies that gas destined for interstate consumption would be produced at government-determined 
prices. Other important orders are: 
US (1984) – FERC order 380: removed contractual minimum bill obligation. The pipeline 
companies had long-term sales contracts with a minimum bill obligation. 
Canada (1985) – Agreement on gas market (Halloween Agreement) prices, deregulation of gas 
prices.  
US (1985) – FERC order 436: allowed pipeline companies on a voluntary basis to offer 
transportation services to customers. Prices were partially deregulated, natural gas spot markets 
developed.  
US (1992) – FERC order 636: required pipelines to separate their sales services from their 
transportation services and provide all transportation on an equal basis for all gas suppliers. 
Transportation remained a regulated monopoly but sales were opened to competition. This is the 
most significant single instrument in the market opening process. 
Source: IEA (2008). 
 
Box 2: European Union Natural Gas Liberalisation Process 
The main aim of liberalising the European gas industry was to create a more appropriate 
competitive framework in gas-to-gas competition, increase economic efficiency and lower the 
cost to final consumers.  
This resulted in the first Gas Directive (98/30/EC) aimed at providing a new gas legal framework 
for opening the gas networks to third parties. This was to be achieved through unbundling of the 
vertically integrated gas operators, thus allowing competition for suppliers and consumers within 
the natural monopoly network. 
A new Gas Directive (2003/55/EC) adopted mandated Third Party Access (TPA) as the basic rule 
for all existing infrastructure, as well as moving the level of unbundling of the Transmission 
System Operator to the level of legal separation. In addition, the role of independent regulators 
was enforced. 
Third Order: The rationale is the integration of the energy and the environmental objective of EU 
with market-based and other measures. The main features of the third package consist of internal 
industry structural change namely ownership unbundling, network harmonisation, continuous 
identification of missing infrastructure, increased coordination between Transmission System 
Operator and regulators through existing institutional groups. 
Source: IEA (2008). 
It emerged that efficient adoption of a specific structure may be as a 




competition, definition of access rules and tariff regulations. Opening the 
upstream and downstream markets to competition favours infrastructure 
investments (von Hirschausen, 2008), and every structure adopted has its 
regulatory design (Spanjer, 2009). 
Regulations and governance arrangements: the natural monopoly 
segments (transmission and distribution) are subjected to regulation. Regulation 
is seen as a corrective measure of market failure (Spanjer, 2008). The main 
objective of regulation is to avoid monopoly inefficiency in gas transmission 
and distribution and protect consumers from exploitation (Andrade, 2014).  
How can the regulatory framework establish a workable balance 
between appropriate industry structure and infrastructure investments 
decisions? Incentive regulations are considered to have significant impacts on 
higher infrastructure investments compared to rate-of-return regulation 
(Correlje and Groenewegen, 2006; Andrade, 2014). For governance 
arrangements, the regulator should be able to operate effectively with a clear 
politically determined legislative mandate and objective to develop guidelines 
and rules. They should be able to operate independently and balance the interest 
of all stakeholders’ across all the segments of the gas industry. An appropriate 
regulatory framework is the most effective instrument for attracting 
infrastructure investments (von Hirschausen et al., 2004).  
Infrastructure Investment Decisions: the shifts towards liberalisation 
and its complementary regulatory system come with uncertainties in 




investments, as investments are required along the entire natural gas value chain 
(exploration and production, transmission, distribution and ancillary services).  
Regulation is the most important determinant of infrastructure 
investment decisions in the gas industry (von Hirchausen, 2004). Therefore, 
issues of Third Party Access to essential facilities must be sufficiently resolved 
by the regulatory framework (Weijermars, 2010). Infrastructure regulations are 
subject to cost-of-service (Rate-of-return) regulation. Relying on traditional 
regulatory systems to set competitive prices may lead to adverse effects on 
innovation and new investments (von Hirschausen, 2008). 
 Rate-of-return regulation is widely criticised for overinvestments 
(Averch and Johnson effects) or inefficiency. Price cap regulations are 
considered a reactive measure to the inefficiencies (von Hirschausen et al., 
2004). Cost-plus and incentive-based regulations continue to go hand-in-hand 
leading to workable hybrid forms of regulations such as sliding scale (von 
Hirschausen et al., 2004). 
The main issue in the design of industry structures and regulatory 
arrangements is how to align business responsibilities of the players. The 
interplay of regulation with investments, irreversibility, risks and uncertainty 
determines whether a regulatory regime will create a governance structure that 
sufficiently facilitates investments (Spanjer, 2009). Uncertainty/risk lowers 
investments both in the short and long-run (Spanjer, 2009) and requires 
management (Weijermars, 2010).  




industry. Long-distance LNG trades, linked to crude-oil indexation, take-or-pay 
contracts with destination clauses, absence of short-term trades and higher 
prices, mark these markets. State-controlled companies, limited third-party 
access to pipelines and other infrastructure dominate the Asian gas industries 
and government regulated gas prices (Vivoda, 2014). Aguilera et al. (2014) 
identified several obstacles limiting the development of the Asian gas markets: 
limited gas delivery infrastructure, lack of storage facilities, underdeveloped or 
inflexible markets and limited legal and regulatory frameworks. 
In sum, it is well established from the developed countries’ gas 
industries perspective as indicated on Table 18, that integrated studies of the 
structure, regulations and investments decisions are relevant to provide detail 
analysis of the gas industry and the lessons learned are: 
 The literature review reveals that there are increasing studies of 
integrating structure, regulation and infrastructure investments decisions 
in these gas industries. 
 There are attempts to transit from monopolistic, vertically integrated, 
and state control structures towards competitive structures. 
 Appropriate and effective regulatory framework for the gas industry 
affects the level of infrastructure investments. 
The basic conditions required for the development of a nascent gas 
industry from the literature review and lessons from the developed countries 
perspective is to develop integrated studies of the structure, regulations and 




Table 18: The Gas Industry from Developed Countries Perspectives 
Reference Sector  Definition of Sector 
Performance 






investments and security 
of supply of the 
restructured USA natural 
gas industry. 
Literature review and case studies  Main finding: there is a relationship between regulatory 
framework and infrastructure investment. There is little 
reason for concern about infrastructure investment, resource 






development in the UK. 
Analytical framework based on 
Structure-Conduct-Performance-
Regulation paradigm and System 
Dynamics. 
Main finding: a holistic framework for the identification and 
discussion of power and gas sector structure, infrastructure, 
markets and regulatory drivers. 
Recommendation: There is an interconnection between gas-
to-power structures, regulations and infrastructure 
investment. 
Juris (1998) Natural Gas The emergence of 
markets in the natural gas 
industry. 
World Bank records and 
experiences from natural gas 
industry stakeholders. 
Main Finding: Deregulation in the natural gas industry 
leading to increasing competition benefiting everyone 
through efficient pricing and greater choices in natural gas 
contracts. Four distinct restructuring models are identified: 
vertical integration, competition, open access and 
unbundling. Regulation was identified equally important in 
maintaining the structure. 
Recommendation: These structural and regulatory reforms 
are available to nascent gas industries trying to develop their 
gas markets. 
von Hirschhausen, 
et al., (2004) 
Utilities Infrastructure regulation 
and investment for the 
long-term. 
Literature review and case studies Main findings: appropriate regulations are required to sustain 
long-term investments. Structural constellations are as well 
required in state ownership, regulated and unregulated private 








Joskow (2005) Electricity 
and Natural 
Gas 
Supply security in competitive 




Main findings: there is a growing link between electricity and gas 
sectors. 
Recommendations: industry structures, regulations and reliability 
policies are needed to be compatible across both industries. 
Neumann and von 
Hirschhausen 
(2006) 
Natural Gas Long-term Contracts and Asset 
Specificity: an empirical analysis 
of producer-importer relationship 
in the natural gas industry. 
Quantitative 
Method and   
interviews 
Main findings: Contract duration decreases as the market structure of 
an industry develops into competitive structures. Contracts that are 
linked to an asset-specific investment are on average four years longer 
than those that are not. Long-term contracts are considered instruments 




Natural Gas The gas market, transaction costs 
and efficient regulations in EU.  
Literature 
Review 
Main Findings: Regulation has a strong impact on market development 
but it is not the driving force for market design. 
Recommendation: the use of mix regulatory approaches and 
competition policy instead of a single market design for efficient 
regulatory design. 
Spanjer  (2009) Natural Gas  Structural and Regulatory reform 




Main findings: TCE is the proper theoretical base for gas regulation. 
Recommendation: European natural gas regulation should move from 
its neoclassical regulation to TCE. 




Main findings: China gas industry is challenged with lack of top-level 
design of gas policy, ineffective industry supervision, and imperfect 
natural gas pricing mechanisms. 
Recommendation: full natural gas industry reforms should be conducted 
and encouraged to help unveil the problems and challenges of the gas 
industry reform process. It will help formulate suitable measures for 











Natural Gas The impact of regulation, 




Main findings: privatisation has a strong impact on investments. Different 
forms of regulation seem to have an important role in transmission 
investments. Incentive regulation has a positive impact leading to higher 
investment more than the rate of return regulations. 
Weijermars 
(2010) 
Natural Gas Value chain analysis of the natural 
gas industry – Lessons from US 
regulatory success and 




Main findings: it is essential to remove impediments in the natural gas 
value chain and streamline the decision-making process. 
Recommendation: increase liquidity in natural gas markets by enforcing 
Third Party Access pipeline. Provide incentive regulations to increase 
market liquidity. Provide higher Rate-Of-Return in the authorised Weight 
Average Cost of Capital for new infrastructure investments to stimulate 
timely delivery of energy projects. 
Weijermars 
(2012) 
Natural Gas Regulatory reform options to 





Main findings: Revised rate-making is required to improve the regulatory 
horizon of utilities that compete for access to funds from capital markets.  
Recommendations: True cost of capital should be allowed in rate cases 
under the General Rate Case and Cost of Capital Mechanism. Construction 
Work In Progress (CWIP) inclusion in the rate base and quick approvals 
of new project investments are essential for successful fundraising. Allow 




Natural Gas The outlook for Floating Storage 
and Regasification Units (FSRU). 
SWOT 
Analysis 
Main Findings: FSRU businesses has grown rapidly. The FSRUs are 
reusable assets. Majority of the current FSRUs are linked to smaller 
onshore power plants. By offering low cost, fast track and flexible option 
compared to onshore terminals, FSRU offers an excellent opportunity to 
grow the LNG market internationally. The possibility of developing 
Floating Power Generating Units (FPGU).  
Recommendations: FSRUs can be used to offer a complete gas-to-power 
package with a power generation facility either on the FSRU or adjacent 







Talus (2014). Natural Gas United States natural gas 
markets, contracts and risks: 
what lessons for the European 






Main Finding: Long-term contracts provided predictability over long 
periods, the companies involved could plan their infrastructure needs 
with a high degree of certainty. Long-term contracts allow for the 
financing of large-scale infrastructure projects through project financing. 
Recommendations: regulatory frameworks, industry structure and 
infrastructure investments should be adapted to reflect the needs of the 
particular natural gas industry. 
Vivoda (2014) Natural Gas Natural gas in Asia: Trade, 
markets and regional 
institutions. 
Literature 
review and case 
studies 
Main Findings: LNG prices in Asia are benchmarked against the average 
monthly price of crude oil imports. State-owned companies with limited 
competition dominate domestic gas markets in Asia. Security of supply 
policy is the primary objective for most Asia LNG trades. The role of the 
state as a market participant instead of regulator through vertical 
integrated gas companies limits competition and market efficiency. 
Recommendations: LNG prices should be de-linked from crude oil prices 
and move towards a mixture of pricing approaches: hybrid 
oil/coal/Henry Hub indexation  and potential regional hub indexation 
Aguilera et al., 
(2014) 
Natural Gas The Asia Pacific natural gas 
market: Large enough for all? 
Analytical 
framework 
Main Findings: Natural gas will play a significant role meeting Asia 
energy demand. Asia gas industry may see a shift from oil-based pricing 
to gas-on-gas pricing regime, with hub-based pricing in China. 
Recommendation: provide understanding of the evolution of the market 






3.2.2. Gas Industry Development from African Perspective 
Africa holds about 503.3TCF of global proven natural gas reserves, 
7.3% of all world reserves (BP statistical review, 2017). These proved gas 
reserves are highly concentrated in four countries – Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and 
Libya accounting for more than 92% of total reserves (E &Y, 2013). Africa 
produced 208.3BCF of gas in 2016 led by Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria 
collectively accounting for 88% of production. Production growth rate in Africa 
from 2005-2016 was estimated at 5.6% per year (BP statistical review, 2017). 
Africa’s gas consumption is estimated at 138.2BCF in 2016 with Algeria, Egypt 
and South Africa leading consumption and accounting for more than 70%.  
Gas consumption in Africa has been growing at a rate of about 4.9% 
per annum from 2005 to 2016. Even though Africa possesses huge gas 
resources, consumption is generally limited. North Africa has historically led 
Africa’s gas sector production and consumption but recent growth from West 
African offshore oil boom comes with huge associated gas developments and 
huge recent discoveries offshore East Africa (Mozambique and Tanzania).  
Ernest and Young (2013) stated that natural gas development in Africa 
present huge potentials and could be the game changer for broader economic 
and social development. However, these opportunities come with risk and 
challenges of which some are beyond the control of local/regional industries 
and governments. Ledesma (2013) noted that commercialisation of these 
resources comes with major challenges, among them are lack of infrastructure, 




Political stability is required to bring rapid gas development in Egypt 
and Libya. In West Africa, domestic consumption of gas is a major constraint 
and the underlying theme for future gas development is the monetisation of 
underutilised gas resource through reducing flaring and the capture of 
associated gas for export and more importantly for domestic use. The most 
important components for gas developments are downstream infrastructure 
development in power generation/industrial development and increasing local 
content focus (E &Y, 2013). 
East African recent gas resources discovery in Mozambique and 
Tanzania presents a case of nascent gas industry development. Mozambique 
holds about 160TCF of recoverable gas reserves in the Rovuma Basin almost 
equal to Africa’s largest gas reserves holder, Nigeria’s 182TCF and same as 
Algeria’s 160TCF. Tanzania, on the other hand, holds about 57TCF of 
recoverable gas reserves.  
However, both countries have limited domestic consumption of gas, 
constituting 15% of energy utilisation in Mozambique and utilisation in 
Tanzania is only increasing marginally in electricity generation. Amanam 
(2017) noted that the gas resources discovered in Mozambique and Tanzania 
will contribute to the increasing global gas demand whilst serving the domestic 
demand in meeting energy needs. The development of these gas resources are 
challenged with: lack of adequate domestic markets and lack of infrastructure. 
In an effort to utilise gas in Mozambique and Tanzania, strides are 




programs and initiative, with an appropriate pricing structure. Both countries 
developed Natural Gas Master Plans. Mozambique, due to their vast gas 
reserves, aims to use LNG as their engine of development. Whilst Tanzania 
focuses on domestic utilisation in power generation as the most economically 
efficient option and later LNG (Deimierre et al., 2014).  
Fruhauf (2014) and Ledesma (2013) identified political risk as a long-
term headline risk to investors in these African countries. Institutional deficit 
poses the greatest challenge to near-term decision making due to acute skills 
shortage. Lack of specialist skills, transparency and corruption risk and overall 
infrastructure deficit poses a significant challenge to LNG export development 
and economic growth. Other challenges facing the domestic energy sector: 
social risk (unrest and social licence) from unfulfilled expectations and 
promises around the resource boom present major risk in the long-run. Demierre 
et al. (2014) recognised that a strong regulatory framework is required in 
infrastructure utilisation and key governance issues will have to be resolved in 
attempts to utilise gas resources for domestic purposes in Africa. 
Mozambique’s Gas Master Plan17 recommended government support 
for infrastructure investment and the provision of a legal framework for 
governing gas development. A suitable gas pricing structure that will allow 
investors to secure an acceptable return on their investments and reward risk 
levels were recommended (ICF International, 2012). 
                                                          





Tanzania, on the other hand, has set out a gas policy18, which set a 
framework for guiding the development of gas. Key challenges in developing 
Tanzania gas industry as summarised in the policy by Ledesma (2013) are:   
 There is the need for an institutional and legal framework to administer 
effectively specific legislation to address governance issues with 
appointment of a regulatory authority. 
 There is a shortage of skilled personnel to manage the gas industry. 
 Gas infrastructure needs to be developed. The policy contemplates 
government ownership and non-discriminatory access of infrastructure. 
Nigeria, on the hand, presents a mixed case study. Nigeria’s natural gas 
reserves are estimated at about 182TCF with a projected 70% growth rate by 
2025. Nigeria is among the top gas flaring nations accounting for 16% of global 
gas flares, which is estimated at about 1.3TCF annually (Odumugbo, 2010). 
Nigeria has a suppressed power sector requiring investments in 
electricity generation with current available generation capacity, estimated at 
2,500MW and installed capacity of 5,000MW. Nigerian current electricity 
demand is estimated at 10,000MW, far short of current available and installed 
capacity. To start with, Nigeria has a significant domestic market for gas in 
power generation. However, gas monetisation in Nigeria has always focused on 
improving LNG export at the expense of domestic consumption. LNG remains 
the largest utilisation strategy for Nigerian gas resources; however, recent focus 
                                                          
18 Minister of Energy and Minerals (2013) The National Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania – 2013 




is geared towards gas-to-power generation in several government initiatives in 
the National Integrated Power Projects (NIPP) and the Independent Power Plant 
Initiative. The Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) the incumbent and 
state monopoly was privatised and separated into six generation and eleven 
distribution companies (Nwaoha and Wood, 2014). 
Odumugbo (2010) maintained that the Nigerians gas resources value 
is attained when it is used in country and plans are far advanced to boost power 
generation to 10,000MW by 2020 and this calls for additional infrastructure in 
15,000km gas transmission pipeline, 16 new power plants and new gas 
distribution pipelines. Gas supply to power generation in Nigeria should be the 
priority of the government and all relevant laws to enhance this policy goal 
needs to be encouraged (Adekomaya et al., 2016). 
Developing Nigeria’s gas-to-power generation is faced with several 
challenges: lower upstream gas prices to power plants, which was intended to 
promote power generation but were not attractive to gas producers following 
the Domestic Gas Supply Obligation (DGSO) principle. Most importantly, 
delays in the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) as the bill promotes 
local content policies, which forces companies to invest in facilities for gas 
processing for further reuse, especially in power generation.  
Nigeria has made frantic efforts to ensure the utilisation of their gas 
resources in developing a gas policy19 with the vision of attaining a gas-based 
                                                          




industrial nation in meeting domestic requirements and international needs. The 
policy is set to establish an independent petroleum regulatory authority; legal 
separation of upstream from midstream: implement legal separation of gas 
infrastructure ownership from operation from gas trading and pursue a project 
based rather than a centrally planned domestic gas development approach. 
In the area of industry structure, the Nigerian gas policy aims to move 
towards wholesale market-based competition, clear separation of roles between 
the private sector and government: restructuring the Nigerian Gas Company 
(NGC) into transportation and gas marketing and review the gas aggregation 
policy. In infrastructure, the policy intents to identify and proceed with key gas 
infrastructure and liberalised access to onshore and offshore gas transmission 
pipelines and gas processing.  
The West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) export natural gas from 
Nigeria to neighbouring countries (Benin, Togo and Ghana) operated by the 
West African Gas Pipeline Company (WAGPCo). The 678km pipeline has an 
initial capacity of 170MMscf/day and plans are far advanced to increase the 
capacity to 460MMscf/day and extending further west into Ivory Coast 
(Nwaoha and Wood, 2014). Eighty five percent (85%) of the gas WAGP 
transport is used for power generation and 15% for industrial purposes.  
Nwaoha and Wood (2014) recognised that WAGP over the years failed 
to deliver the anticipated contracted volume of gas due to the plethora of 
reasons: policy, politics, infrastructure, funding, security and low prices offered 




(TSGP) between Nigeria and Algeria to transmit gas from Nigeria through 
Algeria into Europe. Nigerian gas resources have potential benefits in power 
generation and industrial development for the West African Sub-region.  
Integrated studies of the industry structure, regulations and 
infrastructure investments decisions in these nascent gas industries will give a 
more appropriate perspective of their activities. However, the lessons learned 
from these studies as indicated on Table 19 include: 
 There are common challenges in the development of the gas industries in 
Africa. For instance, Nigeria, Mozambique and Tanzania have similar 
challenges in institutional weakness; regulatory deficiencies; lack of 
infrastructure; high political risk; lack of appropriate gas pricing; weak 
and lack of appropriate regulatory frameworks and; high skills shortage 
and lack of expertise to manage the industry.  
 These nascent gas industries in Africa (Mozambique, Tanzania, Ghana 
and others) can consider integrated studies of the structure, regulations 
and infrastructure investment decisions of their gas industries to provide 
an all-encompassing analysis. 
 Stakeholder (investors, multinational organisations and national 
governments) engagements in these studies of the various gas industries 
are identified as important. These countries are attempting to develop gas 




Table 19: Gas Industry Development and Experiences from Africa 
Reference Sector Definition of Sector 
Performance 
Analytical  Methods Main findings & recommendation 
Ledesma 
(2013) 
Natural Gas East Africa Natural Gas 
Potential for export. 
Analytical framework and 
literature review. 
Main findings: Mozambique has enough gas reserves for domestic 
consumption and exports. Tanzania has uncertainty on their exact gas 
reserves and consideration for domestic consumption or exports. Both 
countries face challenges such as financing, corruption and 
participation by undercapitalised and inefficient local partners in their 
nascent gas industries.  
Recommendations: finalisation of regulatory frameworks for both 
countries. Development of financial packages. Transparency with no 
perceived corruption, clear regulations and government decision-





Natural Gas and 
Electricity 
Gas-to-power 
development in Nigeria 
and Bangladesh. 
Analytical framework  Main finding: Regulation, Politics and International development 
partners plays major roles in gas-to-power development in Nigeria and 
Bangladesh.  
Recommendation: Privatisation is not the only path to improve 
operational efficiency and investments in gas and power infrastructure 
development but collaboration with multilateral development banks 




Natural Gas Development of an 
integrated cash flow 
framework for the 
analysis of natural gas 
value chain in Vietnam 
and Philippines. 
An integrated framework 
and cash flow model  
Main Finding: The model helped identify a set of negotiation for PSC 
terms, determine a suitable pipeline tariff for an independent pipeline 
company and gas price for the power plant. Sensitivity analyses are 
carried out, which help in negotiating production sharing contracts and 
determine pipeline, power tariffs and gas prices. 
Recommendation: A committed market and undisrupted pipeline are 
essential for the viability of the integrated gas project in the short and 
long run. The model can be used to negotiate IOCs and Government 















and survey of literature 
Main findings: Political risk can hinder the development of LNG in Mozambique. 
Including transparency and corruption risk, infrastructure deficits, challenges facing 
the domestic energy sector, labour challenges and social risk. Infrastructure 
bottlenecks pose the single greatest risk to LNG exports.  
Recommendation:  Mozambique signed on Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). Creation of sovereign funds and investments into infrastructure is 
advised. Local gas available support can be seen as a reason to invest in power plants. 
Strengthen existing education and labour training schools. The government needs to 
amend the legal regulatory framework to take into consideration LNG developments. 
Odumugbo 
(2010) 




Holistic framework Main Findings: Nigeria gas reserves are estimated at 182TCF. Nigeria with its large 
natural gas resources still suffers from power crisis. It is imperative to exploit 
Nigeria’s natural gas resources into improvement in the power sector. 
Recommendations: research should be encouraged in academia and government in 
finding out the utilisation options of Nigeria natural gas resources. There should be 
a regulatory framework to guide gas utilisation in Nigeria. There is a critical need to 
stop gas flaring, implement existing commitments in domestic gas markets, 
infrastructure for gas gathering and processing, and establish gas legislation. 
Develop local content in gas utilisation in industries such as methanol, ammonia; 
Gas-To-Liquids (GTL) and power are imperative. 
Ernest and 
Yong (2013) 
Natural Gas Natural gas in 
Africa. The 
frontiers of the 
Golden Age. 
Analytical review Main Findings: Natural gas will be the “prime mover” for broader economic and 
social development in Africa. 
Recommendation: integrated gas development that could include power 
generation/industrial development are necessary. 
Nwaoha and 
Wood (2014) 
Natural Gas A review of the 
utilisation and 
monetisation of 
Nigeria natural gas 
resources: current 
realities. 
Analytical review Main Findings: Nigeria has lost a major gas export market, USA. This requires the 
Nigeria government to encourage investments in the domestic utilisation of natural 
gas. Nigeria has resolved to a gas revolution program for economic development in 
gas-to-power, gas-to-liquid, gas-to-methanol, gas-to-fertilizer, and LNG projects. 
Recommendation: the development of conventional and unconventional gas 
resources has multiple benefits for Nigeria and this could be shared equitably for the 




3.2.3. Gas Industry Development from Ghana Perspective 
The Ministry of Energy (2015) started the roadmap to developing a 
Gas Master Plan for Ghana. Ghana’s gas volumes are not significant (6.4TCF) 
compared to other nascent gas countries such as Mozambique (160TCF) and 
Tanzania (57TCF) nor closer to Africa’s largest reserves holder Nigeria 
(182TCF). LNG has been a major utilisation option for gas in developing 
countries because of the additional financial benefits to the governments.  
Several empirical studies by international and consulting agencies, 
through series of methodologies such as Netback analysis20 and strategic 
analysis21  considered domestic gas utilisation for power generation as an 
economically superior strategy compared to LNG for export or for methanol 
production or for transportation fuel (CNG) in Ghana. The West African Gas 
Pipeline (WAGP) has been the first source of gas supplies into Ghana for power 
generation but offered unreliable and inadequate supply volumes.  
Domestic infrastructure in support of gas-to-power sector development 
in Ghana has led to the construction of a 150,000MMBtu/d gas processing plant 
at Atuabo (Western region of Ghana) to receive associated gas from the Jubilee 
fields and subsequent production fields and a 114km gas transmission pipeline 
                                                          
20 Netback analysis involves taking the current market price of a product either domestic or 
global price for export and subtracting other capital and operational input costs to establish an 
estimated maximum willingness to pay for fuel supply. ECA and PDC netback analysis for 
Ghana’s sector establish the transportation sector as the most viable sector for the use of natural 
gas, followed by the power sector.  
21  However strategic reasons (undertaken by the World Bank (2013&2015) emphasis 





to connect to thermal power plants at Aboadzi (Western region of Ghana). 
However, there is a mirage of challenges, which constrain developing a 
domestic gas industry in Ghana. 
Fritsch and Poundineh, (2016) identified lack of an effective regulatory 
framework for investments, skills shortages and an inefficient electricity pricing 
structure as constraining factors. The Ministry of Energy Gas Master Plan 
(2015) identified lack of clear policy framework; lack of stable regulatory and 
fiscal framework including fiscal conditions and gas pricing; and weak 
institutional and structural inadequacies in terms of the sectors design, 
competition and regulations posing a major risk to attract investments.  
Furthermore, regulatory responsibilities are divided into upstream and 
downstream, and technical and economic regulations in Ghana, a mechanism 
that is unique to the gas industry, regulatory responsibilities and jurisdictions 
are not properly delineated. For instance, who regulates the role of the gas 
aggregator/supplier? Who regulates midstream infrastructure such as the FSRU 
and the gas processing plant? In addition, what are the regulatory jurisdictions 
of the numerous government regulatory agencies in the gas sector in Ghana? 
Gas price settings are not properly regulated considering the supply chain. 
Developing a domestic gas industry in Ghana will require putting in 
place appropriate regulatory and structural arrangements that reduce risk and 
foster infrastructure investments. Previous empirical studies as indicated on 
Table 20 in the gas industry in Ghana emphasised on the utilisation options of 




previous empirical studies: in providing integrated analysis  and appropriate 
industry structural arrangements; appropriate regulatory and governance 
arrangements; and considering business viability analysis in infrastructure 
investments decisions for the gas industry in Ghana. 
Empirical studies from African gas countries (Nigeria, Mozambique 
and Tanzania) focused heavily on developing gas utilisation analytical 
frameworks of their gas industries. They, however, failed to provide integrated 
analysis. Integrated analysis of the gas industry provide a holistic framework 
for thorough identification and discussion of structural, regulatory and 
investment risk analysis. This study combines two study methods; developing 
an analytical framework based on SCP paradigm and TCE theory, stakeholder 
consultation through interviews to develop an integrated cash flow model of the 
supply chain components of the gas industry for Ghana. The lessons learned 
from previous empirical studies of the gas industry in Ghana are as follows: 
 Domestic gas-to-power consumption is prioritised over an export 
strategy for Ghana’s gas industry.  
 Ghana will have to develop an integrated analysis of the structure, 
regulations and infrastructure investments decisions of the gas industry. 
In developing the integrated studies, emphasis should be placed on risk 





Table 20: Gas Industry Development and Experiences from Ghana 


















Utilisation options in 
Ghana. 
Netback analysis 
and a dispatch 
model 
Main findings: The power sector is identified as the priority area for gas 
utilisation in Ghana. Appropriate regulatory framework and efficient 
institutions are required. The gas industry structure in Ghana is 
monopolistic in nature. 
Recommendations: develop a comprehensive gas sector act, provide a 
stable regulatory framework, ensure the financial viability of off-takers 
and associated creditworthiness of power and gas sector utilities. 





The role of the 
power and petroleum 
sectors in economic 
growth in Ghana. 
Analytical 
framework 
Main findings: natural gas will play a vital role in Ghana’s energy future 
and ensuring adequate and reliable natural gas supply is fundamental to 
improving the cost of power. 
Recommendations: power generation is recommended as the priority for 
gas consumption in Ghana. The government must develop its credit 
approach to support gas development. Publication of the gas pricing 
policy in Ghana and perform commercial viability analysis for LNG and 












analysis for Ghana. 
Analytical 
Framework 
Main findings: lack of affordable and reliable fuel supply was a major 
problem in power generation in Ghana. Ineffective institutions and 
unfavourable investments climate resulted in poor electricity 
performance in Ghana. 
Recommendations: utilisation of gas reserves in Ghana’s gas-to-power 
market is an economically superior strategy compared to export. 
Modification to electricity tariff to send a signal to investors without 























and literature review 
Main Findings: GNPC is responsible for the aggregation, transportation and 
commercialisation of gas. GNPC will be the off-takers of the Sankofa Gas 
Project. The power sector is a main gas consumer but financially constrained. 
The World Bank will guarantee $8billion of infrastructure investments into 
the gas sector in Ghana. Natural gas demand deficit is expected in the long-
term that will necessitate the consideration of LNG. 
Recommendation: continuous risk Identification and mitigation should be 






Natural Gas The Ghana Gas 
Master Plan. 
Qualitative and 
Quantitative analysis  
Main Findings: Gas demand will come from power generation, industrial use 
and transportation. LNG will play a key role in Ghana’s gas supply. 
Recommendations: Develop a Gas Sector Policy Act. Provide a natural gas 
industry structure suitable to a nascent gas industry. Regulations should be 










Main Findings: Power sector is the priority area for gas consumption; provide 
a framework for natural gas price negotiation. Natural Gas Reserves in Ghana 
are estimated at 6TCF. Energy Commission Act 1997, 541 calls for unbundled 
transmission pipelines. BOST was awarded the NGTU. 
Recommendation: Monopolistic industry structure. Providing data set for the 
natural gas/energy sector to enable continues monitoring and accessing the 
effectiveness of policies.  Provide a clear framework for the introduction of 
LNG. Gas must be economically priced to ensure full cost recovery of all 
investments. Unbundling of the Gas Industry shall occur only after 10years. 
Nexant 
(2010) 
Natural Gas Gas sector 




Main findings: Power and industrial demand should be the main areas of focus 
for Ghana’s gas resources.  
Recommendation: Improve the quality of energy data in Ghana. A thorough 
analysis of projected electricity demand in Ghana. There is the need for a 
detailed regulatory policy document, which will outline natural gas industry 
regulatory structure in Ghana. The regulatory structure should clearly set the 
roles and responsibilities of each player, how infrastructure will be regulated 




3.3.0. Strands of the study 
The section focuses on the three objectives of the study. These are 
classified into three strands: strand 1: structuring the gas industry; Strand 2: 
Business Viability of the supply chain components of the Gas Industry and 
strand 3: Regulation and governance arrangements in the Gas Industry in Ghana 
(as discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.5.3: Natural Gas Industry Institutional 
Arrangements in Ghana). 
3.3.1. Strand 1: Structuring the Gas Industry in Ghana  
What is the current structure of the gas industry in Ghana? It is hard to 
find empirical evidence supporting the theory of market structure in the gas 
industry (Joskow, 2002; Arora, 2012). Much of the available literature is 
borrowed from other networked industries such as the electricity sector. 
Bhattacharyya (2011) identified six industry structures for the power sector22. 
Juris (1998) however, focused on gas industry structural models: Vertical 
integration; Competition in natural gas production; Open access and wholesale 
competition; and Unbundling and retail competition.  
The discussion focuses on the nascent gas industry in Ghana. The 
structural models considered includes the combination of Bhattacharyya (2011) 
power sector models and Juris (1998) gas industry structural models: Vertical 
Integration Model (VIM) or the Single Buyer Model (SBM), Multiple Buyer 
                                                          
22 Bhattacharyya (2011): Vertically integrated monopoly; Monopsony (single buyer) model; 
Transitional models; Price-based pool and wholesale competition; Cost-based pool and 





Model (MBM), Competition in natural gas production, Open Access and 
Wholesale competition, and unbundling and retail competition. 
3.3.2. Model 1: Vertically Integrated Model (VIM) 
 Vertical integration is the traditional structure of the gas industry. 
Production, pipeline transportation, and distribution are performed by one 
utility to benefit from economies of scale (Bhattacharyya, 2011). Such a 
company has an exclusive position in gas supply to end users (Juris, 1998). 
Integration is seen as a way to prevent opportunistic behaviour and hold-up 
problems from other companies and concentrates assets ownership and 
operations to a single entity (Oliver and Moore, 1990).  
When is it appropriate to operate VIM and to what extent? This fits 
well with the early development stages of the gas industry due to the site-
specific and dedicated nature of infrastructure requiring long-term contracts to 
provide security to investors and guaranteed returns on investments (Glachant 
et al., 2014). What are the benefits of VIM? VIM offers firms incentives to 
maximise the aggregate gains from trade associated with transactions without 
any offsetting costs of the internal organisation. VIM has superior efficiency 
properties to decentralise trade between independent buyers and sellers in a 
market (Joskow, 2002). In essence, VIM seeks to maximise the joint profits of 
its upstream and downstream operations because pricing decisions are 
coordinated in a way that leads to profit maximisation (Bresnahan and Levin, 
2012) and eliminates information asymmetry between upstream and 




 VIM coupled with regulations ensure that consumers receive 
reasonable prices and through government initiatives, gas can be delivered to 
longer distances and to rural areas. VIM can be the most efficient response to 
uncertainty and contractual incompleteness (Bresnahan and Levin, 2012; 
Williamson, 2010). VIM can lead to the easy settlement of minor conflicts than 
haggling and litigation (Williamson, 1971). 
VIM could provide technological and economic advantages to the 
industry in that having a single firm means that the firm can easily take up 
technological innovations to improve on its operations at a much lower cost 
possible (Barrera-Ray, 1995). However, in VIM, the single firm will usually 
require heavy regulation because of its monopoly position since such industries 
lack the flexibility required in a dynamic market environment and even 
regulation is often insufficient to induce it to operate efficiently (Juris, 1998).  
VIM alters the bargaining power of producers, reduces innovation from 
others and protect returns from its own innovation (Riordan, 2008). This may, 
in the long run, result in higher prices. VIM can be used to strategically lessen 
competition in the short-run by raising rivals’ costs or in the long run by 
increasing rivals’ cost of market entry (Joskow, 2010). Whenever a firm 
operates in VIM and self-supplies itself with some inputs, other potential 
suppliers are in some sense “foreclosed” from providing those inputs and 
therefore “forecloses competition” (Joskow, 2010). In effect, if not checked 




A key concern to a nascent gas industry such as Ghana is how VIM will 
keep the industry viable and attract infrastructure investments. VIM is 
obviously favoured when there is an urgent need to monetise flared gas with 
imperfect and uncertain downstream markets. In this instance, Joskow (2010) 
postulated that the benefits of mitigating opportunism problems that may arise 
because of specific investments under VIM are greater than the cost of other 
sources of static and dynamic inefficiencies that may be associated with 
allocations within bureaucratic organisations, so it is preferable to opt for VIM. 
 Uncertainty mitigation in the early commercialisation of the gas value 
chain is considered as one of the main drivers for VIM (Claussen, 2011). 
Uncertainties are reasons to follow VIM especially when the uncertainties affect 
multiple stages of the value chain. VIM is attractive but if the uncertainties 
affect only one stage, contractual relationship is appropriate (Claussen, 2011; 
Barrera-Ray, 1995). The implementation of VIM requires a balancing act: to 
prevent the misuse of monopoly power while ensuring adequate revenue to 
firms (Bhattacharyya, 2011). 
 Regulations in VIM is not usually an easy task due to the conflicting 
nature of the role of the state and in many instances, the tariff structure is always 
divorced from cost structure. Subsidies and cross-subsidies are used to 
manipulate tariffs for specific advantage, and the utilities do not have incentives 
to improve performances, which leads to inefficiencies (Bhattacharya, 2011). 




3.3.3. Model 2: Single Buyer Model (SBM) 
A modified version of VIM is SBM. The SBM introduces a single 
purchasing agency at the wholesale level. This single entity is often state-
owned, performs transmission and wholesale supply functions (Bhattacharyya, 
2011). This centralised agency has some role in coordinating supply and 
demand (Castalia, 2013). Gas producers/suppliers enter into gas purchase 
contracts with the single buyer who in turn performs the trading function 
(selling) gas to consumers. For the effectiveness of SBM, gas 
producers/suppliers, transmitting companies and consumers must work 
independently and tariffs set by an independent regulator (Celik, 2003). 
How does the SBM work? Production and supply of gas is undertaken 
by multiple entities such as several IOCs and gas traders supplying gas (Kasim, 
2014) different from VIM. In the production segment, the single buyer through 
long-term purchase contracts procures the required capacity volumes of gas. 
The single buyer pays the producers under long-term contracts and the contracts 
are for the economic life of the oil and gas wells (Castalia, 2013). The single 
buyer then delivers the gas to consumers through a regulated pipeline, under the 
ownership of the single buyer or a different owner. 
Lovei (2000) stated the advantages of the SBM as; SBM allows easy 
management of the sector in decision-making processes and investment in 
additional supply capacity. SBM turns to maintain a unified wholesale price and 




major gas supply projects from market risk and retail-level regulatory risk, 
reducing financial costs and making the investment commercially bankable. 
SBM can be seen as a transitional structure before introducing 
wholesale competitive markets. In general, SBM is seen as providing a 
relatively simple and quick first step towards competition and a mechanism for 
handling stranded costs (Lovei, 2000; Celik, 2003). SBM allows multiple gas 
producers participation and thus opens the production segment to participation 
and facilitates the vertical separation of activities, which provides better cost 
information and scope for improvement (Bhattacharyya, 2011). The single 
buyer in Gas Sale Contract provides a guaranteed purchaser of gas at a certain 
price. SBM is able to make social benefits considerations; maintains uniform 
retail tariffs and can even facilitate tariff discrimination. 
However, SBM is seen to provide no clear signal for improving the 
transmission network and has a very complicated regulatory structure and not 
setting up the independence of the institutions that eventual competitive market 
will require (Lovei, 2000). SBM assume full responsibilities in the entire gas 
sector but does not take responsibility for final consumption and sales, which 
the entire gas industry is dependent. As the revenues flow backward, from the 
consumers to the single buyer any default from the consumers due to either poor 
tariff rates or inefficiency or a combination of different factors, can lead to 
default of the entire value chain (Bhattacharyya, 2011). 
SBM is likely to be influenced by politics or government control and 




Moreover, once the single buyer enters into a long-term contract with the 
suppliers or producers it becomes difficult to undertake further reforms 
(Bhattacharyya, 2011). 
3.3.4. Model 3:  Multiple Buyer Model (MBM) 
The MBM is considered a transitional model from VIM or SBM to 
competition. This model has been advocated for small systems because the risk 
of directly moving to spot markets may outweigh the benefits. The idea behind 
MBM is to adopt an intermediate structure for a transition period at the end of 
which the industry moves to final competitive structure (Bhattarcharyya, 2011). 
The intermediate model should be appropriate, compatible and not 
create hindrance to reach the final structure. This transitional model can take up 
one or two features of VIM or SBM or the final wholesale competition model 
(Bhattacharyya, 2011). Two of such models are identified as multiple-buyer 
multiple-seller model without retail competition (MBM: A) and multiple-buyer 
multiple-seller model with limited retail competition (MBM: B). 
In both models, gas production and supply, transactions are unbundled 
from transmission services and a number of producing and supply companies 
would operate in the system. Similarly, there would be a number of distributing 
companies, which may be regulated monopolies (Bhattacharyya, 2011).  
Multiple-buyer multiple seller model without retail competition 
(MBM: A): The supply market would have two components: a competitive 
segment and a non-competitive segment. The non-competitive segment acts as 




through a gas purchase agreement to the balancing buyer/seller. Nevertheless, 
some gas would be available for trading competitively. This can be achieved by 
defining the proportion of gas supply capacity to be released from 
producers/suppliers Gas Sales Agreements to the balancing buyer-seller. 
Initially, the proportion of available competitive gas would be relatively 
small but this could be increased over time. Producers/suppliers would compete 
with each other for selling their competitive portion of gas to consumers using 
bilateral contracts with physical delivery. The balancing buyer-seller would sell 
gas to consumers under a regulated bulk supply tariff. The balancing buyer-
seller could be the transmission company, which is often a state-owned 
company (Bhattacharyya, 2011). 
Multiple-seller multiple buyer model with retail competition 
(MBM: B): introduces a limited amount of retail competition by allowing larger 
consumers to purchase gas directly from producers/suppliers through bilateral 
contracts. Competition arises from the retail level, as eligible customers would 
have the choice of taking gas from the producers/suppliers directly 
(Bhattacharyya, 2011). Large customers are selected on some criteria such as 
consumption volumes or size of companies. 
The model allows for some wholesale competition and provides 
incentives on producers/suppliers to improve efficiency. Frequent price 
determination will allow the reflection of production and supply cost more 




development of short-term bilateral contracts to manage the risk faced by 
market participants (Bhattacharyya, 2011). 
Initially, the markets are regulated to provide the needed level of 
certainty to potential investors and at the same time, it avoids a major problem 
of SBM by allowing risk to be shared by all market participants. It provides a 
foundation for introducing competition and an opportunity to simulate spot 
market operations (Bhattacharyya, 2011). However, the model implementation 
is complex than VIM or SBM. Both producers/suppliers and consumers will be 
exposed to risk, as the financial viability of both would be interdependent and 
this limits the possibilities of cross-subsidisation (Bhattacharyya, 2011). 
3.3.5. Model 4: Competition in Natural Gas Production 
The gas industry in recent times is experiencing new trends in reforms 
in unbundling VIM, and opening wholesale gas markets to new entrants and 
stimulating competition in gas production/supply. The liberalisation policies 
aimed at breaking traditional state monopolies led to the new entrance and 
market segmentation, which allows entries on the production/supply side and 
enable consumer switching on the demand side (Cavaliare, 2007). Recent 
examples of such liberalisation processes include the European gas industry, 
which has three features: unbundle potentially competitive segments of the 
industry: Third Party Access to essential facilities and competition in the 
demand side, thus allowing consumers to switch suppliers.  
What are the benefits of competition in the gas industry? In seeking to 




and over-dependence on single/few purchasers, competition introduces 
flexibility and economic rationality (OECD, 2000). De Mello Sant Ana et al. 
(2009) stated that, if competitive markets are well conducted, dependenting on 
access to gas supplies they tend to reduce prices to downstream consumers and 
propitiate improvement in the security of supply by creating new flexibility 
mechanisms capable of balancing supply and demand. If gas supply is limited 
and there are constraints to adequate supply, prices will not reduce and security 
of supply will not increase. 
Competition in the gas industry is expected to promote additional 
sources of supplies (Robert and Harman, 2002). Competition ensures energy 
security and supply diversity, improved accessibility, operational optimisation 
allowing market liquidity and flexibility in the local gas market. For the private 
sector promoting competition is a signal for market certainty in regulations, 
transparency and long-term structures (International Gas Union, 2004). 
Why should the introduction of competition into a nascent gas industry 
be a structural alternative? The logic of competition, as posited by Economides 
(2003) is to guard against restrictions, impediments, and maximisation of 
efficiency. Competition seeks to stimulate non-discriminatory open access 
through regulation focused on information transparency and tariff regulation 
(Ana et al., 2008). Lack of competition in one segment of the gas sector can 
affect the competitiveness of the other sectors and introducing competition in 




How can competitive structures in a nascent gas industry attract 
infrastructure investments? Different from VIM, competition will require the 
consideration of keeping gas production as part of oil and gas activities. Ernest 
and Young (2014) recognised that uncertainty and risk in weak legal institutions 
and inefficient and ineffective institutions are among several other factors 
affecting investments into the development of oil and gas resources in Africa 
and the introduction of competition is hoped to strengthen existing institutions.  
Will competitive structures reduce investors’ risk for nascent gas 
industries? There are three risks factors to investors in these nascent gas 
industries. Lack of safeguards to ensure gas is delivered to end-users. Lack of 
regulation in transportation activities. Weak institutional and regulatory 
arrangements to ensure that investor’s remunerations and incentives are enough 
to promote further investments in providing adequate gas pricing and 
appropriate economic tariffs (Ana et al., 2008). 
Competition introduces choice to retailers and eligible customers at the 
wholesale level and avoids some of the pitfalls of SBM and MBM. The model 
provides efficient economic signals to generators and retailers. All market 
participants and not only the single buyer take up credit risk (Bhattacharyya, 
2011). Investment decision-making is decentralised to market participants, 
liquidity in the market is increased to encourage new market entrants. With an 
effective open access regime, competition in upstream gas production offers 
easy transition to full customer choice models (Norwak, 2010; Bhattacharyya, 




competitive structures in the nascent gas industry an option at the 
developmental stages, unless there is certainty of cost recovery for potential 
investors in guaranteed buyers of gas at economic tariffs investors will be 
deterred. Competition does not give a guarantee of cost recovery and is not an 
initial industrial structural option especially for nascent gas industries. 
3.3.6. Model 5: Open Access and Wholesale Competition 
Open Access (OA) is the mandatory wholesale access where legitimate 
users are offered effective, transparent, fair and non-discriminatory access to 
the pipeline network and paying regulated tariffs (Kramer and Schnurr, 2014; 
Hallack and Vazquez, 2014). This includes the ex-ante set of rules for 
infrastructure usage (Hallack and Vazquez, 2014). Open access implies 
allowing entry to the market through access to essential facilities such as 
transmission and distribution network (Bhattacharyya, 2011).  
The essential infrastructure owners under the VIM tend to express 
opportunism (Williamson, 2010) i.e. to favour their own subsidiaries and block 
new entrants (Nowak, 2010). To solve this problem, non-discriminatory access 
to essential infrastructure is required (Nowak, 2010). These essential facilities 
are considered natural monopolies which cannot be economically duplicated 
and occupy a strategic position in the industry (Austrian Competition and 
Consumer Commission and Public Utility Research Centre, 1997). 
Von Hirschausen (2008)  and Willaimson, (2010) argued that vertically 
bundled companies that own the infrastructure and participating in the trading 




invest in infrastructure expansion as compared to an unbundled infrastructure 
network where profitability drives infrastructure investments. The reason being 
that, the integrated company have access to the infrastructure and letting-out a 
third party would defect the opportunism of the integrated company.  
There are two forms of Open access: regulated and negotiated open 
access. Under the regulated Third Party Access (TPA), the regulatory 
authorities set the tariffs and other terms and conditions of use of the pipelines, 
which are applicable to all users alike. Negotiated TPA, on the other hand, 
allows eligible users of the pipelines to negotiate voluntary commercial 
agreements with the infrastructure owner (Bhattacharyya, 2011). 
In an open access regime, the infrastructure owner has no right to 
discriminate among legitimate users and impede the network from colluding 
with certain players while excluding other players from accessing the 
transmission grid (Glachant et al., 2014). Ghana has existing open access 
policies on gas transmission pipelines as indicated in Box 3. 
How effective is the open access regulatory policy in Ghana? One way 
to determine if an open access regime is operational is to ask if a 
company/customer can switch its supplier. Which implies that, suppliers/traders 
have easy access to the networks and that this access is equal, transparent and 
based on well-defined tariffs (Nowak, 2014). On the other hand, whether the 
percentage of customer switching suppliers is high or low and whether 





 Box 3: Open Access Regulations in Ghana 
Energy Commission, Natural Gas Transmission Access Code: Gas 
Transmission Services are to be provided on a non-discriminatory basis. This Code 
is to promote the development of a competitive gas market by instituting uniform 
principles for owners and users of gas pipelines and allow transparent and non-
discriminatory access to the transmission systems. Prevent abuse of power by the 
Natural Gas Transmission Utility (NGTU); provide rights of access to the 
transmission systems on conditions that are fair and reasonable for both service 
providers and users.  
West African Gas Pipeline Access Code Part A and B: The Code is published 
pursuant to clause 26 of the International Project Agreement (IPA), which allows 
WAGP to operate under an Open Access system: transportation services are to be 
provided based on non-discrimination. The WAGP Authority is the enforcement 
authority of the access code.  
Source: Energy Commission (2014); WAGPCo (2004). 
Open access alone is not a sufficient condition to ensure the objective of 
any reform process. Third Party Access (TPA) implementation may lead to 
intrusive and burdensome regulatory oversight, which may not lead to the full 
benefits of reform as the structure of the industry undergo little changes 
(Bhattacharyya, 2011).  To deepen competition is to unbundle VIM completely. 
 3.3.7. Model 6: Unbundling and Retail Competition 
There are concerns on whether open access under VIM, SBM or MBM 
will deliver the non-discriminatory access to essential facilities and whether 
these alternative structures will indeed deliver efficient and timely infrastructure 
investments (Pollitt, 2007). Unbundling and retail competition provides the 
solution and this is the ultimate structure in the gas restructuring process where 
all customers have equal access to competing producers/suppliers, access to 




competition is the complete separation of gas production/supply and retailing 
from the transmission network business to allow all customers to choose their 
suppliers (Bhattacharyya, 2011). The model allows competition in production, 
wholesale, retail and open access to gas transmission and distribution networks. 
Effective implementation of unbundling will result in lower prices, 
better quality, and innovation than expected under-regulated regimes, if there 
are excess capacity and adequate gas supply to meet demand and would result 
in efficient production, investments and consumption and improve allocative 
and productive efficiency. The emergence of the spot market would provide an 
investment indicator for investors in gas production/supplies and improve 
investments (Bhattacharyya, 2011). 
However, unbundling is weak in the gas industry as compared to the 
electricity industry and this is mainly because gas can easily be substituted for 
other fuels as compared to electricity (Haucap, 2007). Unbundling as an 
industry structural alternative has not been used extensively for the gas industry 
as compared to the electricity industry and much of the studies on the cost and 
benefits of unbundling are related to electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution segments. This study will attempt to explore the benefits of 
unbundling to the nascent gas industry in Ghana. The consideration of 
unbundling as a structural alternative will require effective regulatory oversight, 
which may not have previously existed (Pollitt, 2007). The implementation of 
the model will require technical managerial skills and therefore difficult to 




3.3.8. Evaluating Criteria for the Structural Models 
Which of these models will be a best-fit structural model for the 
nascent gas industry in Ghana? These models will need to be evaluated against 
selection criteria to identify the most suitable model. The evaluation criteria are 
adapted from the World Bank (2018) RISE project (Regulatory Indicators for 
Sustainable Energy). RISE is the first global policy scorecard of its kind grading 
111 countries in three areas on energy access, efficiency and renewable energy.  
The RISE project is aimed at helping government assess if there is a 
policy and a regulatory framework in place to drive progress on sustainable 
energy and pinpoints more on what can be done to attract investments. RISE 
classifies countries into a green zone of strong performers in the top third, a 
yellow zone of middle performers and a red zone of weak performers in the 
bottom third. The RISE project is adapted and modified for evaluating the gas 
industry structural models: on reaching to gas consumers; making gas 
affordable to consumers; reliable supply of gas; viable supply chain; attracting 
investments; reducing risks; ease of implementation and regulation. 
Additionally, Eberhard (2007) and Mckinsey (1993) provided 
structural model evaluation criteria where the various models are measured 
against a series of variables such as number of buyers and sellers, asset 
specificity, transaction frequency and uncertainty as indicated on Table 21.  
The balance of power between buyers and sellers determine the terms 
of transactions in an industry (Mckinsey, 1993) and the type of model required. 




relationship that involves frequent transactions, VIM is considered appropriate 
and as the features reduce the model evolves (Mckinsey, 1993). 
Table 21: Evaluation of the Structural Models 
Structural Elements Evaluation Questions 
Number of Sellers One seller, Few sellers or many sellers, no one 
dominant seller 








Site specificity, technical specificity and human 
specificity. 
Asset Intensity  
Durability: long term or short term contracts. 
Transaction Frequency Haggling, negotiations and renegotiations.  
Uncertainty Bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Source: Adapted from Mckinsey (1993). 
There are three factors in asset characteristics that affect the 
organisation of industry structures: specificity, intensity and durability, which 
raise switching cost and compartmentalises industries into VIM, SBM, MBM 
or Unbundling (Mckinsey, 1993).The degree of asset specificity determines the 
types of transactions and frames a signal for the type of industry structure model 
to adopt. A higher degree of asset specificity in long-term contracts will require 
VIM but as assets become re-deployable, the degree of VIM reduces and as 
more players are introduced, this will require open access to infrastructure. 
High capital intensity and high fixed costs increase the cost of any 
production disruption because of the magnitude of both cash and opportunity 
cost incurred during the interruption. In addition, asset durability increases the 
time horizon over which the risk and costs are relevant (Mckinsey, 1993). Put 




switching cost for both buyers and sellers and asset specificity has the highest 
degree in determining industrial structural organisation. 
High transaction frequencies raise cost since haggling and negotiation 
occur more often and allow for frequent exploitation, which is present in a 
typical VIM: in such instances, alternative structural models are considered. 
Uncertainty makes it difficult for companies to draw up contracts that will guide 
them as circumstances change and VIM locks companies to a single buyer even 
under uncertain conditions. Higher uncertainty exposure to a single firm under 
the VIM means that alternative models should be considered.  
In essence, the nascent gas industry structural models evaluation 
criteria in Ghana are measured on the basis of the objective of the industry in 
reaching to more gas consumers; making gas affordable to consumers; reliable 
supply of gas; viable supply chain; attracting investments and investors; ease of 
implementation; ease of regulation; reducing asset specificity; transaction 
frequencies and reducing risk/uncertainties.  
3.4.0. Strand 2: Business Viability of the Gas Industry in Ghana 
This section reviews literature on risk/uncertain investment conditions 
in the nascent gas industry in Ghana. Unfavourable investment climate was 
identified as a major challenge to business viability in the gas industry in Ghana 
(Fritsch and Poundineh, 2016). What are these unfavourable (risk and 
uncertainties) investments conditions and how can they be mitigated? How 
viable are supply components of the gas industry chain and what are the 




3.4.1. Risk Factor Identification in the Gas Industry in Ghana  
Conditions with unknown negative outcomes are termed risk or 
uncertainties (ADB, 2002). Whilst risk is the quantity subject to empirical 
measurement, uncertainties are non-quantifiable (ADB, 2002). Investing in 
natural gas projects has similarities to investing in oil and power projects. 
Upstream gas projects are modelled like oil projects, mostly left to private 
companies and joint venture entities (Razavi, 2007). 
Financing projects in the gas industry in a developing country are 
considered riskier than financing similar projects in the developed world. 
Investors want higher returns to compensate for higher risk and would want to 
diversify their risk and take mitigation measures (Razavi, 2007). Developing 
countries present to international investors unfavourable business 
environments, in institutional and organisational deficiencies in structural 
rigidities or vague divisions of responsibilities in weak regulatory systems.  
Bhattacharyya (2011) noted that energy investments are exposed to 
several risk factors at different levels, which are categorised into four levels: 
external, macro, meso and micro. At the external level, changes in global market 
conditions, financial markets, international trade, and environmental laws can 
affect investment decisions. 
 At the country-specific level, political and regulatory influences can 
affect investments. At the macro level, risk arises from possible changes in the 
political condition, regulatory environment or economic/financial conditions of 




currency valuation and the possibility of labour unrest.  
At the meso and micro levels, government-related issues could have 
major concerns. Three factors can be highlighted: law and order situation may 
not be conducive for undertaking investment projects. Terrorist and militant 
activities, kidnapping and other anti-social activities may prevent or delay the 
implementation of projects; high levels of corruption could adversely influence 
investment decisions, and politicisation of projects could lead to delays of 
projects (Bhattacharyya, 2011; Pend and Poundineh, 2017). 
At the micro-level, economic risk, volumetric risk, market risk and 
consumer risk, commercial risk as well as project implementation risk can 
influence investment decisions (Bhattacharyya, 2011). Schindlmayr et al. 
(2007) identified credit risk as one of the important micro-level risk factors 
where a party to a contract is unable to fulfil his contractual obligations of 
payments of agreed physical deliveries or acceptance to counterparties. 
These micro-level uncertainties (risk) according to Yescombe (2002) 
are generally classified into three: commercial, political and financial risk as 
indicated on Table 22. Commercial risk or project risks are those inherent in the 
project itself or the market in which it operates; financial risk or macroeconomic 
risk relates to external economic factors not directly related to the project and 
political risk or country risk relates to government action or political force 
majeure. Political and economic risk are also common in developing countries’ 
business environments. Economic risk affects the ability of consumers to pay 




cases result in total loss of investments or returns on investments (Razavi, 
2007). Leppard (2005) considered market risks to encompass commodity, 
foreign exchange and interest rate risks and exposure to uncertainties in these 
traded markets and physical risk such as force majeure and volumetric risk. 
James (2008), related operational risk as the loss caused by failure in 
operational processes or the Information Technology (IT) systems that affect 
the whole system including those adversely affecting reputation, legal 
enforcement and contractual claims. Leppard (2005) grouped all these risks into 
a risk galaxy, which describes the full range of risks that a transaction may 
expose an energy company to as captured on Table 22. 
Table 22: Risk factors common to the natural gas industry 
Risk Examples 
Commercial Risk: The influence of 
internal factors on gas projects. 
Project viability risk, completion risk, 
environmental risk, operational risk, revenue risk, 
raw materials and energy supply risk, contract 
mismatch risk, position concentration risk, 
operational risk, reputational risk, force majeure, 
volumetric risk, systems/procedural risk, tax risk, 
compliance risk, counterparty concentration risk, 
credit risk, price risk, and basis risk. 
Financial Risk: effects of different 
economic factors, which influences the 
realisation of projects in the gas industry. 
Their influence is indirect since they affect 
the economic environment of the project. 
Inflation risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, 
modelling risk, proxy risk, raw data risk, 
accounting risk, currency risk, funding liquidity 
risk, liquidity risk, and cash-flow risk. 
Political Risk: refers to the possibility that 
the government or political authorities in 
the country can influence development in 
the gas industry 
Political risk, investment risk, regulatory change 
or legal system change risk and quasi-political 
risk. Eg. War, civil unrest, expropriation, breach 
of undertakings by the host government, 
expatriation of profits, inconvertibility of a 
developing countries currency, litigation risk, 
sovereign risk, and country default risk.  





Traditionally, the uncertainties that the nascent gas industry in Ghana 
is exposed are not different from those identified above. Other possible risk 
factors include the risk of upstream investment viability, which requires a 
reasonable gas price and downstream consumer’s ability to pay, as they require 
low prices to stay viable, and the risk of arriving at an adequate gas price that 
will meet the expectation of all stakeholders. 
There are other possible risk factors such as foreign exchange, delays 
in project development, lack of supporting infrastructure, lack of credible off-
takers at the downstream, competition from other fuels such as LCO and 
competition from renewable energy, risk of appropriation and many more.  
3.4.2. Risk Evaluation in the Nascent Gas Industry in Ghana 
To evaluate the risk factors and their impact on the viability of the 
supply chain components of the gas industry in Ghana, several risk valuation 
models are considered: such as Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) model and input-
output models. LCA is the compilation and evaluation of inputs, outputs and the 
potential environmental impact of a product system throughout its lifecycle. 
LCA is used to provide a better understanding of the environmental impact of 
the product and its effects on each step of the chain and to show the competitive 
advantage of a product by showing its impact on the environment (International 
Gas Union, 2015). LCA has been used to access environmental impacts in LNG 
import projects and receiving terminals to identify synergies that reduce all 
environmental impact by sharing infrastructure asset (IGU, 2015). 




energy sector, it provides a consistent framework of analysis, and can capture 
the contribution of related activities through inter-industry linkages 
(Bhattacharyya, 2011). The scenario approach has been widely used in climate 
change and energy efficiency analysis, which narrates a set of illustrative 
pathways of possible future events and how they unfold. 
Bhattacharyya, (2011) posited that scenario analysis evidently does not 
capture all possible eventualities but tries to indicate how things could evolve, 
as the approach tries to use an analytical structure to examine future 
uncertainties and identify future pathways and estimate uncertainties. The main 
advantage of scenario approach is its ability to capture structural changes 
explicitly by considering sudden changes in the development paths.  
The theory of investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) 
applies the Net Present Value (NPV) principle in project decision making to 
determine the economic viability of projects (ADB, 2002). NPV converts all 
benefits, cost of projects occurring at different points into their present value 
equivalent, and aggregate them into the overall cost and benefits of the project 
(Bhattacharyya, 2011). NPV’s are usually considered the preferred methods in 
project evaluation and selection compared to Internal Rate of Return especially 
when both results are contradictory (Bhattacharyya, 2011). 
This study considers the evaluation of the supply components of the 
gas industry using NPVs to determine the viability of upstream production, 
processing, transmission and consumption of gas to power generation in Ghana. 




invest in the integrated gas value chain in Ghana? A basic method to determine 
this is to calculate the NPV of the project supply components.  
Sensitivity analysis measures the sensitivity of decisions to changes in 
the values of one or more parameters. Sensitivity analyses are performed when 
the conditions of uncertainty exist for one or more parameters (ADB, 2002). 
The objectives for undertaking sensitivity analysis is to help identify key 
variables affecting the viability of the project; investigate the consequences of 
likely changes in those factors; access reversal potentials and alternative 
investments and mitigation measures (Bhattacharyya, 2011; ADB, 2002).  
Sensitivity analysis fails to capture correlation and probabilities in 
changing events, (Bhattacharyya, 2011) as a result this is complemented with 
simulation analysis. Jehl et al. (1999) identified three simulation methods for 
oil and gas projects: option pricing, decision trees and Monte Carlo simulation. 
Option pricing uses Black and Scholes models for spot prices and expresses the 
value of the project as a stochastic differential equation. Decision trees neglect 
the time variation in prices but concentrate on estimating the probabilities of 
possible values of the project using Bayes theorem, prior and post probabilities.  
Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) captures probabilities and correlations 
in future events and require the user to specify the marginal distribution of all 
the parameters appearing in the equation of the NPV of the project. The 
simulation analysis fills the gap in sensitivity analysis by providing correlation 
and probability analysis (Jehl et al., 1999). MCS, however, assumes a fixed 




Risk evaluation using MCS is carried out using specially designed 
software such as RiskMasters, @RISK and Crystal Ball, which are adds-on to 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet programs. Comparatively, the @RISK software 
package is identified as highly suitable for undertaking Monte Carlo based 
simulations to drive probability distribution outcomes, fitting distributions to 
dataset outcomes and viewing graphically the distribution of variables and 
outcomes (ADB, 2002). Simulation and Sensitivity analysis are performed on 
the project NPVs, with outputs showing the impact of varying the key risk 
factors on the viability of the projects to identify which risk factors are 
financially sensitive to decreasing NPV and mitigation measured identified 
(Kasriel and Wood, 2014). 
This study develops an integrated cash flow model involving the gas 
value chain in Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to determine the business viability 
of the supply chain components, perform simulation analysis using @RISK 
software, and perform sensitivity/correlation analysis to identify uncertainties 
and areas of enhanced competitiveness in the nascent gas industry in Ghana. 
3.5.0. Strand 3: Regulation and Governance Arrangements  
It is important to note that, the regulatory framework, governance 
arrangements in the gas industry will depend on the industry structural model 
adopted. This has to evolve as the industry develops with decreasing. An 
effective regulatory framework will need to take retrospective and futuristic 
perspectives and adopt to the structural changes and risk/uncertainties as the 




in Ghana are presented in Chapter 2 (section 2.5.3.). 
Under VIM/SBM, effective regulations are required to prevent abuse 
of monopoly power, setting prices and ensure effectiveness. As the structural 
model evolves from SBM to MBM, the regulatory requirements are minimised 
until full competition is achieved where regulation is minimal.  
The regulatory regime under a vertically integrated structure is an 
administrative supervisory relationship between the government entity 
responsible for utility regulations and the state-owned companies. The 
regulatory entity responsibility, in this case, is to approve the overall tariff, 
design the structures that allocate the cost of energy provision among different 
sectors of the society and to set objectives for the industry (Peng and Poundineh, 
2016). Regulations in VIM are relatively simple because government regulation 
on industry behaviour is compared to competitive industries where self-
regulation is required. (Peng and Poundineh, 2016). 
In the competitive industry structure, ownership is dispersed among 
many different agents; both public and private participants operate in economic 
and market conditions. The government, via the activities of the regulatory 
authorities, interact with many companies along the gas value chain. Typical 
institutions include the ministry concerned, the regulatory authority more or less 
independent of the ministry.  
Regulations in competitive markets are those that promote effective 
competition by addressing market failures such as imperfect competition, 




unbundling and regulating the network: liquidity and competitiveness check for 
the other segments: correction of information asymmetry between suppliers and 
consumers and control of external factors. Infrastructure investment regulation 
is directly linked to economic regulation23.  
Economic regulations address a major problem in infrastructure 
investment: how will cost be recovered? (Phillips et al., 2016). An effective 
Regulatory framework must examine two basic dimensions of the regulatory 
system: regulatory governance24 and regulatory substance25 (Gencer et al., 
2006). Jamison et al. (2014) noted that economic regulations deal with 
regulatory independence and investors value the presence of independent 
regulations since this limits government opportunism and independent 
regulation strategically affects the interaction in price levels and investments. 
3.5.1. Regulating to Promote Infrastructure Investments  
How do we use regulations to attract infrastructure investments into 
the nascent gas industry in Ghana? Infrastructure investment decisions in energy 
networks are strongly influenced by regulatory frameworks and institutional 
arrangement (Cullmann and Nieswand, 2015). Eberhard (2006) stated the aim 
                                                          
23 Economic regulation refers to government impose restrictions on firms’ decisions through the 
control of price or quantity or control of entry or exit or the combination of them (Bhattacharyya, 
2011). 
24 Regulatory substance is the content of regulation, the “what” of regulations, which involves 
decisions about tariff levels and structures, cost mechanism, investments obligations (Gencer et 
al., 2006). 
25 Regulatory governance refers to the institutional and legal design of the regulatory system, 
the “how” of regulation, which involves decisions about the independence of the regulator 





of regulations in these nascent markets is to encourage efficient, low-cost, and 
reliable service provision while ensuring financial viability and attracting new 
infrastructure investments.  
How can regulation incentivise the appropriate balance for lower 
prices to consumers and provide incentives for infrastructure investments? The 
regulatory concerns in Ghana are targeted at providing appropriate tariffs for 
both consumers and investors. (Berg, 2001; Gencer et al., 2006; Cambini and 
Rondi, 2010; Poundineh and Jamasb, 2013; Jamison et al., 2014), identified the 
concept of combining economic regulation with an independent regulator as a 
panacea for addressing the problem of providing appropriate tariffs and 
attracting investment. (Bhattacharyya, 2011) noted that, there are two main 
types of economic regulations: rate-of-return and incentive regulations. 
3.5.2. Rate-of-return Regulations 
Rate-of-return is the income which investors are allowed to earn per 
unit of investments (Bhattacharyya, 2011). This rate-of-return allows the 
investor to recover its cost, guarantees investors fixed return on investments and 
reduce regulatory risk but fewer incentives to improve productive efficiency 
(Egert, 2009; Cambini and Rondi, 2010). The allowed rate-of-return on the 
ceiling capital can lead to overinvestments (Cullmann and Nieswand, 2015). 
Egert (2009) noticed that this may actually lead to under-investment 
due to allocative inefficiency i.e. the Averch-Johnson effect, because the 
guaranteed rate-of-return is higher than the market interest rate, companies have 




inefficient allocation of resources and overinvestments and lead to price 
distortions (Vogelsand, 2001; von Hirschausen, 2008).   
Vogelsand (2001) and Egert (2009) argue that rate-of-return 
regulations do not allow for industry structural changes in the transition from 
VIM/SBM to MBM/competition, as the tendency of over-investment and the 
issue of excess capacity may be used as a strategic tool to limit competition. 
Alternative regulations such as incentive regulations offer structural transitions, 
incentives for investments and efficiency improvements. 
3.5.3. Incentive Regulations 
The concern is how incentive regulation is used to attract and sustain 
infrastructure investments. Incentive regulations use rewards and penalties to 
induce utilities to achieve desired goals where the utility is afforded some 
discretion in achieving such goals (Bhattacharyya, 2011). The regulator rewards 
outcomes and controls less of behaviour (Vogelsand, 2001). Incentive 
regulations follow two principles: Competition is preferred to regulations and 
regulations should emulate competitive outcomes (Bhattacharyya, 2011). 
Incentive regulation provides the platform to transit fully to a competitive 
structure because it provides flexibility (Vogelsand, 2001). 
Poundineh and Jamasb (2013) analysed the relationship between 
incentive regulations, infrastructure investment and efficiency improvement. 
This relation requires a rebalancing of different incentive regulatory 
mechanisms. Incentive regulations improve efficiency and efficiency 




higher and productive efficiency improves under incentive regulations 
compared to rate-of-return regulations (Cambini and Rondi, 2010). 
Empirical evidence indicates that incentive regulation has a positive 
effect on infrastructure investments and if implemented with an independent 
regulator leads to higher infrastructure investments (Egert, 2009; Cullmann and 
Nieswand, 2015). Incentive regulations should be implemented within a 
coherent regulatory framework with an independent regulator to support 
infrastructure investment (Egert, 2009). However, Joskow (2008) opined that 
incentive regulation implementation requires a large amount of information 
from the regulated utilities in capital accounting, capital cost and expenses, cost 
reporting protocols, data collection and reporting requirements for dimensions 
of performance, comprehensive rate cases and price reviews and relevant 
incentive mechanisms determined. This information asymmetry presents a 
challenge to nascent industries to implement incentive regulations effectively.  
Incentive regulations can take two generic forms: individual incentive 
and yardstick regulations. In individual incentive regulations, the regulator will 
regulate the utility based on some of its observable measures and other 
alternative regulatory mechanisms are, price cap regulations, revenue cap 
regulations, targeted incentives, sliding scale, menu of contracts and partial cost 
adjustments (Bhattacharyya, 2011; Jamasb and Pollit, 2007). The main 
challenge in regulations in the nascent gas industry in Ghana is setting prices 




3.5.4. Price Cap Regulations 
Price cap regulation is defined as the index of the regulated service that 
is adjusted on an annual basis by the movement on general inflation (RPI), 
reference price, an X-factor that reflects efficiency improvement and a Y-factor 
that allows for pass-through of specific cost outside the control of the regulated 
utility (Vogelsand, 2001; Khalfallah, 2013). The initial rates under a price cap 
regulation are typically set based on the traditional rate of return regulations but 
subsequent changes are made automatically by using a set formula adjusted 
annually (Bhattacharyya, 2011). 
Price cap displays two main regulatory benefits: incentives for cost 
reduction and incentive and freedom for price rebalancing which are the main 
concerns of regulation in the nascent gas industry in Ghana. Two commonly 
used price indices are the retail price index (RPI-X) and the consumer price 
index (CPI-X). 
Price cap regulations are simple and flexible to use and implement 
(Vogelsang, 2001): they offer incentives to investors and consumers, reduction 
in regulatory intervention and micromanagement possibility and greater price 
certainty. Price cap regulations are consistent with the implementation of a 
competitive market structure and can accommodate gradual deregulation 
transition (Vogelsand, 2001). They can maintain cost-reducing incentives and 
improve on allocative efficiency compared to rate-of-return regulations.  
 However, price cap regulations are subject to manipulations, turn to 




2001). The argument on allocative inefficiency holds as it leads to lower 
productive efficiency; and finally, they do not provide a guaranteed return on 
investments as RoR regulations (Bortolotti et al., 2007; Bhattacharya, 2011). 
Joskow (2008) recognised that price cap regulations increase regulatory 
uncertainty for investors, which according to Egert (2009) can lead to under-
investment. Regulatory uncertainty does not only result in under-investment but 
may change the structure of investment, where the investor's chances of 
attracting finances may decrease resulting in future financial distress. However, 
regulatory uncertainty as Egert (2009) maintains can be mitigated by 
introducing the concept of an independent regulator. 
3.5.5. Designing Appropriate Incentive Regulations  
The tailor-made regulatory structure which Vogesland (2010) 
suggested for network industries is recommended for the nascent gas industry 
in Ghana, which involves the combination of rate-of-return and incentive 
regulation. Khalfallah (2013) suggested a hybrid approach of regulation where 
rate-of-return is combined with incentive regulations. Therefore, information on 
CAPEX is obtained from rate-of-return regulations with specific adjustment 
mechanisms that prevent overinvestment. OPEX information is obtained from 
incentive regulation to shift some operating cost to investment cost. Price cap 
under incentive regulation will regulate OPEX and rate-of-return for CAPEX.  
Khalfallah (2013) concluded that, while there is no single dominant 
regulatory approach that can be used to attract and sustain infrastructure 




system for such a purpose will be a sum of complementary regulatory tools. 
Price cap regulation is used as the central regime to reach cost and price 
efficiency. It is adjusted to include additional regulatory schemes to address 
other regulatory objectives beyond investments and tariffs. 
 3.6.0. Regulatory Governance and Institutional Arrangements  
Regulatory governance is the legal design of the regulatory system, 
institutional arrangements and the processes of regulatory decision making and 
infusing order (Williamson, 2010). Institutional arrangements are required to 
reorganise structural and regulatory institutions. Effective regulation is the 
function of governance mechanisms that frame and give rise to sound 
regulations and policies (Sovacool and Jarvis, 2011).  
The regulatory framework needs to be supplemented by governance and 
institutional arrangements, which are essential for gaining the social license to 
operate (Vivoda and Cornish, 2016). The independent regulatory model is 
recommended in regulatory governance (Gencer et al., 2006). Jamasb and 
Polllit (2007) posited that independent regulation has become the pre-requisite 
and cornerstone of reform of infrastructure investments in network industries.  
What is an independent regulator? This is when the regulatory body 
makes decisions without the prior approval of any other government entity and 
no entity other than the court or a pre-established appellate panel can over-rule 
the decision (Gnecer et al., 2006). The institutional building blocks of an 
independent regulator are organisational independence, financial independence 




principles that governed the independent regulator include credibility, 
legitimacy and transparency (Gencer et al., 2006).  
In fragile and weak states where regulatory capacity, commitment, or 
both are limited; there is considerable scope for developing transitional 
regulatory systems. Although not having all the elements of the independent 
regulator, there should be good dynamic properties (Gencer et al., 2006). These 
transitional models should be able to provide better incentives and pressure to 
move to full independent regulations. 
Estache (1997) and Gencer et al. (2006) recognised that for regulatory 
governance effectiveness and independence in the utilities sector ten principles 
have to be implemented; Independence, Accountability, Transparency, 
Predictability, Clarity of Roles, Completeness, Proportionality, Requisite 
Powers, Appropriate institutional characteristics and Integrity. 
3.6.1. Developing Effective Infrastructure Regulatory Framework  
The ultimate aim of the regulatory governance system should be 
targeted at achieving an effective regulatory framework, which transparently 
provides investors with credible commitments and consumers with genuine 
protection (Gencer et al., 2006). An effective regulatory system should be able to 
deliver important sector outcomes such as an increase in capital investments, 
adequate price levels, improved service quality, consumer satisfaction, 
profitability, productivity gains, expansion of basic services, subsidies to reach 




An effective regulatory system for infrastructure investments consist 
of the following; a legal framework where the regulatory agency is created 
based on a prospective law that fully articulates its jurisdictional authority, 
powers, duties and responsibilities. Legal powers to make final decisions within 
its statutory domain in setting tariffs and standards, rules and policies, prevent 
monopoly, promote competition, and protect consumers from unfair abuse. 
Financing of regulatory agencies: the level of financing for the agency 
should be maintained by law and should be adequate for the regulatory agency 
to meet its responsibilities competently and professionally in a timely manner. 
Regulatory accountability: the legislative committees or relevant ministries 
should subject regulatory agencies to periodic management audits and other 
types of effectiveness and performance reviews of the regulatory agencies. 
3.6.2. Regulatory Risk 
Investors in infrastructure in developing countries usually complain of 
regulatory risk and this is the potential loss of regulated revenues resulting from 
arbitrary changes to an agreed or pre-specified legal framework governing 
infrastructure investments. This could result from the idiosyncratic application 
of rules (Eberhard, 2006). Regulatory risk is mitigated through improved 
governance and Partial Risk Guarantees (PRG).  
The first PRG is a US$5million from the World Bank, a 20-year Utility 
concession in Uganda in 2004, to support a potential loss of regulated revenues 
resulting from a “guaranteed event”, based on pre-defined loss-of-revenues 




infrastructure expansion and additional network investments (Eberhard, 2006). 
Second, is the Ghana Sankofa Gas Project in 2015 involving the government, 
ENI-Ghana and World Bank of record investments of US$7.9billion to underpin 
a US$8billion of gas-to-power infrastructure investments (World Bank, 2015). 
3.7.0. Chapter Summary  
There is a relationship between industry structuring, independent 
regulation, and Infrastructure investment. VIM/SBM are been replaced with 
MBM/competitive structures so as traditional regulatory models of rate-of-
return are replaced with incentive regulations. Regulatory commitments in 
regulatory independence are one of the most important features influencing 
infrastructure investments. This study is viewing industry structuring through 
transiting from VIM/SBM to MBM/competitive markets, independent and 
incentive regulations in infrastructure investments and business viability of gas 















4.0. Introduction  
Chapter four presents the methods used to undertake the research. It is organised 
as follows: the first section provides details on the analytical framework and 
how it is developed. The next section describes the stakeholder consultation 
interviews and the procedures involved, and the final section describes the 
integrated cash flow model.  
The research methodology is a way to systematically solve a research 
problem. Analytical research method uses facts and information available to 
make analysis for critical evaluation purposes to solve a research problem 
(Creswell, 2012). The analytical research approach is an inductive research tool, 
which considers the cause-effect relationship in deterministic and stochastic 
phenomena (Kothari, 2004). 
4.1.0. The Analytical Framework for the Gas Industry in Ghana 
The methodology of the study develops an analytical framework based 
on an integrated cash-flow model, which systematically analyses issues in the 
gas-to-power sector in Ghana. The analytical framework incorporates technical, 
economic and policy issues in building an integrated gas-to-power industry. The 
integrated cash-flow model is used to undertake business viability and risk 
analysis in gas-to-power development. Two theories: Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) paradigm and the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) are 




regulations and infrastructure investment decisions in the nascent gas industry 
in Ghana. Stakeholder consultation through semi-structured guided interviews 
is included to collect primary data from the gas industry for the analysis. 
The integrated cash-flow model develops an Excel-based spreadsheet 
of the various supply components of the gas industry chain to determine their 
business viability for risk identification and enhanced competitiveness. 
Simulation and sensitivity analysis are performed on the integrated gas value 
chain to identify the various risk variables affecting their viability and 
mitigation measures suggested.  
This study combines the analytical framework built on the solid 
theoretical background of SCP and TCE to provide analysis on structure and 
regulations. It, also, develops an integrated cash flow model to undertake 
business viability, simulation and sensitivity analysis for opportunities and 
enhance the competitiveness of the nascent gas industry in Ghana. The rest of 
the study explains how the analytical framework and the integrated cash flow 
model are developed. 
4.1.1. Developing the Analytical Framework  
The analytical framework combines the SCP paradigm and TCE 
theories. The SCP paradigm establishes the interrelationship between industry 
structure, regulations and infrastructure investment decisions in gas-to-power 
industries. TCE, on the other hand, provides the theoretical relationship between 
these three components. The application of this analytical framework is narrated 




SCP is used to provide an evaluation model from the perspective of 
gas-to-power development to evaluate the performance of industrial 
organisation and regulations and attract infrastructure investments (Peng and 
Poundineh, 2017). The SCP framework offers a dynamically complex system 
of interlocking decisions made by government, firms and major stakeholders. 
The framework unites industry structure, regulations, governance and 
investment decisions. The SCP framework makes the following claims:  
 The ownership structure of the industry influences regulations. 
 The use of infrastructure is constrained by the capacity of the 
infrastructure available. 
 The continuous interactions between industry structure, regulations and 
investments decisions determine activities in the industry. 
 Governmental regulation or industry self-regulation? 
 Multidimensional and evolving nature of the interrelationship. 
 Hybrid nature of sector ownership in many developing countries   
From Table 23, ownership of infrastructure dictates the structure and 
regulatory pattern in the gas industry. Infrastructure ownership and operations 
determine the structure and regulations of the industry. The government and its 
agencies are the regulators, and at these early stages, government is the main 
infrastructure investor. The heavy government ownership of infrastructure and 
investments which dictate vertical integration and centralised ownership and 




government ownership and control. 
Table 23: The SCRP in three dimension 
Key Agents Structure Regulations Infrastructure 
Investments 








Own and operate 
infrastructure 
Government 
and its agencies 
Sector regulation 







constraints by sector 
regulatory regime. 




Implementation of new 
sector regulatory regime 
increases own regulatory 
capacity and influences 
goals of agents in other 
dimensions through 







Indirect regulation of 




regulations of sector 
performance through 
ownership control  
Sector performance 
perceived relative to 
interest groups. 
Source: Adapted from Peng and Poundineh (2017). 
As private sectors investments in infrastructure ownership increases, 
there are now several interest groups in the industry, mostly government, 
investors and other key industry players. There will be structural and regulatory 
constraints requiring interventions. Regulations influence the goals of agents in 
the industry through control and infrastructure operations and self-regulation, 
and the government indirectly steers the industry through economic regulations.  
Centralisation allows only state-ownership of infrastructure but 




structure encourages decentralisation and promotes private participation, 
regulations and governance arrangements would be designed in such regards 
and infrastructure investment decisions can be influenced positively or 
negatively. At a nascent stage where infrastructure is lacking, a combination of 
both state and private ownership of infrastructure can be formulated. 
Regulation of gas facilities such as the transmission network and storage 
facilities requires Third Party Access, tariff regulations and legal/functional 
unbundling. The absence of independent regulations will require that 
differences relating to institutional, administrative and governance are properly 
resolved. An independent regulator will, be able to resolve this issue.  
Under the centralised structure, the state utilities are responsible for all 
investment decisions: planning new investments and expanding existing ones. 
In most cases, the approval of the national regulator is needed. Cost recovery is 
integrated into the overall electricity tariff payable by end-users. Under the 
decentralised structure, however, the network segment is unbundled and 
infrastructure ownership is dispersed between a number of companies licensed 
to own and operate the infrastructure. The owner's plan for network 
infrastructure investments needs to be approved by the regulator and the value 
of investment is recovered via regulated tariffs payable by end-users of the 
network with full cost recovery. 
The SCP paradigm establishes the interrelationship between structure, 
regulations and infrastructure investments decisions in the nascent gas industry. 




semi-structured guided interviews. TCE, on the other hand, is used to determine 
industry behaviour and provide guiding principles for structuring, regulations 
and investment decisions (Spanjer, 2008). TCE considers the alternative 
governance structures and their competencies (Pratten, 1997), and vertical 
integration is the focal point of analysis for industry structure (Williamson, 
2010). However, competitive structures are alternative governance 
arrangements, which generate efficient outcomes (Pratten, 1997). 
In vertically regulated structures, government opportunism may present 
a source of risk to investors and to public organisations, which generally leads 
to inefficiencies (Spiller, 2013). Regulatory rules such as incentive regulations 
(price caps, incentive schemes, and use of competition) may generate flexibility, 
which reduces risk and may lead to higher investments. Investors also require 
appropriate institutional arrangements and safeguards to be prevented from 
government opportunism. This suggests an appropriate regulatory framework, 
which includes price setting, conflict resolution procedures, investment 
policies, quality control and sunk cost recovery (Spiller, 2013). 
Infrastructure investments in the gas industry can be viewed from the 
perspective of TCE. That is, long-term, asset specific investments require heavy 
capital and face several uncertainties (Jin and Doloi, 2007). Government alone 
cannot provide the entire infrastructure; the private investors usually 
supplement. The major challenges hindering private investors are the 
uncertainty of cost recovery and making a return on their investments. This 




arise from changes in the exogenous disturbances (external environment) or 
behavioural changes affecting the system (Willaimson, 2010; Jin and Doloi, 
2007) as indicated on Table 23. 
In a situation where the infrastructure is highly specific with dedicated 
ownership and unified contracts, there is a rare frequency of transactions or the 
transactions are between few players with simple transactions where vertical 
integration with governmental regulations are common. Uncertainties at this 
stage are minimal but government opportunism in meeting its objectives is high. 
In this condition of vertical integration with government, regulations are 
sufficient to maintain efficient industry performances. 
Investors are concerned with cost recovery and return on investments 
from the regulated tariffs as uncertainty levels are moving towards intermediate 
levels. Cost recovery and efficiency regulations are required to attract and 
sustain infrastructure investors. At this stage, the regulatory mechanism will 
require modifications to reflect the needs of the industry in addition to a 
dedicated regulator. An independent regulator with appropriate institutional and 
governance setting is required. The contribution of the SCP and TCE theories 
to the study methodology formulation is as follows: 
 The analytical framework provides a holistic view of the gas 
industry.  
 SCPR provided leading questions in structural, regulatory and 
investment decisions, which are used to develop the semi-




The theoretical review provided some questions, which serve as the 
basis for developing the questionnaires during the stakeholder consultations 
from the three objectives of the study:  
Industry Structure: to what extent does the ownership/operational 
control of the components of the gas industry impact on development? How is 
the current structure supporting industry operations? Who owns what, operates 
where and how? What is the appropriate industry structure for Ghana? To what 
extent does ownership/operational control in the gas sector overlap? What are 
the implications of such overlaps on regulations and investment decisions?   
Infrastructure Investment Decisions: what is the state of the gas 
industry infrastructure? What are the infrastructure requirements? What could 
be the potential risk and mitigations measures for investors? Which segments 
of the gas industry are viable for business? In addition, how sensitive are the 
most variable risk factors (e.g. prices, volumes, cost and others)? What is the 
state of gas-to-power infrastructure in the industry? What could be the potential 
implication of absolute and relative use or substitution between gas and power?  
Regulations and governance arrangements: what are the regulatory 
arrangements and measures affecting the industry? Are the regulatory measures 
adequate? What implication has regulation on infrastructure investment? Does 
the gas industry require its own laws and an act of Parliament? Are government 
energy policies related to the gas industry policy? Moreover, do power sector 
goals or gas sector goals or both drive them? How are government regulatory 




gas sector planning? 
The scheme on Figure 6 presents the analytical framework for the study 
of the gas industry in Ghana, which centres on the SCP and TCE theoretical 
framework. Stakeholder consultations with major players in the gas industry 
identified major challenges in the gas industry’s business environment. As a 
result, an integrated cash flow model is developed to lead the discussions, which 
are used for the viability analysis of the supply components of the gas industry.  
The top components (stakeholder consultation, review of business 
environment and the model development) influenced the choice of an all-
encompassing theoretical framework (SCP and TCE) suited for analysing the 
interrelations between structure, regulations and investment decisions in the gas 
industry in Ghana. These two theories influence the choice of structures and 
identification of structural options for the nascent gas industry in Ghana. 
Stakeholder consultation, business environment analysis and the theoretical 
framework should inform the identification of industry structural options and 




Figure 6: Analytical Framework of the gas industry in Ghana 
 
Source: Adapted from Bhattacharya (2011). 
The structural option and the regulatory arrangement identified should 
influence how institutions are to be arranged in the gas industry. The integrated 
cash flow model allows analysis of the business viability of the gas industry 
with input data from the stakeholder consultation and analysis based on the 
structure and regulatory arrangements and the SCP and TCE theories. A final 
specific regulatory choice is made for the gas industry in Ghana, which is 
informed by the feedback loop from the stakeholder consultation, business 
environment review and the integrated cash flow model development. 
The questions from the SCP and TCE theoretical review are identified 




semi-structured interviews is designed in stakeholder’s consultation to provide 
answers to the questions (Venables, 2016; Grindsted, 2005).  
4.2.0. Stakeholder Semi-structured Guided Interviews 
Semi-structured guided interviews are designed to allow subjective 
knowledge acquirement from persons regarding a particular reality they have 
experienced (Vinci et al., 2017; McIntosh and Morse, 2015). They provide the 
best methods for obtaining information on the motivation behind an entity’s 
choices, attitudes and beliefs, impacts of specific policies or events (Raworth et 
al., 2012). The method employs a relatively detailed interview guide and it is 
used when there is sufficient objective knowledge about a phenomenon 
(McIntosh and Morse, 2015; Elo and Kyngas, 2007). 
The semi-structured interviews are chosen in place of focus group 
discussions because it is difficult to bring together several organisations under 
one meeting schedule (Laforest, 2009). Questionnaires alone would not be able 
to give the detailed guided questions and answers from the analytical framework 
on Figure 6 and the number of questionnaires needed to meet a standardised 
research would not be met due to the limited number of participants (McIntosh 
and Morse, 2015). 
Semi-structured interviews provide simple and flexible questioning in 
addition to less imposing and more neutral and spontaneous data gathering tools 
required for gathering structural, regulatory and investments decisions 
information.  The interviewer refraining from evaluating comments, restricting 




manages interviewer bias (Wood et al., 2016; Grindsted, 2005). 
4.2.1. Sampling  
The sample size for data adequacy for semi-structured interviews must 
be guided by the following principles to ensure data adequacy (McIntosh and 
Morse, 2015). The semi-structured guided interviews answer the questions from 
the SCP and TCE framework, which as well provide numerical data for the 
integrated cash flow model to develop the analytical framework. Hence, a fair 
representation of respondents is required (Laforest, 2009).  
A sample size of 10-30 participants is recommended in performing 
non-parametric statistical analysis since a meaningful parametric statistical 
analysis requires a minimum of 10 participants (McIntosh and Morse, 2015). 
The instrument is, thus, used to collect data from eight (8) governmental and 
five (5) private companies engaged in the gas industry value chain in Ghana. 
Stakeholder individual respondents in their various organisations were 
identified based on their specific roles and direct participation in the gas 
industry as either state institutions or private infrastructure investors. The 
stakeholders are categorised into upstream, midstream, downstream and 
regulatory agencies and private companies to represent the full range of the 
components of the gas industry as indicated on Table 24. These companies are 
identified by their sectors of operations and the codes used to refer to the 
interviewees in subsequent chapters are described.  
  At least each of the segment is represented by an organisation. For 




is the national oil company involved in all oil and gas contracts with IOCs and 
acts as the national gas aggregator. ENI-Ghana is an IOC focused on non-
associated gas production as compared to Tullow Plc, Kosmos Energy, 
Anardarko, and Hess, which focus on crude oil production. In the midstream, 
Ghana National Gas Company Limited (GNGC) processes and transmits gas 
from the processing plant at Atuabu (Western Region) to thermal plants in the 
same region. WAGPCo is engaged in the transmission of gas from Nigeria to 
Ghana and provides a valuable contribution in private operation.  
In the downstream segment, there are four Independent Power 
Producers (IPP) using gas as a part of a stream of fuels or as the only fuel for 
their thermal plants operations. These are the Takoradi International Company 
(T1 and T2) which are operating under the Volta River Authority (VRA), the 
state utility company, Sunon-Asogli Power Plant (SAPP), and Asian-Middle 
East Resources and Investments (AMERI) Power Plant. Three of the four IPPs 
were interviewed (T1, T2, and SAPP). It was difficult interviewing AMERI due 
to the political hype and media attention it attracted on the contractual 
arrangements. There are other IPPs such as Karpower and CENIT, Emergency 
Power Barges, which do not use gas but light crude oil, heavy oil or distillate 







1. Ministry of Energy (Petroleum)- Energy Sector policy formulators 
2. Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC)-Involved in upstream natural gas 
production  
3. Ghana National Gas Company-National natural gas processing company 
4. Bulk Oil Storage and Distribution Company (BOST) - Natural Gas Transmission 
Utility 
5. Public Utilities and Regulatory Commission (PURC)-Energy financial/economic 
regulator  
6. Energy Commission- Energy Sector downstream technical regulator  
7. Petroleum Commission-Upstream Petroleum regulator  
8. Volta River Authority (VRA) – Ghana- electricity generation company  
And five (5) major private international companies  
1. ENI Exploration and Production Company: International Oil Company  
2. West African Gas Pipeline Company: Transmitting natural gas from Nigeria to Ghana 
3. Takoradi International Company 1 (T1): an IPP under VRA generating electricity using 
LCO/natural gas 
4. Takoradi Plant Thermal Plant Station (TAPCO): an IPP under VRA generating 
electricity using LCO/natural gas 
5. Sunon-Asogli Power Plant: an IPP generating electricity using only natural gas 
 
Table 24: Semi-structured guided Interviews Organisations  
State Institutions Activities Sector/Code 
Date of 
Interview 
Ministry of Energy 












Ghana National Gas 
Company 






Bulk Oil Storage and 
Distribution Company 

































Private Institutions       
ENI-Ghana 
International Oil Company-
Operators of SGP IOC-ENI 
4 May, 
2016 
West African Gas 
Pipeline Company 







Company (TICO) Downstream-IPP TICO-IPP 
6 May, 
2016 
Takoradi Thermal Plant 




Plant Downstream-IPP SAPP-IPP 
9 January, 
2017 
Source: Data from Interviews. 
4.2.2. Procedures for Conducting the Semi-structured Interviews 
The procedures started with a study plan; that is, conceptualising the 
sort of information required from the stakeholders based on the analytical 
framework and questions raised from the SCP and TCE framework for 
analysing the nascent gas industry in Ghana. Planning the interview sessions 




statement of willingness to participate in the interviews were next. Eight 
government agencies agreed to participate in the interviews and gave their 
consent. Three IPPs using natural gas as fuel and two private entities (ENI-
Ghana and WAGPCo), also, gave their consent. In total thirteen organizations 
agreed and gave their consent to participate in the interviews (see Appendix 1 
for sample of consent form). 
The interview questions were taken through a pre-test (pilot study) 
with three selected companies within the three segments of the gas industry 
including upstream, midstream and downstream. The pilot study companies 
were mostly state institutions which validated, refined questions, estimate 
interview durations, obtain clarity and feedback on using the semi-structured 
interview and reformulating the questionnaires (Vinci et al., 2017 and Wood et 
al., 2016). The pilot study also revealed that an authorization letter from the 
Ministry of Energy and De Montfort University would indicate authentication 
for the research. As a result, letter from the Ministry of Energy is obtained as an 
introductory letter during the interviews (see Appendix 2). 
The pilot study led to the modification of the interview schedule; thus, 
grouping it into three sections based on the study objectives and analytical 
framework: industry structure, regulations, governance arrangements, and 
infrastructure investments decisions. The introductory letters also serve as point 
of reference and authorization for the conduct of the main interviews. 
The interviews usually lasted an average of fifty minutes (50). The 




knowledge and experience in the gas industry and their ability to answer the 
questions. Open-ended questions are asked as indicated on the Boxes 4, 5 and 
6. The interview commences with the introduction of the purpose, signing of a 
second consent form, which indicates their acceptance to be interviewed, and 
seeking permission for audio recording. The audio recording provided a reliable 
means to transcribe the interview (Vinci et al., 2017).  
At the end of each interview and transcription, the interview was 
evaluated using the evaluation criteria suggested by Vinci et al. (2017). These 
include verification of questions asked during the interview in comparison with 
the questions on the interview schedule plan to ascertain their convergence and 
to verify whether there were disagreements or complementarity in each question 
asked. During the interviews, questions were rephrased, adapted to suit the 
condition of the industry players and to reflect the understanding of the player 
and the segment of operation. At the end of the validation process, the questions 
in Boxes 4, 5 and 6 were used as the main interview guide. Nevertheless, each 
industry player, depending on the segment of operation, is asked specific 
questions that pertain to their main operations. General questions were asked as 
well. However, some of the industry players such as GNPC, VRA and ENI have 

































Section 1: Structure of the natural gas industry in Ghana 
a. Which segment of the natural gas industry do you operate?   
b. How would you describe the current structure of the gas industry? What problems do 
the current structure pose to your investment? How should the industry be 
restructured/structure redefined? What possible industry structure do you 
recommend? How is the current gas industry structure contributing to your 
performance? 
c. Upstream Operations: Why should upstream production and supply of gas in Ghana 
be dominated by state-monopolies? Why should one company be allowed to operate 
the entire value chain of gas-to-power generation? What are your views on the current 
structure of the Gas Processing Plant (GPP)?  
d. Transmission Pipelines: what are your views on industry structure of gas 
transmission? How can the government play a role in the pipeline transmission of 
gas? What are the conflicting roles between the major pipeline companies in Ghana? 
How are gas transmission tariffs determined? Are they competitive to promote further 
investments?  
 
Section 2: Infrastructure Investment and Business Viability  
a. Identify the infrastructure requirements for the gas industry in Ghana, identify business 
opportunities in the industry, and identify the risks your organisation faces in the 
industry and suggest any mitigation measures. 
b. What are your major investment obstacles in the industry? Are you satisfied with the 
current structure of the industry? Are you satisfied with current regulatory activities in 
the industry? How are your operations affected by the structure and regulations of the 
gas industry in Ghana? 
c. What is the best investment environment for you? What should be done to provide the 
best investment environment for your future infrastructure investment? What should 
be done to enable full cost recovery and sufficient return of your investments from 















4.2.3. Stakeholder Semi-structured Guided Interview Data Analysis 
The aim of the stakeholder interviews in this study is to elicit and 
ascertain stakeholders’ perspectives to confirm, correct, or discover new 
knowledge pertaining to the nascent gas industry in Ghana (McIntosh and 
Morse, 2015). Analysis from the interviews are designed to provide a 
comprehensive and accurate descriptive summary of participants’ perspectives 
and to lead arguments in the analysis. The data analyses procedure include 
preparing the data for analysis and conducting content analyses. The three main 
forms of analysis of semi-structured interviews are content analysis, discourse 
analysis and hermeneutic analysis (Vinci et al., 2017). This study adopts content 
and discourse analysis, which started out with organisation and transcription of 
data obtained, identification and coding of statements made using NVivo, 
outlying of statements made from the study objectives; analysis and clarification 
Section 3: Regulatory Arrangements of the natural gas industry in Ghana 
a. Upstream: Is there any regulatory framework for upstream production of gas? Are 
there specific regulatory requirements for gas production? Do we require any 
upstream gas production regulatory framework for Ghana? How is the regulatory 
mechanism working? 
b. Midstream: Is there any regulatory framework for pipeline transmission activities? 
How is the regulatory framework for pipeline transmission of gas working? How is 
the current regulatory framework contributing to your performance?  
c. Downstream: Do we have a regulatory framework governing the use of gas for 
electricity generation? How is the regulatory framework working in support of your 
investment cost recovery? What should be factored in the pricing of gas for 




of obtained and coded terms and summary of findings (Vinci et al., 2017). 
The transcribed data were converted into a PDF document, embedded 
into the NVivo software version QSR11, coded into various themes and sub-
themes and analysed. The outcome was used to lead arguments and discussions 
in Chapters 5 and 7. Some of the answers and data obtained (e.g. prices, 
production volumes, discount rate and others) from the interviews are also 
added to the integrated cash flow model in Chapter 6 to develop a more accurate 
and robust analytical framework which reflects industry activities.  
4.3.0. Integrated Value Chain Analysis  
The risk intrinsic to natural gas industries in developing countries 
makes it necessary to develop an integrated value chain, which links exploration 
and production, processing, transmission and consumption as a complete 
system. Although IOCs oil production is linked to gas production, gas 
production is peculiar to an exclusively linked pipeline transportation to specific 
consumers with high initial fixed cost and consumption limited to a particular 
location, unlike oil, which is a global product (Herath and Malhotra, 1996). 
While most cash flow studies are concerned with modelling Production 
Sharing Contracts (e.g. Kasriel and Wood, 2014) and power plants economics 
separately (e.g. Razavi, 2007), Herath and Malhotra (1996) modelled gas 
exploration and production, transmission and power generation as an integrated 
system. Their integrated cash flow model has three main objectives. First, to 
demonstrate the need to analyse gas projects as an integrated system; second, to 




determine the returns to different parties under different parameters and perform 
sensitivity analysis and finally, to provide a practical tool to help governments 
negotiate gas contracts.   
Ibata (2009) extended the integrated cash flow model in a Ph.D. thesis 
to ascertain the economic viability of gas supply and the economic analysis of 
alternative natural gas uses in DR. Congo. The integrated cash flow model was 
used to demonstrate that in DR. Congo gas to power generation is economically 
viable. However, associated natural gas to power generation was identified as 
economically viable due to lower upstream gas prices. Non-associated gas-to-
power generation will require government subsidy to remain viable and should 
be competitive to hydropower.  
This study’s methodology will adapt the integrated cash flow model of 
Herath and Malhorah, (1996) extended by Ibata’s (2009) DR. Congo gas-to-
power analysis to examine the business viability of the supply components of 
the gas industry value chain in Ghana. This is achieved through developing an 
integrated cash flow model and performing simulation and sensitivity analysis 
to provide a practical risk identification and mitigation tool for the nascent gas 
industry in Ghana. 
The advantage of considering the gas industry within the fulcrum of an 
integrated cash flow model instead of mutually exclusive components is the 
ability to analyse the impact of Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) terms, 
processing and transmission tariffs and power generation profitability on 




viability of natural gas exploration and production, processing and transmission 
and power generation, determining the negotiating boundaries for gas prices and 
PSC terms in Ghana’s nascent gas industry. 
4.3.1. Integrated Gas-to-power Value Chain Analysis 
Natural gas integrated value chain analyses consist of activities related 
to exploration and production of natural gas, its transportation from the 
wellhead to a processing plant, then through the transmission pipelines to end 
users in the gas market. The initial consideration is usually given to the type of 
contracts signed, as indicated on Figure 7. This is either Production Sharing 
Contracts (PSC) or Joint Venture Agreement or Hybrid Contracts. The next 
component of the system is the processing and the transportation companies, 
which are usually independent companies. 
The final component in the integrated system is the consumer, either a 
thermal power plant or ammonia/fertilizer plant, Aluminium plant, Mining 
Companies, Medium to Small-Scale Industries or LNG for exports if reserve 
volumes are sufficient. Emos Consultancy (2010) envisaged the use of natural 
gas as a source of raw material or source of generating power for the 
industrialisation roadmap of Ghana. The salt industry, the bauxite industry, the 
lime industry, manganese, iron ore and the gold mining industries provide 












Source: Adapted from Herath & Malhotra (1996). 
Herath and Malhotra (1996) noted that a necessary condition for the 
long-term stability of the integrated natural gas chain for electricity generation 
is that it should be competitive with the other alternative uses and alternative 
fuels. Elements of the project components have to be viable in the supply of gas 
to the endpoint of the project and must be cost competitive compared to the 
alternative fuels such as coal, or imported gas, distillate fuel oil or Light Crude 
Oil (LCO).  For the development of LNG for export, the project must be 
competitive with current LNG export prices and capital cost. There should be a 
receiving country willing to provide guaranteed investments. In addition, as 
feedstock to petrochemical industry or usage to other industrial consumers such 
as a fertilizer plant, the end product must be competitive with current domestic 
and international market conditions and project economics, possible alternative 
product sources and services.  
The government is involved in the gas chain decisions making 
processes in terms of fiscal policy, energy policy, ownership, loan guarantees 
and impact on balance of payments and developing a legal framework for 
contracts. The government has the capacity to influence the business viability 

















appropriate form and government interventions (Herath and Malhotra, 1996). 







4.4.0. The Integrated Cash Flow Model for the Gas Value Chain 
The Integrated cash flow model for the natural gas industry is a simple 
spreadsheet consisting of four cash flow models: upstream production project 
(PSC), the gas processing plant, transmission pipeline network and the power 
plant consumers interconnected by their pricing and fiscal relationships as 
indicated on Figure 7. The link between upstream and the processing plant is 
the wellhead price of gas while the link between the transmission pipeline and 
power generating companies is the selling price of gas. 
 Each of these activities is linked to government and investors through 
the fiscal relationships, production royalties, and processing and transmission 
charges. The impact of these costs, profits and fiscal interrelationships are 
reflected in the power tariffs to be charged from electricity consumers (Herath 
and Malhatro, 1996). While the integrated cash flow model for the natural gas 
chain cannot be used for optimisation analysis, which is not the focus of this 
study, it can be used to perform static business viability analysis, simulation and 
 Long and firm chain 
 Physically fixed links from well-head to power consumers 
 Upstream production is dominated by IOCs 
 Single natural gas aggregator upstream - GNPC 
 Two major transmission pipeline networks (GNGC and WAGPCo) 
 One natural Gas Processing Plant (GPP) (GNGC) 
 Interruption in upstream affect downstream and vice versa 
 High capital investment along the chain 
 Downstream consumption is dominated by power plants (VRA) 
 The industry is dynamic and subject to modification  




sensitivity analysis. The inputs for the model are relatively simple and consist 
of capital expenditures, operating costs, gas production data, initial set of gas 
prices, plant capacity, load factors, efficiency rate, heat rate and electricity 
tariffs for the power plant summarised in Table 25.  
Once the data pertaining to the gas industry are inputted and the model 
is set up. It aims at providing output information of Net Present Values (NPV) 
for upstream gas production, NPV for the processing plant, NPV for the 
transmission pipeline and NPV for the combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) 
which are used for simulation analysis. The risk factors identified are compared 






Table 25: Input Build-up Cash Flow Model Table 
Source: Herath and Malhotra, (1996). 
Upstream Natural Gas 
Production PSC 
Natural Gas Processing Plant Transmission Pipeline Company Power Generating Plant 
Upstream Capital Cost (US$m) Processing Plant Capital Cost (US$m) Pipeline Capital Cost (US$m) Plant Capacity (MW) 
Upstream Operating Cost (US$m) Processing Plant Operating Cost 
(US$m) 
Pipeline Operating Cost (%) Capacity Cost (US$/kW) 
Gas Production Volumes (bcf/year) Natural Gas Receiving Volumes 
(BCF/year) 
Pipeline Transmission Tariffs 
(US$/mm)  
Plant Load Factor 
Well-Head Price of Gas 
US$/mmbtu 
Condensate Receiving Volumes  Efficiency Rate 
Cost Gas (%) Natural Gas and Condensate 
Processing Tariffs (US$/mm) 
 Heat Rate 
Royalty, Profit Tax and Income 
Tax 
Discount Rate, Inflation Rate and Rate 
of Return (%) 
 Operating Cost ($/kwh) 
Discount Rate   Maintenance Cost 
(cents/kwh) 
Cost Recovery % (CR)   Electricity price (US 
cents/kwh) 




4.4.1. Components of the Cash Flow Model 
Kasriel and Wood (2014) developed an advanced integrated cash flow 
model using PSC terms modelled in Microsoft-Excel spreadsheet to provide an 
analytical framework that reflects the objectives of this study. The inputs for the 
model would have to be changed according to requirements of each country 
prior to carrying out the static, simulation and sensitivity analysis to determine 
negotiating boundaries for gas prices and PSC terms, which serve as the most 
important element for the gas industry (Herath & Malhotra, 1996). Discounted 
cash flows (NPVs) are calculated as follows (Kasriel and Wood, 2014): 
a. Discount every year’s cash inflows (cash received, e.g. Revenues) 
b. Discount every year’s cash outflows (cash spent, e.g. Costs) 
c. Subtract each year’s (b) from (a) to get annual discounted net cash flow 
values and 
d. Sum each year’s (c), to get net present value (NPVs), which is one of 
the most commonly used business viability valuation metrics in the 
petroleum industry. 
The basic NPV decision rule is that investments, which have a positive 
NPV, are good investments, i.e. they are viable businesses. Those with negative 
NPVs, on the other hand, are considered not viable or high-risk projects 
requiring further risk analysis. From the NPVs generated, simulation is carried 
out using @RISK software to determine the level of viability. Sensitivity 
analysis are carried out on the most variable risk factors to determine which risk 




Kasriel and Wood (2014) upstream PSC model is used to develop the 
first component of the integrated cash flow model for Ghana (Upstream Natural 
Gas Production) because of its robustness in building analytical frameworks for 
upstream gas/oil production.  












4.4.2. Upstream Production Project: Sankofa Gas Project  
In Production Sharing Contracts or Agreements (PSC/A) the IOC has 
a 100% equity interest in the oil and gas project and pays for all field costs. For 
instance, the Sankofa Gas Project has ENI-Ghana, the operators of the field, 
contributing 44.4% capital share, Vitol contributing 35.6% and GNPC, on 
behalf of the Government of Ghana, having a carried interest of 20%. ENI-
 Gross revenue/field revenue are the production volume times the price. Here 
“gross” means before any deductions and sometimes the term “net revenue” 
is used to mean “net of” i.e. after the deduction of royalty and rate-of-return 
(ROR). 
 Fiscal Outflows (Government Take): A bonus is a kind of fiscal payment 
made, often when some production milestone is reached e.g. Signature bonus 
paid when an agreement is executed. Rentals are periodic fees payable, based 
on the area of the license, and sometimes varying depending on what kind of 
activity (e.g., exploration, development or production) is occurring. Royalties 
are fiscal payments, which are usually calculated as some proportion of gross 
revenue (e.g. 15% or 17%). Income tax is payable as a percentage of taxable 
income, which is calculated as gross revenue less certain deductions or tax 
allowances. Field Outflows (IOC): CAPEX is capital expenditure. In this 
case, it is the cost of getting the field ready to produce by drilling wells and 
building infrastructure such as pipelines and processing facilities. OPEX is 
ongoing operating costs during the production years. (OPEX is sometimes 
incurred in the pre-production years, when CAPEX is being spent, consisting 
of things like administrative and managerial costs. Decommissioning costs 
are the cost of removing equipment, plugging wells and restoring production 
site after production ends.  







Ghana and Vitol account for 80% of the projects cost with GNPC given the 
opportunity to increase their participating interest in the future. 
The upstream gas revenues are arrived at by multiplying gas 
production volumes by the wellhead price of gas. It is estimated on average 
54BCF (which is the total reserve volumes of gas divided by the contract 
duration) of gas is produced annually from SGP sold at US$9.8/MMBtu. 
Royalties are the first to be deducted from the gas revenues. Full cost recovery 
is allowed whereby CAPEX and OPEX are deducted from the net gas revenues 
after royalties. The net income is then discounted to arrive at the net present 
values. The PSC specifies that a portion of net revenue, that is revenue after 
royalty deduction, will be the maximum amount available to the contractor to 
be reimbursed for designated field cost incurred. The portion of revenues the 
contractor receives as reimbursement is cost gas (Kasrial and Wood, 2014).  
4.4.3. Contract Parties 
Gas Production Sharing Contract (PSC) is a contractual agreement 
between two or more parties for the exploration and production of natural gas. 
The state automatically becomes one such party to the contract,  with a state 
entity acting on its behalf such as the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation 
(GNPC) while the other party may be a single or a consortium of investors 
usually foreign companies (International Oil Companies) with experience, 
technology and financial stability (Kasrial and Wood, 2014). For the Sankofa 




4.4.4. Contract Duration 
PSC are long-term contracts usually for the full potential of the 
producible area. A typical PSC would be for about 20 years or more with the 
option to extend the contract required to enable any contractual obligations to 
be met. Due to the long-term nature of PSC, its utmost importance is for all 
parties to come to an agreement to reflect on the balance of commercial interest 
of all involved. The SGP, for instance, has an average duration of 20years. 
4.4.5. Royalty 
PSC includes a royalty payment to the government on natural gas 
produced, which could take several forms. For instance, a flat charge, a 
percentage of revenues or a sliding scale tied to the level of output. The 
advantage of a sliding scale is that it is progressive on higher prices and higher 
production and the government’s take would increase in case of favourable 
developments (Kasrial and Wood, 2014). Royalties are a direct source of 
income to the government but should not be too excessive, as it would adversely 
affect the success of the project and provide no benefit to consumers since the 
gas is domestically consumed (Kasrial and Wood, 2014). The Government of 
Ghana takes 7.5% of gross revenues as royalty for gas production from the SGP. 
4.4.6. Natural Gas Processing Plant (GPP)  
The processing plant receives natural gas from upstream as their main 
input. The current installed capacity of the GPP is 150,000MMBtu/day. The key 
components of the processing plant include the capital cost, operations and 




production of gas is the associated gas and condensates received for processing. 
The associated gas is then separated into lean/methane gas and other products 
such as ethane, propane, and butane together known as Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
(LPG). There is a processing tariff for methane gas to the operators of the GPP 
but the LPG is sold separately. The processing tariffs and LPG sales revenues 
are added together to arrive at the total sales revenues for the GPP. CAPEX and 
OPEX are deducted and the remaining net revenues are discounted to arrive at 
the net present value for the entire operation of the GPP.  
4.4.7. Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline  
The transmission pipeline receives lean/methane gas from the GPP and 
non-associated gas from the SGP through an Onshore Receiving Facility (ORF). 
Key components of the transmission pipeline include the capital, operation, 
maintenance cost, and transmitting tariffs. The link between the transmitting 
pipeline and the GPP are the methane/lean gas. The transmission tariffs for the 
GNGC pipeline is US$2.28/MMBtu. 
Transmission volumes are multiplied by the transmission tariffs to 
arrive at gross revenues. CAPEX and OPEX are deducted from net income, 
which is discounted to arrive at the net present value of the transmission 
pipeline. Five percentage of the total gas volumes made available to the pipeline 
is assumed to be either used for the compressor station fuels or lost due to 
technical leakages and regarded as “unaccounted for gas” (Arpino et al., 2014).  
In order to recover the investment cost for the processing plant, the 




charged. In doing this, the loan from the Chinese Development Bank for the 
construction of the GPP and the transmission pipeline with its interest 
repayments, recovering other capital and operations costs and getting a 
reasonable return should be considered. Both processing and transmission 
tariffs are determined by the economic regulator PURC in consultation with the 
infrastructure owners.  
4.4.8. Combined Cycle Gas Thermal Power Plant 
The CCGT is assumed to receive natural gas from the SGP through the 
GPP and the transmission pipeline for electricity generation. This is the last 
component of the integrated cash flow model. The cost components of the 
CCGT plant include capital cost, operations and maintenance cost, gas 
requirements, fuel cost, power generated and electricity tariffs. The CCGT plant 
is also assumed to have a capacity of 1100MW because the quantities of natural 
gas available for consumption per annum is on average 54BCF and it is a 
1100MW plant which can fully utilise this gas as indicated on the integrated 
cash flow model (in Appendix 3). This could be a single plant or a multiple of 
plants totalling 1100MW. However, this study assumed that this is a single unit. 
Table 26: Power Plant Assumptions 
Assumptions  
Plant Capacity (MW) 1100 
Capital Cost 950$/kW 
Plant Cost US$ million 1615 
Plant Life 25years 
Plant Load Factor 90% 
Plant Efficiency 48% 
Heat Rate 7145BTU/kWh 





The 1100MW plant will cost about US$1.045billion based on a capital 
cost of US$950/kW (World Bank, 2013). The operations and maintenance 
(O/M) cost are also based on the assumed O/M cost for a typical 1100MW plant. 
The plant efficiency is based on the plant heat rate multiplied by the number of 
days the plant is operational and divided by one. The load factor is assumed as 
90% since this is a relatively new plant and the plant is assumed to have a 
20years lifespan (World Bank, 2013). 
The total cost of the CCGT Plant includes the capital cost of the 
project, operations and maintenance cost and fuel cost. The fuel Cost is the gas 
volumes required to operate the plant multiplied by the prevailing gas prices or 
the current Light Crude Oil (LCO) price multiplied by the LCO volumes 
consumed. The link between the CCGT and the upstream project is embedded 
in the final price of gas.  
4.5.0. Why Gas-to-Power or a Fertilizer Plant in Ghana? 
Why gas-to-power development in Ghana? The first reason is the 
relative strategic importance attached to electricity demand in Ghana and the 
second is the netback pricing of electricity and other products and projects. The 
Ministry of Energy final Gas Master Plan (2015) reports identified the power 
sector as the highest value user of Ghana’s gas resources. Hydro-electricity 
generation potential is exhausted and the increasing generation cost of 
petroleum fuels has made gas the most reliable fuel for electricity generation 




fertilizer plant as a strategic investment alternative (Gas Master Plan, 2015). 
Table 27: Natural Gas Utilisation Options in Ghana 
Utilisation Options Key Requirements 
Power Plant -Requires reliable and constant supply of gas. 
-Competitiveness of electricity tariffs would very much depend on 
how competitive gas prices would be. 
-Tariffs competitiveness would also require high plant utilisation. 
Ammonia Plant -Economic size of a world-scale ammonia plant would need to be 
660,000 tons per year and would require about 60million cubic feet a 
day (cfd) of gas over at least 20years. A supply level over the Jubilee 
field’s projected gas output at plateau level but possible with other 
fields (TEN, Greater Jubilee and Sankofa). 
-Depending on ammonia prices, an ammonia plant would need 
competitive gas prices of about US$1 to US$2 per MMBTU for the 
case of a project based in Ghana, which are far below the short-term 
projected gas prices. 
Methanol Plant -Economic size of a world-scale methanol plant would need to be 
1.6million tons per year and would require about 170million cfd of gas 
over at least 20years. A supply level over the Jubilee fields projected 
gas output at plateau level unless the Sankofa project which is also 
dedicated to power plants. 
-Depending on world methanol prices, a methanol plant would need 
competitive gas prices of about US$4 to US$5 per MMBTU for the 
case of a project based in Ghana. 
Industries  -Economics of gas to industries would depend on load proximity to 
gas supply (issues of gas infrastructure-distribution pipelines) and 
nearby demand (anchors and demand clusters). 
-Gas prices should be competitive with alternative fuels. 
Source: Nexant Report, (2010). 
An ammonia/fertilizer plant could be a viable business opportunity in 
Ghana considering that for a viable fertilizer plant, 60 million cubic feet of gas 
a day as indicated on Table 27 feedstock is required for a period over 20years. 
These gas volumes could be assured from any of these gas sources: the Jubilee 
fields and the TEN fields coming on stream since these are associated gas 
sources with relatively cheap wellhead prices. The 660,000 tons per year of 
ammonia produced from the plant would supplement Ghana’s increasing 




(AfricaFertilizer.org, 2017).  
A 30,000MMBtu/day of gas can be spared from either the Jubilee 
fields, TEN, Sankofa fields or the TEN 50,000MMBtu/day associated gas can 
be dedicated to the fertilizer plant. A domestic associated gas reserve (with 
crude oil absorbing all project CAPEX and OPEX cost), dedicated to the 
fertilizer plant could meet the downstream price requirements of a projected 
US$1.7/MMBtu to make the plant competitive. This is capable of providing an 
alternative downstream consumer of gas to prevent the condition of industry 
monopsony structure in Ghana’s nascent gas industry. 
4.6.0. Simulation and Sensitivity Analysis  
Nersesian (2013) applied the @RISK software developed by Palisade 
Inc. to model risk in energy projects. The @RISK software is applied to 
integrated cash flow models’ output variables (NPVs) to analyse the 
uncertainty/risk contained in the model. This presents a slightly different 
uncertainty/risk modelling output from Herath and Malhotra (1996) and Ibata 
(2009) integrated cash flow models. The @RISK software incorporates the 
building of simulation models, which present a variety of scenarios that 
explicitly incorporate uncertainty/risk with probability distribution. @RISK 
takes care of the tedious details of uncertainty/risk and allowing careful 
examination of distributions.  
Palisade (2011) states the steps for performing simulation and 





 The first step is to create an integrated gas industry value chain cash 
flow Excel model using appropriate Excel formulas to implement the 
logic that leads from the inputs, the uncertain inputs, and the decision 
variables to outputs (NPVs). 
 Identify the certain and uncertain inputs. Uncertain inputs (e.g. Prices, 
volumes, cost parameters etc.) are the focus of the model and decide 
which probability distributions to use for the uncertain inputs and 
determine the decision variables. 
 Designate the output(s) you want @RISK to keep track of and change 
@RISK setting as necessary, especially the number of iterations and 
possibly the number of simulations and run the simulation. 
 Examine the distributions of the designated outputs with various 
@RISK tables and charts and perform sensitivity and correlation 
analysis on the results to see which uncertain inputs have the largest 
effects on the outputs. 
The main advantage of the integrated cash flow model is the ability to 
perform sensitivity analysis under different business scenarios and negotiating 
conditions whilst considering the profitability of the projects and their risk using 
“what if” based on a percentage variation from the base case, i.e., the original 
project NPV. Most importantly, Excel models can facilitate sensitivity analysis 
where various outputs vary as inputs and/or decision variables are varied in a 
systematic way.  




analysis together. A 5-100% change on either of the risk factors can be varied 
to detect its effects on the project NPV. Example, “what if” natural gas prices 
increase by 10%, 20%, 30% or 90%; what happens to the CCGT project NPV? 
Excel provides a one-way and two-way “data table” feature which is more 
useful and powerful for showing the effects of many different variable settings 
in a single view (Kasriel and Wood, 2014).  
Box 9: Typical Sensitivity Analysis 
Influence of varying gas prices, electricity tariffs, processing tariffs, and 
transmission tariffs on projects NPV. Impact of fiscal policy (royalties) on 
government and contractor returns. Effects of government take and contractor 
returns on charging production rate on projects profitability. Effects of changing 
capital and operating cost on the projects NPVs. Effects of the varying discount 
rate on the profitability of the projects. 
 
 
4.7.0. Chapter Summary  
The methodology of the study combines the SCP and TCE theories 
with stakeholder consultations through semi-structured guided interviews and 
an integrated cash flow model to develop a robust analytical framework to 
undertake an integrated analysis of the structural, regulatory and governance 
arrangements and infrastructure investment decisions within the nascent gas 









STRUCTURING THE NASCENT GAS INDUSTRY IN GHANA 
5.0. Introduction 
Chapter five focuses on the first objective of the study: to evaluate 
possible gas industry structures in Ghana. The first section of the chapter 
focuses on the structural challenges identified during the stakeholder 
consultations. The next sections, however, look at the alternative structures 
while the final section considers evaluating the different structures. The chapter 
ends with a conclusion.  
During the semi-structured guided interviews with stakeholders, the 
following questions on industry structure were asked: 
a. How would you describe the structure of the gas industry in Ghana?  
b. What problems does the current structure pose to your investment?  
c. Should the industry be restructured?  
d. What possible industry structure do you recommend?  
5.1.0. The Current Structure of the Gas Industry in Ghana 
Stakeholders identified the current structure of the gas industry in 
Ghana as state-controlled or a state monopoly of vertically integrated structure. 
This current structure is government-led as espoused by the Ministry of Energy, 
GNPC and GNGC and is similar to the VIM/SBM. The interviewee in the 
Ministry of Energy edged for VIM/SBM at the initial and infantile stages of 
development [Min-Energy]. However, other interviewees [Midstream-EC and 
IOC-ENI] argued for a rather competitive structure. 




of the gas industry in Ghana is “confusing” and “in a state of a mess” [IOC-
ENI]. The structure of the gas industry, which is largely described, as a 
competitive model by current laws are not being implemented though the 
Energy Commission Act 1997 (Act 541) states their mandate as: 
‘Promoting competition in the supply, marketing and sale 
of petroleum products26’ [Midstream-EC]. 
In this model, one interviewee [Midstream-EC] emphasised that 
upstream production/supply of petroleum products including gas will be open 
to competition, and the transmission of gas will operate on open access basis as 
indicated on the Energy Commission Natural Gas Access Code: 
‘Promote the development of a competitive gas market by 
establishing uniform principles for owners and users of gas 
pipelines to allow transparent and non-discriminatory 
access to the gas transmission system’ [Midstream-EC].  
The existing gas industry structure in Ghana identified in the 
stakeholder consultation (VIM/SBM) is different from what is stated in the 
above Energy Commission Act (541) and the Energy Commission Natural Gas 
Access Code (a Competitive structure). These contrasting structures present a 
challenge to the nascent gas industry in Ghana. The question arising from this, 
then, is ‘how can a suitable gas industry structure be developed for the nascent 
gas industry in Ghana?’ 
5.1.1. Challenges of the Current Gas Industry Structure in Ghana 
The stakeholder consultations and the NVivo analysis identified five 
                                                          
26 Petroleum products are liquid or gaseous fuel and lubricants derived from crude oil (Energy 




major challenges in the gas industry in Ghana as indicated on Table 28. 
Table 28: Challenges Identified from Stakeholder Consultations 
Stakeholder Identified Challenges Segment 
Lack of appropriate industry structure Upstream, midstream and 
downstream 
Lack of appropriate regulations Midstream and downstream 
Lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities Midstream and downstream 
Institutional conflicts Upstream and Midstream 
Lack of clarity in contractual obligations 
and gas pricing 
Downstream  
Source: Data from Interviews. 
In the NVivo analysis Node: structuring the gas industry in Ghana, the 
two most frequent words featuring are ‘Government’ and ‘Infrastructure’. 
Government, through GNPC, plays the dominant role in the current gas 
industry, and infrastructure presents the most important concern to industry 
players. Other frequently used words include ‘aggregator’, ‘regulatory’, 
‘prices’, ‘investment’, ‘electricity’, ‘vertically’ and ‘competition’ as indicated 
on Figure 8. This trend of word frequency establishes that government 
ownership of infrastructure and government-leading role in the gas industry are 




Figure 8: Industry Structuring Word Cloud  
 
Source: NVivo QSR 11. 
5.2.0. Alternative Natural Gas Industry Structural Arrangements  
TCE assumptions of asset specificity, uncertainties and frequency of 
transactions (Spanjer, 2009; Ghosh and Kathruria, 2015) provide the theoretical 
analytical framework for evaluating the various structural models of the gas 
industry in Ghana. A particular structure is selected based on the efficiency of 
its transactions in the timeframe instead of market power strengthening 
(Lafontaine and Slade, 2010; Mahoney et al., 2007).  
GNPC (upstream) aggregates associated gas upstream to be delivered to 
Ghana National Gas Company (GNGC) (midstream) processing plant for 
processing and transmission through the GNGC pipeline to Volta River 
Authority (VRA) as the only downstream consumer. GNGC operates as a 




the only license for the importation of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) into Ghana. 
GNPC is regarded as the national gas aggregator. 
The domestic production/supply of gas are under the remit of GNPC as 
the aggregator and as the LNG importer. GNPCs domestic gas supplies are sold 
to a single downstream consumer, which is VRA. A fixed structure: GNPC-
GNGC-VRA is created as indicated on Figure 9 to handle domestically 
produced gas in Ghana, a system described as a state monopoly and vertically 
integrated with a single buyer. 
 On the other hand, the West African Gas Pipeline Company 
(WAGPCo) (midstream) has been in the business of transmitting gas from 
Nigeria to VRA (downstream) in Ghana. Nigeria Gas (N-Gas) is the gas shipper, 
which arranges upstream gas from Nigeria to be delivered to downstream 
consumers in Benin, Togo and Ghana. In Ghana, VRA is the buyer of Nigerian 
Gas (N-Gas) gas. On the WAGP, N-Gas is the only owner of transported gas. 
Natural gas from Nigeria presents the structure: N-Gas-WAGP-VRA, which is 
described as a firm structure. Wholesale supply of gas into Ghana presents two 
firms structures: GNPC and N-Gas (in the upstream) through two main 
pipelines: GNGC pipeline and WAGP (in the midstream) to one major 








Figure 9: Current Structure of the Natural Gas Industry in Ghana 
 
Source: Adapted from Weijermars (2010). 
Figure 9 captures the current structure of the gas industry in Ghana. 
There are two pipelines in this early phase development: West African Gas 
Pipeline and the Ghana Gas Company pipeline.  Both transmission pipelines 
have open access regimes even though they have not been effectively 
operational [Midstream-EC and Midstream-WAGPCo].  
5.2.1. The Single Buyer Model in the Natural Gas Industry in Ghana 
It is not very clear whether the current gas industry structure in Ghana 
is VIM or SBM. For domestically produced gas, there is a firm structure: 
GNPC-GNGC-VRA structure, similar to SBM as upstream gas production is 
open to competition. GNPC (the single buyer) procures gas through long-term 
production contracts from upstream producers (IOCs) after which the gas is 
delivered through a regulated pipeline to a single downstream consumer, VRA. 
On the other hand, N-Gas procures gas from upstream producers in Nigeria in 
long-term contracts to be delivered through the regulated WAGP to VRA in 










Source: Adapted from Bhattacharya (2011). 
Domestically produced gas from three International Oil Companies 
(IOCs) (Jubilee fields, TEN and SGP) are aggregated, processed and transmitted 
by GNPC delivered to VRA.  With this, GNPC serves as the single buyer 
upstream while VRA serves as the single buyer downstream. N-Gas, on the 
other hand, procures gas from several IOCs in Nigeria and delivers to VRA. 
Though two parallel structures, VRA serves as the single downstream gas buyer 
in Ghana in both cases. 
Upstream gas production/supply however, is open to competition. The 
GNGC transmission pipeline and WAGP are regulated monopolies by Energy 
Commission (EC) and the WAGP Authority in Nigeria respectively. The Public 
Utilities and Regulatory Commission (PURC) and the WAGP Authority 
regulate natural gas tariffs.  
In SBM, transmission pipelines and downstream consumers must work 
completely independently and tariffs need to be set by an independent regulator 
(Celik, 2003). GNPC controls the GNGC transmission pipeline even though 
WAGP is independent of N-Gas. Although production/supply is competitive, 
IOC 1: Jubilee Fields N-Gas 
GNPC: Transmission and Gas Aggregator 
VRA 





consumption is a monopsony with only VRA while gas prices and transmission 
tariffs are set by PURC. Thus, the current gas industry structure in Ghana can 
best be described as SBM than VIM. 
Why SBM in Ghana’s nascent gas industry?  
SBM is considered adequate in the early stages of the gas industry (Juris, 
1998; Riordan, 2008; De Mello Sant Ana et al., 2009; Bresnahan and Levin, 
2012, Williamson, 2010) where a single purchasing agency is introduced at the 
wholesale level to perform transmission and wholesale gas supply functions. 
Accordingly, GNPC is selected as the upstream aggregator and wholesale 
agency to coordinate domestic gas supply and demand in Ghana.  
The SBM is a dedicated asset framework designed by the Ghana 
Government to monetise domestic gas resources, which were previously flared. 
This arrangement led by GNPC is an integration policy agenda designed by the 
Ministry of Energy. These informal institutions form the basic view of the 
market where the gas industry policy is determined. The Ministry of Energy’s 
policy for the gas industry, for now, is to operate an integrated system (SBM). 
In the interviews with GNPC, GNGC and the Ministry of Energy, 
several reasons were given for establishing an early stage and short-term SBM 
for domestically produced gas in Ghana [Upstream-GNPC, Midstream-GNGC; 
Min-Energy]. As part of the arrangements, GNPC is to act as the upstream gas 
aggregator to deliver associated gas to the GNGC midstream infrastructure, the 
GPP and methane gas, through the GNGC transmission pipeline to VRA. GNPC 




plants in the Tema industrial enclave. 
 In the interviews, it was explained that GNPC is the state partner in all 
upstream petroleum agreements and as per the upstream petroleum regulations, 
it is mandated to act as the aggregator of all upstream produced associated gas 
with the vision of facilitating midstream and downstream commercialisation 
activities and curbing flaring [Upstream-GNPC; Min-Energy]. This is captured 
in the statement:  
‘There will be only one supplier of gas essentially and 
that is GNPC’ [Min-Energy]. 
The structure is to have a single purchaser of upstream gas/aggregator 
from the Jubilee Fields, TEN and SGP, making the supply of upstream gas a 
monopoly [Midstream-EC].  
The SBM is regarded as an economically and technically efficient 
structure to monetise previously flared gas in Ghana. Kwoka (2001) added that 
for cost-effective, economic and technically efficient reasons, it is better to 
operate the SBM. At this infantile stage, the most important need was to avoid 
gas flaring and to monetise the gas for power generation. The interviewee at 
Ministry of Energy succinctly stated that GNPC being the national gas 
aggregator is to enable logistical transmition of gas in the country through 
dedicated asset [Min-Energy]. 
SBM is seen as the most efficient response to reduce commercial 
uncertainty, mitigate against contractual incompleteness (Bresnahan and Levin, 




bankability. For instance, GNPC had to provide financial guarantees in the form 
of bankable balance sheets and letters of credit as well as serve as a credible off-
taker to upstream gas projects. GNPC seems to be the only most credible off-
taker in the energy sector in Ghana. 
5.2.2. TCE and SBM in Ghana’s Nascent Gas Industry 
TCE and the stakeholder consultation influencing the SBM policy are 
based on the TCE assumptions of asset specificity, uncertainty and transactions 
frequency (Ruester and Neumann, 2009). Asset specificity in capital, physical 
and human expertise is the strongest determinant for the SBM policy (Ruester 
and Neumann, 2009; Neumann and von Hirschhausen, 2006). During the 
interview with GNPC it was stated that, GNPC is involved in all upstream 
petroleum contracts with IOCs with carried and participation interest in 
projects. GNPC has the technical and financial expertise to lead in the 
development and monetisation of gas resources in Ghana [Upstream-GNPC].  
Initially, IOC’s were not interested in developing or investing in 
midstream infrastructures such as the GPP and a transmission pipeline; 
consequently, associated gas was flared in crude oil production to the detriment 
of downstream power plants’ requirements. Subsequently, the Government of 
Ghana had to secure a Chinese Development Bank loan of US$3billion and 
make GNPC the technical and economic advisor to the Ghana Gas Company 
Project27. US$1billion was, thus, invested in the development of a midstream 
                                                          
27 Ghana Gas Company Projects – Included constructing a 150,000MMBtu/day gas processing 




gas infrastructure to provide an alternative fuel to thermal plants and ensure fuel 
security by relying on domestically produced gas, especially when gas supplies 
from Nigeria were inadequate and unreliable and LCO considered expensive. 
The Sankofa Gas Project is another example of the dominant role of 
GNPC. GNPC, on behalf of the Ghana Government, provided financial risk 
guarantees and serves as the off-taker for the commercialisation of SGP. The 
SGP partners28 required a credible upstream off-taker to reach final financial 
closure and GNPC was elected to play that role because of their existing 
financial credibility. GNPC, thus, was made a partner to the SGP agreements. 
These gas contracts are long-term and require credible off-takers to provide 
financial support (Razavi, 2007). 
Saussier (2000) noted these assets (the GPP, FSRU and the 
transmission pipelines) are site-specific with their investments considered 
irreversible. These are capital intensive infrastructure investments (Weijarmars, 
2010) and are project specific, requiring quasi-rent negotiations29 which leave 
small room for competition and, according to Neumann and von Hirschhausen 
(2006), lead to the SBM or vertical integration (Williamson, 2010). 
                                                          
28 Sankofa Gas Project commercialisation partners: World Bank Guarantees, IFC leading and 
MIGA political risk insurance are to support the Government of Ghana and private parties (ENI, 
Vitol and GNPC). 
29 Quasi-rent negotiation is where the suppliers’ returns are guaranteed through government 
protection by restricting entry and this according to Williamson (2010) allows vertical 
integration. And the more difficult it is to find substitute performance or to redeploy investments 
to alternative uses, the larger the appropriable quasi-rent and the greater the risk that 
transactional surpluses will be dissipated as the parties engage in hold-ups or other forms of 
opportunistic behaviour attempting to influence the terms of trade to their favour (Crooker and 




Each of the investments from the IOCs and Ghana Government is 
considered capital intensive, not having an alternative use except for the benefit 
of the gas industry and creates hold-up problems (von Hirschhausen, 2015). The 
asset specificity and dedicated nature of existing infrastructure limit other 
private sector players from participating in both midstream and downstream 
segments due to the long-term contracts to which investments are committed. 
Long-term contracts are seen as a tool to avoid the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour in transactions (von Hirschhasen et al., 2015).  Most of these energy-
intensive infrastructure investments display hold-up and lock-in problems, 
which are solved through long-term take-or-pay contracts between the investors 
and buyers. These are considered long-term risk allocation mechanisms, used 
as collaterals in project finance where the project serves as a recourse to banks, 
and are designed to protect the interest of the investors. They often occur where 
the investor has to undertake huge debt and capital commitment in an uncertain 
environment (Energypress, 2014). 
When these infrastructures are finally built under long-term take-or-
pay contracts, they seem to restrict access by third parties since these are 
dedicated assets under specific contractual agreements. These are often used as 
market foreclosure or anticompetitive tools (Energypress, 2014). GNPC 
assumed the role of a guaranteed buyer in most of the take-or-pay contracts such 
as the SGP, the FSRU infrastructure project and the “GNGC infrastructure 
project” [Min-Energy; Upstream-GNPC].  With a higher degree of asset 




appropriate in order to protect infrastructure investors [Upstream-GNPC]. 
However, these long-term contracts, which resorted to the current 
SBM, are seen as tools to secure monopolistic rents (von Hirschhausen, 2015). 
There are other downstream consumers aside VRA who are willing to pay for 
gas and need a secured and adequate supply of natural gas. Furthermore, 
pipelines seem to express less asset specificity if they are allowed to operate 
under open access regimes (Mulherin, 1986).  
In the midstream, there are two transmission pipelines whose 
capacities can be increased and which could be interconnected through 
additional compressors and a backflow/reverse flow technology. The SBM is 
less feasible when there are alternative pipeline systems (Mulherin, 1986). 
These will reduce the asset specificity of pipelines and enable asset re-
deployability, especially in extra capacity usage.  
Easing the completion of gas purchase contracts and avoidance of 
contractual renegotiations is considered an important reason for maintaining 
the SBM (Saussier, 2000). One interviewee explained that historically, the 
electricity industry in Ghana has not been able to pay for the gas it has been 
consuming from Nigeria [Upstream-GNPC]. For new natural gas purchase 
contracts and as a risk mitigating measure, IOCs requested for securities and 
risk guarantees from the main downstream gas consumer VRA. However, 
VRA’s balance sheets were not bankable (see Table 13) because the wholesale 
buyer of electricity, Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) had not paid for over 




This is a very critical issue in developing countries since the end-users 
are unable to pay for the natural gas they consume. It is, also, among the reasons 
why it is difficult to attract infrastructure investments into the other segments 
of the gas industry in such countries. New gas purchase agreements with VRA 
are risky; hence, the need for alternative off-takers for upstream gas. With the 
Bankability of the Sankofa Gas Project, one interviewee explained that the 
Government of Ghana had to rely on GNPC as the only credible off-taker: 
‘….having GNPC step in with oil reserves securities will 
reduce the requirements for some of these projects and 
it is easier for some of these contracts to be signed. 
GNPC don’t have to put up cash upfront for 
securitisation because the future revenues from oil can 
provide the necessary security for these agreements’ 
[Downstream-EC]. 
GNPC assumed a single buyer role as a credible off-taker to these gas 
contractual agreements. However, GNPC will still have to deal with the non-
credibility of VRA whilst gas could be arranged to be sold directly to various 
IPPs as end-users to revert the hold-up risk of a single downstream buyer. This 
arrangement exposes GNPC to the risk of VRA and ECG non-payments for the 
purchase of electricity since the gas industry depends on the electricity 
industry’s payment for gas purchases. GNPC is held-up and locked in VRA and 
ECG’s risk of non-payments, which will affect the gas industry value chain.  
The main challenge of the current SBM is how to avert the existing 
hold-up and lock-in problems between GNPC and VRA in gas purchases and 




is resolved, VRA can finance their fuel purchases and be able to payback the 
gas value chain including GNPC for subsequent payments to the IOCs. 
Alternative gas consumers or gas sales to different IPPs will reduce the over-
reliance on VRA as the only single downstream buyer. Direct gas sales to IPPs 
instead of VRA will reduce the hold-up risk and the burden on VRA as the 
single gas buyer and will diversify downstream gas buyers whilst solving ECG 
inefficiency challenges. 
Minimises Uncertainty: SBM mitigates investment risks in the form 
of “hold-up” and lock-in problems (Dahl and Matson, 1998). Lack of 
willingness and inability to pay was identified by one interviewee as a major 
concern for the gas industry in Ghana, at this infantile stage [Upstream-GNPC].  
Investment in a natural gas asset is immobile, has low salvage value 
and is highly asset specific, leading to the possibility of opportunistic behaviour 
in contract non-compliance and causing uncertainties to initial investors (Dahl 
and Matson, 1998). The natural gas markets can develop when contracts 
between producers, suppliers and buyers are credible, complete and have low 
risks of opportunism (Ghosh and Kathuria, 2015). Upstream gas producers 
require credible purchasers of gas to sign long-term contracts before production 
can be assured or their revenue streams, secured. GNPC serves as a risk-free 
partner in upstream gas production transactions in Ghana. 
Providing financial guarantees and securitisation is the most enduring 
reason for the SBM policy, especially when World Bank was to provide the 




GNPC proved to be the most credible Government institution in the energy 
value chain to serve as off-takers [Upstream-GNPC].  
Although GNPC could solve part of the problem in the entire energy 
industry by being a credible upstream off-taker for gas projects, it cannot solve 
the inefficiencies embedded in the final delivery of gas to VRA and ECG. 
GNPC could, also, not solve the accumulated debt and repayment problems of 
VRA and ECG [Min-Energy]. There exist uncertainties in debt accumulations 
due to the inability of the main downstream gas consumer (VRA) to fully pay 
for the consumed gas owing to inefficiencies of ECG to adequately collect 
electricity tariffs from consumers (World Bank, 2015). 
In the end, GNPC’s financial position will be overburdened with 
having to serve as a guarantor to several gas projects and dealing with VRA and 
ECG, which have low financial credibility. Also, GNPC’s financial position 
maybe affected and weakened by low prices in the global crude oil market, 
making its ability to play the role of a risk-free off-taker of gas diminish. 
Frequency of transactions: a recurrent frequency of transaction is a 
justification for considering alternative structures (Willaimson, 2010). GNPC 
had to provide financial guarantees for the SGP and serve as an off-taker for 
other gas projects such as the Jubilee field, TEN project and FSRU [Upstream-
GNPC]. GNPC is elected to be the only buyer of upstream gas estimated at 
350,000MMBtu/d; these are recurrent transactions expected daily. 
The viability of GNGC Gas Processing Plant is directly dependent on 




aggregator, GNGC GPP is assured of associated gas supplies to remain viable 
and be able to pay for the outstanding Chinese Development Bank US$1billion 
infrastructure loan facility.  
There is, however, a problem when natural gas is sent to VRA 
downstream for power generation as VRA has proven to be non-credible off-
taker indebted to major gas suppliers. On recurrent (daily) basis, GNPC will be 
delivering an estimated 350,000MMBtu of gas to VRA, which implies that 
GNPC is exposed to the uncertainty of VRA’s existing non-payment risk.  
VRA uses these gas volumes to generate electricity and frequently 
supplies thermal power to ECG on daily basis. Yet, ECG, as the bulk buyer of 
electricity, is unable to collect economic electricity tariffs and efficiently 
mobilise tariffs to pay VRA. The existing SBM in the power sector, as well, 
does not provide alternative large-scale buyers of VRA’s electricity, and this 
locks-in GNPC to the indebtedness of VRA and ECG.  
ECG has a natural monopoly of downstream electricity distribution in 
Ghana but is considered inefficient as it records 23% of technical and 
commercial power losses, which result in a considerable amount of revenue loss 
annually (World Bank, 2018). Kao et al., (2014) noted that the introduction of 
competition in the downstream distribution of electricity would enhance 
efficiency in electricity tariff mobilisation. 
The SBM poses two main challenges to the nascent gas industry: the 
hold-up problems in the GNPC-VRA-ECG link and cost recovery issues. This 




tries to address these challenges by artificially hiding issues within the 
government-owned entities, but this does not generate investor confidence. The 
SBM will not diminish the ex-post investment risk in the gas industry due to the 
hold-up and lock-in problems from VRA and ECG. It will require the 
consideration of selling natural gas to alternative consumers to avert VRA non-
payment problems and inject efficiency into electricity transmission and 
distribution and into ECG tariff collection. 
The SBM further discourages investors from entering the gas industry 
since there are higher investment uncertainties/risks: hold-up and lock-in 
problems between the gas aggregator, downstream consumer and electricity 
tariff mobilisers. Potential investors are not attracted to the industry because 
they expect the gas industry to work efficiently and be able to pay for itself 
through viable processes [IOC-ENI-Ghana].  
Can these challenges be solved under the SBM? There are attempts 
by the Ministry of Energy to recapitalise VRA’s thermal power generation to 
be listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange [Min-Energy]. This will inject liquidity 
and efficiency into their operations. In addition, there are attempts to privatise 
the management of ECG operations through a management concession program 
under the Millennium Challenge Account Compact II agreement. 
 However, these are not guaranteed actions to reduce the higher 
uncertainties to the nascent gas industry in Ghana. The structural solution is to 
diversify downstream gas consumption and divert gas purchases to alternative 




structural model should be able to provide solutions to SBM. 
5.3.0. Multiple Buyer Model in the Gas Industry in Ghana 
Juris (1998) noted that in SBM, the utility companies often lack the 
flexibility required in a dynamic market environment. In addition, regulation is 
often insufficient to induce efficient operations. Governments seek to look for 
alternative structural models with potential for higher efficiency and cost 
savings. Lu et al. (2016) further noted that to ensure gas supply security is to 
diversify supply sources. MBM assures greater flexibility and more efficient 
functioning of the gas market (Radezki, 1999). 
The first consideration for MBM is to avert the hold-up and lock-in 
problems inherent in SBM. In addition, it allows consumers and 
producers/suppliers direct transaction access. MBM allows the introduction of 
multiple buyers of natural gas at the wholesale level. Contrary to SBM, 
interviewees at ENI-Ghana and the Energy Commission argued for a liberalised 
policy and unbundling the activities of GNPC as the single upstream gas 
aggregator and infrastructure owner [IOC-ENI; Midstream-EC]. Their 
argument is that there should rather be multiple buyers of upstream gas. The 
arguments of the ENI-Ghana and the Energy Commission for a liberalised 
industry structure agrees with Joskow’s (2000) assertion that in the past 25years, 
the energy sector, including the gas industry, has witnessed market liberalisation 
[IOC-ENI; Midstream-EC].  
Joskow (2000) noted that there are potential benefits of market forces 




separation with its associated contractual hazards when they are being 
disintegrated. This raises issues and the advocates [Midstream-EC; IOC-ENI-
Ghana] argued that the MBM should be promoted even at the infantile stage of 
the nascent gas industry in Ghana.  
Since the monetisation of the Jubilee Fields’ associated gas through the 
development of midstream infrastructure, there have been numerous 
modifications to the gas industry structure as several other offshore fields were 
discovered. The Jubilee Field was expanded to include the Greater Jubilee and 
the TEN fields. The Sankofa Gas Project (SGP) was also introduced to produce 
significant volumes of non-associated gas. Furthermore, there are investments 
into an FSRU to receive LNG. 
The supply of domestically produced natural gas comes from multiple 
sources, and this has changed the initial structure of the gas industry. From 
2018, there will be several IOCs producing gas from multiple sources (World 
Bank, 2015). Figure 11 indicates the sources of domestically produced gas from 
Jubilee and Greater Jubilee, TEN, Sankofa Gas Project (SGP), the construction 
of FSRU to regasify LNG and WAGP supplies. 
Some interviewees noted that the existing SBM structures: GNPC-
GNGC-VRA and N-Gas-WAGP-VRA need to be altered to allow IOCs direct 
access to downstream consumers (IPPs) and vice versa [IOC-ENI; Midstream-
EC]. This will avert the dependence on a single upstream buyer and the 
uncertainties and hold-up problems of a single downstream buyer (VRA and 




structure such as the MBM is considered for the nascent gas industry in Ghana 
(Bhattacharyya, 2011).  
Figure 11: Introduction of Competition in Gas Production/Supply 
Source: Adapted from Juris (1998). 
MBM is considered as a transitional model from the existing SBM to 
competitive structures because the risk of moving directly to spot markets may 
outweigh the benefits (Bhattacharyya, 2011). The MBM contains some of the 
features of VIM, SBM or wholesale competitive models. Two of such models 
for consideration are the Multi-buyer Multi-seller model without retail 
competition (MBM: A) and the Multi-buyer Multi-seller model with limited 
retail competition (MBM: B). 
5.3.1. Multiple Buyer Multiple Seller Model without Retailing (MBM A) 
A new segment will allow competitive trading of natural gas where 




restrictions. This is possible when the gas producers/suppliers discover extra 
gas supply sources than the fixed contractual agreements with the single buyer 
which is GNPC for both domestic gas and imported LNG. This extra capacity 
may be initially small but will increase over time. The producers/suppliers will 
compete to sell these extra volumes to distributors using bilateral contracts for 
physical delivery. 
MBM: A introduces a limited amount of retail competition by allowing 
large-scale gas consumers to purchase gas directly from producers/suppliers 
through bilateral contracts. Consumers will have the choice of gas supply either 
from supplying companies or directly from producers. These large-scale 
consumers will be selected based on selection criteria such as consumption 
capacity, access to transmission pipelines, size and their ability and willingness 
to pay economic prices. The initial SBM however, will remain unchanged.  
On Figure 12, the thick lines are the current transaction links while the 
dotted lines indicate future/potential transactions. The existing contractual 
agreements for the Jubilee, TEN and SGP is maintained under the SBM  or 
renegotiated with GNPC as the single buyer, which is limited to the contractual 
volumes, prices and other terms. Additional discoveries or increasing volumes 
would be competitively traded through negotiated bilateral contracts depicted 
by the dotted links. The GNGC transmission pipeline will be unbundled from 
GNPC to operate with WAGP on open access basis. The two pipelines are to 
operate on a reverse/backflow technology to allow the efficient exchange of gas 




The upcoming FSRU-LNG can provide much more gas supply 
flexibility for wholesale traders to facilitate a quicker transition into competitive 
markets, especially if downstream consumption is open to competition. 
Wholesale suppliers and consumers can now directly arrange for their own LNG 
and use the FSRU as a tolling facility, given a guaranteed access to the 
transmission pipelines to deepen competition in gas trading.  
Figure 12: MBM: A in Ghana’s Gas Industry  
 
Source: Adapted from Bhattacharyya (2011). 
In addition, the MBM: A will promote competition of upstream gas 
production and diversify natural gas supply to the aggregator (GNPC). The extra 
gas capacities, as well, can be sold to alternative consumers on negotiated 
contractual arrangements or on the spot markets. This will lead to the possible 
creation of a spot market or negotiated contractual arrangements. In the 
negotiated contracts, bilateral sales to large-scale consumers will give gas 




spot market, wholesale market competition will be deepened as gas consumers 
and suppliers are given choices to decide where to buy, sell and at what price.  
However, the MBM: A restricts small-scale consumers’ participation 
in the industry and gives prominence to only large-scale consumers through a 
consumer selection criterion. This limits competition and restricts gas market 
penetration, especially in a nascent gas industry such as Ghana where gas usage 
penetration should be encouraged in small-scale industries for a wider coverage. 
5.3.2. Multiple-Buyer Multiple Seller Model with Retailing (MBM: B) 
The MBM: A allows limited amounts of retail competition by allowing 
only larger consumers to purchase/enter into long-term Gas Purchase 
Agreements so that they can directly receive gas from upstream 
producers/suppliers. MBM: B, on the other hand, will allow gas retailing and 
direct gas transactions with small gas consumers such as small-scale industries 
and industrial consumers as indicated on Figure 13. Small consumers can now 
directly trade in gas with producers/suppliers through bilateral contracts or spot 
markets. The criteria for entry will be their ability and willingness to pay 
economic tariffs. 
Additional improvements on MBM: A will be to allow existing 
upstream gas producers or new gas producers/suppliers direct access to the two 
existing transmission pipelines to deliver their gas to consumers directly without 
the single buyer agency (GNPC) and the inclusion of several other small-scale 
consumers. However, a balancing market will be required to manage the day-




the market. Bilateral gas contracts can be signed between upstream gas 
producers (IOCs)/suppliers and downstream gas consumers. MBM: B will 
require distributing lines to deliver gas to these small consumers. 
The SBM indicates the risk of hold-up and locked-in to VRA and ECG 
inefficiencies. If producers/suppliers can avert the hold-up role of GNPC as the 
only upstream gas aggregator ex ante to all domestically produced gas and can 
sell extra gas to other third parties (gas consumers or gas trading partners) on 
negotiated bilateral contracts, they can make alternative arrangements with 
other downstream consumers. This will reduce their current risk exposure to 
VRA and ECG and diversify downstream gas consumption in Ghana.  









Source: Adapted from Bhattacharyya (2011). 
Will MBM ensure the viability of the nascent gas industry in Ghana? Are 
there credible downstream gas buyers in Ghana? The choice of the 





Large-scale gas consumers/buyers are thermal power generators, who require 
substantial volumes of gas on continues basis for electricity generation. 
Whether large-scale gas consumers in Ghana can support upstream gas 
investment projects raises a critical challenge since most of these thermal plants 
are small-scale plants ranging from 100 to 250MW.  
Can the alternative large-scale and small-scale consumers be able 
to pay for the prices of gas offered directly by the upstream gas 
producers/suppliers? This will depend on the viability of thermal plants, the 
netback value of the other users and the spark spread30 between gas and 
electricity prices as well as competitive fuel prices (LCO and distillate fuel). 
Interviews with IPPs confirmed that, as IPPs and large/small scale consumers, 
they are interested in reliable, available and secure fuel supply [TICO-IPP, 
TAPCO-IPP; SAPP-IPP]. Moreover, they prefer natural gas to LCO for 
economic, technical and environmental reasons and are willing to pay economic 
prices for natural gas.  
These IPPs will therefore, have to avert selling their electricity to VRA 
and ECG and rather consider commercial and industrial power consumers who 
can readily pay for their power at economic rates. Not until VRA and ECG are 
able to sustain and pay for the fuel they consume, the gas sector should avert 
them. By this, instead of one entity defaulting, the issue is distributed. In 
                                                          
30 Spark spread is the profitability of a thermal plant which buys natural gas to produce 
electricity: this is the difference between the cost of electricity generation using natural gas and 




addition, depending on the volume of gas bought, small-scale consumers will 
be able to negotiate prices and are likely to face high-cost gas that may affect 
their viability. GNPC, on the other hand, via SBM is able to cross-subsidise gas. 
What are the transaction cost implications of MBM to the gas 
industry in Ghana? Market Power Control by ENI-Ghana: Allowing upstream 
operators’ access to downstream consumers will also mean alternative 
integrated activities may emerge from other IOCs. For instance, interviewees 
from ENI-Ghana and GNPC hinted that ENI-Ghana has the financial and 
technical capacity to develop an integrated gas value chain similar to that in 
Tanzania where they produce upstream, invest in midstream transmission 
pipelines and feed gas into their own thermal plants downstream to generate and 
sell electricity into the national grid [IOC-ENI-Ghana; Upstream-GNPC].  
This implies that a private entity will have to compete with the existing 
government SBM structure (GNPC-GNGC-VRA structure) as an alternative 
vertically integrated entity. However, one interviewee confirmed that because 
of government interest, ENI will not be allowed to pursue such models 
[Upstream-GNPC]; these sentiments are referred to as government opportunism 
(Williamson, 2010).   
Cost of disintegration and contractual hazards: Over the years, 
VRA increasingly became indebted to the various IPPs and was unable to secure 
reliable and economically efficient fuels for them. A major complaint from the 
IPPs during the interviews was that their fuel supply choices are limited to VRA 




IPP]. Existing VRA and IPP power purchase contracts can be 
maintained/renegotiated with new contracts that require VRA to serve as an off-
taker for only electricity purchases and not both. 
The renegotiation of these contracts can, nevertheless, be hazardous to 
both parties. This will send a wrong signal to other potential IPP investors of 
unstable regulatory systems in the Ghanaian power/gas sector, and this may 
affect the potential of attracting other IPPs requiring the design of new industry 
structures that may align existing IPPs and take thermal power generation 
control from VRA.  
The MBM will introduce the challenge of how to coordinate gas 
transmission pipelines and supplies investments (Joskow, 2000). Natural gas 
produced will need to be transmitted to consumers so a gas source is connected 
to consumers through transmission pipelines. If there are increasing gas 
suppliers, there must be efforts to allow access to pipelines and increase 
investments in transmission pipelines and downstream infrastructures. 
With the SBM, the single buyer company knows the gas quantities, 
their transmission capacity and the capacities of their downstream consumers. 
However, with MBM, production quantities, transmission pipelines and 
downstream demand requirements must be efficiently coordinated in that 
supply is matched to demand and vice versa.  
Transmission investments can be lumpy, require longer planning, 
permission and construction times (Joskow, 2000). Natural gas supplies require 




investments. The trade-off between the location of new natural gas supply 
sources and investments in new transmission pipelines is complicated by the 
interdependencies of demand and supply. Joskow (2000) noted that the SBM 
could easily coordinate gas supplies and transmission investments and 
internalise potential network externalities as compared to MBM. The successful 
implementation of an MBM requires “overinvestments” in transmission, 
downstream gas consumption infrastructure and other common infrastructure 
capacities compared to SBM (Joskow, 2000).  
MBM allows multiple bilateral contracts. If each supplier enters 
into different negotiated price contracts, what are the transaction cost 
implications? Negotiated contract pricing is the mechanism by which a 
competitive governance structure strives (Sutherland, 1992). This will promote 
relationship specific and transaction-specific investments between these 
contracting parties (Williamson, 2007) requiring long-term contracts to ensure 
positive returns on their investments. This long-term contract mitigates against 
opportunistic behaviour that gives the parties ability to renegotiate the contracts. 
Natural gas prices will become competitive and efficiently priced due 
to the activities of market forces. Long-term fixed non-negotiated prices in 
natural gas contracts are economically inefficient and untenable in a competitive 
governance structure (Sutherland, 1992). With negotiated prices, asset 
specificity will reduce since this introduces multiple gas owners, which will 





The implication of asset specificity is that a long-term contract may 
have lower transaction cost than a short-term contract that is frequently 
renegotiated (Sutherland, 1992). Upstream gas producers in Ghana may have 
lower transaction costs with longer-term contracts with a single buyer than with 
several customers with different negotiated prices. 
Negotiated price contracts with different shippers and consumers will 
then require pipelines to operate as common carriers of upstream gas 
(Sutherland, 1992). This means that upstream producers, shippers and 
downstream consumers must all have equal access to the transmission pipelines 
and other common infrastructures such as the GPP, FSRUs and storage facilities 
on negotiated short-term and long-term basis and prices.  
The key issue in transiting to MBM will be to unbundle the 
transmission pipeline system and invest in the transmission network. The 
transmission network will have to operate under an effective open access and 
on non-discriminatory basis serving all the parties and not exclusive to the de 
facto aggregator or asset owners or excluded few. The MBM will, thus, 
introduce flexibility in dealing with suppliers and buyers of natural gas.  
Consequently, the MBM will have several implications for the nascent 
gas industry in Ghana. The first concern borders on whether the downstream 
consumers are credible enough to commit to buying sufficient quantities of gas 
at reasonable prices to make upstream investments viable. There are over 
2500MW of installed thermal electricity capacity with an additional planned 




fuel or Gas as fuel.  
Gas is, however, the preferred fuel choice for the majority of these 
power plants for economic, technical and environmental reasons, according to 
the interviews with IPPs [TICO-IPP, TAPCO-IPP; SAPP-IPP]. IPPs in Ghana 
are much particular of secured and reliable gas supply at economically viable 
rates compared to competing fuels (LCO). The choice between the duration of 
contracts between IPPs and gas producers/suppliers will depend on the specific 
situations of both parties.  
Whereas long-term contracts in gas trades are increasingly becoming 
irrelevant because of their rigid nature, short-term trades introduce flexibility to 
contracting parties. However, will downstream consumers in Ghana prefer short 
or long-term contracts with gas producers/suppliers? Long-term contracts 
minimise transaction costs between parties (Neumann and von Hirschuasen, 
2015). They guarantee upstream producers/suppliers projects, a downstream 
buyer and financial commitments over a long-term period.  
The MBM will lead to shorter gas contracts with flexibility (Neumann 
and von Hirschausen, 2015) but as industry structures move from SBM to 
MBM, long-term contracts lose their value (Neunmann and von Hirschausen, 
2015). The introduction of short-term contracts in Ghana’s nascent gas industry 
because of adopting the MBM will have minimal implications for upstream gas 
producers/suppliers as this deepens competition in gas supply. However, 
investors are not as bothered about competition as they are about the protection 




facilitate transactions in FSRU LNG between gas traders/suppliers and 
downstream consumers. 
At what point will downstream consumers switch a supplier. If 
that happens, what happens to gas producers? When the consumers’ short-
term contracts with gas producers/suppliers expire, both parties can renew their 
contracts or switch if there are more favourable terms with other parties or 
renegotiate existing contracts. When alternative fuels (LCO and distillate fuels) 
are cheaper, consumers will switch fuels, which is most unlikely in the short-
term because, historically, gas prices are relatively cheaper than LCO.  
Gas producers/suppliers require protection from arbitrary customers 
switching from consumers. Investments in storage facilities allow lower-priced 
gas to be stored and sold when prices increase. The MBM will facilitate 
investments in storage infrastructure. Ghana, however, is currently under a 
stressed natural gas demand and requires a supply security than consumers 
switching suppliers. 
5.4.0. Open Access to Pipelines and Essential Infrastructures in Ghana 
There are efforts to encourage the common use of the existing limited 
infrastructures in transmission pipelines whilst encouraging further 
investments. The Energy Commission, Natural Gas Transmission Access Code 
and the West African Gas Pipeline Access Code Part A and B seek to establish 
open access and transparent/non-discriminatory third party access to both 
transmission pipelines [Midstream-EC; Midstream-WAGPCo]. A Natural Gas 




operate as an independent pipeline transmission operator, whilst WAGP 
Authority regulates and enforces the WAGP Access codes [Midstream-EC; 
Midstream-WAGPCo].  
The GNGC Transmission pipeline network operation is still under 
contention between GNGC and BOST as to who should be the operator. 
According to an interviewee BOST is recognised as the NGTU; however, 
GNGC owns the pipeline and is unwilling to relinquish it to BOST [Midstream-
EC]. Resolving the issues of who should be the NGTU and enforcing effective 
open access regulations to existing pipeline infrastructure are crucial to reducing 
regulatory risk [IOC-ENI-Ghana], especially with the introduction of the MBM.  
The MBM will require effective third party access to transmission 
network and other essential infrastructure. For effective MBM, access to the 
transmitting pipeline must be guaranteed (Marston, 1991). The use of the same 
transmission pipelines by different entities on a fair and equal basis is at the core 
of transiting from SBM to MBM (Kessides, 2004; Hallack and Vazquez, 2014).  
Open access to transmission pipelines is necessary when there are 
many players and high intensity of trading (Kessides, 2004) and when there is 
excess gas supply capacity arising from old investments. There is a growing 
number of industry players and potential for further growth in the upstream and 
downstream segments; therefore, a non-discriminatory access to the 
transmission pipeline is necessary if they are to compete favourably (Kessides, 
2004). In addition, there is significant need for infrastructure in gas supply, 




problems with gas non-payments from consumers such as VRA and ECG 
[Midstream-WAGPCo].  
How can an effective Third Party/Open Access transmission 
system be established in Ghana’s nascent gas industry? The first option is to 
separate the network owner and operator from participating as suppliers in the 
competitive segments and to retain the benefits of vertical integration, the asset 
owner should be allowed to charge transmission tariffs based on cost-recovery 
prices (Newbery, 2001). In the MBM, there is likely to be monopoly power 
abuse in favour of asset owners over the other players. Separating GNGC 
transmission network from GNPC upstream gas aggregation role or allowing 
fair access tariff for WAGP and GNGC transmission pipelines are required for 
effective third-party access and transition to the MBM.  
Gas transmission pipelines are either regulated through a set of access 
codes applied to all users termed regulated access codes (practiced in EU) or 
through each pipeline network defining its services separately based on 
negotiations with the user, termed negotiated access code (practiced in USA) 
(Hallack and Vazquez, 2014; Kesside, 2004). Network access rules for the 
GNGC transmission pipeline and WAGP are based on a set of access codes 
applied to all users. The first step is to ensure fair access and fair access charges 
to the gas transmission network (Newbery, 2001). As the incumbent owner of 
the transmission pipeline can deter entry by capturing all capacity rents, access 
tariffs on the GNGC and WAGP transmission pipelines must be fair to all 




Access charge design must, therefore, include efficiency and 
investments decisions while enabling the owner of the network to remain 
financially solvent. Access tariffs should be high enough to be compensatory 
and yet not so high as to preclude efficient operations by the entrant. Kessides 
(2004) identified two ways to offer effective access tariffs: 
 Baumol-Willig efficient component pricing rule or parity pricing and 
 Laffont-Tirole global price cap rule.  
For the efficient component-pricing rule or parity pricing, the holder 
of the transmission pipeline is allowed to charge as much for its services as it 
would earn from providing them itself. The Laffont-Tirole global price cap rule, 
on the other hand, ensures that the profit of the integrated incumbent is an 
increasing function of the access charge and the final retail price. The regulator 
would have to take into account the balance between the two access tariff 
processes to determine the access charge. Albeit, a hybrid model can be 
developed with the objective of promoting productive, allocative efficiency, 
pro-poor and rural-led gas infrastructure policy development (Kessides, 2004). 
The second step is to design effective access regulations, which set 
network regulations with realistic perspectives of being implemented. The 
motive of an effective open access to the transmission pipeline is to ensure that 
the infrastructure owner has no right to discriminate against legitimate users in 
offering three basic services: transportation of gas between two points in a 




transport and line-pack storage31 of gas (Hallack and Vazquez, 2012).  
 Without good access rules, efficient competition will be difficult to 
implement in the competitive segments especially when the infrastructure 
owners are also players of the gas supply and distribution sectors (Joskow, 1998 
and Kessides, 2004). The use of the network by a single or multiple users 
determines the rules of the industry (Hallack and Vazquez, 2014). This requires 
effective institutional arrangements and efficient network rules and 
implementation (Hallack and Vazquez, 2014) which, in the case of Ghana, are 
the ex ante network access regulatory codes.  
Institutionally who determines the rules of use? Open access 
requires an independent regulator (European Commission, 2013). The 
independent operator, the NGTU, will coordinate the transmission access usage. 
The NGTU will provide a stable market condition required to attract funding 
for long-distance pipelines, develop a regulatory framework to ensure 
competition and non-discriminatory access to pipelines whilst providing 
incentives for increased infrastructure investments and meeting the needs of 
vulnerable consumers (European Commission, 2013; Correlje et al., 2013).  
Gas owners will, therefore, acquire transportation contracts from the 
NGTU, which specifies the volume to be transported from an injection point to 
a withdrawal point and metered to verify volumes (Hallack and Vazquez, 2014). 
Property rights will be defined by the NGTU in different ways: injection, 
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withdrawal, flow and pressure management, nomination, exclusion and many 
more (Glachant et al., 2014).  
The NGTU, on the other hand, must choose between common carriage 
and contract carriage rights, which define the basic frame of infrastructure 
usage, the injection/withdrawal rights and exclusion rights for the users. In the 
common carriage system, injection/withdrawal rights are offered ex ante to all 
potential users of the pipeline. In the contract carriage, the set of user rights to 
injection/withdrawal is defined ex ante and restricted to those who have long-
term contracts with the pipeline owner or the operator (Glachant et al., 2014). 
What are the network access rules? Network access rules are 
categorised under two broad headings: first, the mechanism allocating rights of 
usage among all potential users and second, the definition of the actual 
transmission service characteristics corresponding to this usage right (Glachant 
et al., 2014). They are, also, known as balancing rules32 and localisation of entry 
and exit of the flow rules33 (Hallack and Vazquez, 2014).  
Capacity allocation rights are categorised into implicit and explicit 
rights. Under the implicit capacity allocation rights, the market outcome of the 
transmission capacity allocation and the market outcome of the commodity 
trade are voluntarily coordinated ex ante. By this, all gas owners with wholesale 
gas volumes can access the transmission pipeline in real time (Glachant et al., 
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2014). The explicit capacity allocation rights, however, involve an independent 
and separate transmission market in which the transmission capacity is traded 
and priced for itself, disregarding who owns the gas commodity. It is up to each 
gas commodity owner to ensure how to use the pipeline (Glachant et al., 2014). 
Where the market has not yet been developed and transmission 
network capacity is limited, will open access attract new investments in the 
gas industry in Ghana? This depends on how the current gas transmission 
network is being used; that is, the past offer and demand of the pipeline and how 
it might be used in the future, which in turn influence the expectation of possible 
usage of new infrastructure (Glachant et al., 2014). The investment path 
corresponds to certain allocation of decision rights:  how much extra pipeline 
capacity is required and at what cost, volume and tariff?  
The NGTU is responsible for operating and increasing transmission 
pipeline investments in Ghana. Strong access rights generally encourage higher 
investments (Glachant et al., 2014). A network only company has the incentives 
to expand infrastructure once the demand exists because every gas transported 
increases profits (von Hirschhausen, 2008). Unlike a network only company, 
which operates a small pipeline, an integrated company can raise funds using 
its balance sheet and provide guarantees and securities.   
An allowable ROR is used by the US Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) as an instrument to attract investments in pipeline 
infrastructure as FERC calculates Return on Investments (ROI) to recover the 




subject to an overall ROR. Transmission tariffs are negotiated between the 
transmission asset owners and asset users and are regulated by Public Utilities 
Regulation Commission of Ghana [Downstream-PURC].  
In determining the appropriate risk-adjusted cost of capital and the 
appropriate rate base, the weighted cost of capital is determined by estimating 
the appropriate rate of debt, the cost of equity and the capital structure-gearing 
ratio. ROR was, thus, used to secure long-term network infrastructure 
investments and medium-term infrastructure adequacy. ROR is, however, 
criticised for triggering overinvestment and an inefficient use of capital and 
labour (von Hirschhausen, 2008). Other regulatory schemes such as Incentive 
regulation and performance-based ratemaking in which pipeline owners share 
efficiency gains with users via lower prices are recommended. 
What are the benefits of an open access system in Ghana’s nascent 
gas industry? The open access system will mitigate the incentives of 
discriminating against competitors and increase equal access to the market 
(Hallack and Vazquez, 2014). However, an open access regime is not a priority 
in the nascent gas industry as a lack of equal and transparent third-party access 
will create enormous entry barriers for new players and would severely hamper 
the development of an effective MBM (Nowak, 2010).  
5.5.0. Unbundling Natural Gas Services in Ghana 
Unbundling means completely separating midstream infrastructure 
from upstream producers and downstream consumers and electing an 




Unbundling will involve maintaining competition in the production, services 
and retail segments of the gas industry and regulating the essential facilities 
(Correlje and Groenewegen, 2006) for the common use of all participants 
(Hallack and Vazquez, 2014).  
Unbundling natural gas services in Ghana will involve altering the 
SBM of GNPC and separating gas supply from the pipeline transmission 
network and enabling the full operation of the MBM. Unbundling, essentially, 
means separating GNPC aggregating role from upstream suppliers and GNGC 
infrastructure ownership (the GPP and the transmission pipeline) and allowing 
different entities to provide each service separately. In the interview with the 
Ministry of Energy, critical concerns where raised against unbundling gas 
services in Ghana:  
‘Does it make sense to unbundle gas services in Ghana? Does 
it make sense to let BOST operate the gas transmission lines 
instead of GNGC to avoid possible pipeline access 
discrimination and possible abuse of monopoly power’? [Min-
Energy].  
The Ministry of Energy based their arguments on two assumptions: 
 Assuming GNPC is the sole aggregator and owner/shipper of gas in 
Ghana (SBM), the issue of access discrimination would be non-existent 
since there will not be any other gas owner in the country to discriminate 
against [Min-Energy].  
 Assuming GNPC is not the sole aggregator/shipper of gas in Ghana, 




infrastructure (GPP and GNGC transmission pipeline), the issue of 
access discrimination will not be plausible due to adequate available 
pipeline capacity. Since the regulator determines the tariffs and service 
charge, the issue of monopoly would not exist [Min-Energy]. 
Scenario A: Assuming GNPC is the sole gas aggregator and the 
only gas owner/shipper; will unbundling be necessary? Having GNPC act as 
the sole upstream gas aggregator has some advantages to the development of 
the nascent gas industry in Ghana. GNPC serves as the upstream partner to all 
gas projects and is the de facto aggregator of upstream gas in the gas sales 
contracts. The SBM allows GNPC to provide financial guarantees for the 
commercialisation of gas projects (e.g the SGP) and makes it possible to shield 
financiers of upstream gas investors from market risk and retail level regulatory 
risk. This reduces financing cost and makes gas investment projects 
commercially bankable in Ghana. Such a model helps maintain a unified 
domestic gas price downstream by delivering average gas prices and cross-
subsidization of gas prices. Government control of gas markets has often led to 
distorted prices, inefficient operations and deteriorating infrastructure that could 
be avoided through effective regulations.  
Additionally, Lovie (2000) strongly opposes SBM of GNPC, as it 
invites corruption, weakens payment discipline and imposes large contingent 
liabilities on government (GNPC). The SBM may show upward bias from 
interest groups pushing GNPC to serve as a financial guarantee for additional 




to serve as an off-taker. As an interviewee recounted, soon, there will be another 
gas project that will require GNPC to provide financial guarantees, and this will, 
in the long-run, overburden the responsibilities of GNPC and drift them away 
from their core mandate of being a national oil company [IOC-ENI-Ghana].  
Moreover, GNPC having to provide financial guarantees as off-takers 
for most of these gas projects creates contingent liabilities for GNPC which is 
supposed to step in when downstream consumers (VRA and ECG) are unable 
to honour their obligations of gas purchases. These implicit and explicit 
contingent liabilities can undermine GNPC’s creditworthiness and their balance 
sheets may deteriorate. 
The current structure can, as well, undermine the development of the 
nascent gas industry in Ghana since a state-owned company (GNPC) which 
leads industry development without a strong profit motive can become a major 
disadvantage when expanding new infrastructure and introducing innovation. 
The SBM, with GNPC as gas owner, weakens the willingness of state-owned 
gas consumers such as VRA to pay for gas purchases. This will worsen the 
current hold-up and lock-in debt problems of VRA in paying GNPC. These 
state-owned institutions dominating the gas value chain in Ghana (GNPC, VRA 
and ECG) are unlikely to take politically unpopular decisions (Lovie, 2000). 
This usually results in poor payments for gas purchases and could lead to poor 
liquidity in the gas industry in the long-run. 
The SBM allows government intervention in influencing gas prices 




improve the gas value chain. However, cash is diverted into illegal purposes 
such as funding political campaigns, especially in instances where there are high 
levels of corruption (Lovei, 2000). Finally, the SBM may be used by pressure 
groups to indefinitely delay government’s move towards the next step of 
unbundling (Lovei, 2000).  
Scenario B: Assuming there are multiple gas owners but GNPC 
leads the SBM and are the infrastructure owners, guaranteeing third-party 
access to essential infrastructure, will unbundling still be necessary? There 
is the likelihood of abuse of market power by GNPC in infrastructure access, 
and this will limit effective competition. It is better to skip the SBM altogether 
for the MBM (Lovei, 2000) as the MBM will drive the market to unbundle 
(Cramar, 1991). The MBM will introduce other gas owners who will not require 
only GNPC to provide financial guarantees for gas agreements. GNPC will, 
thus, not shield gas producers/suppliers from regulatory/market/political risks. 
Meanwhile, the lack of a direct contract between gas producers and consumers 
will still undermine payment discipline. Private partners, as well, based on 
market performance, can influence decisions for new gas supply infrastructure.  
Unbundling gas supply from transportation services and consumption 
presents two distinct markets: the gas supply/trade market where participants 
trade natural gas as a commodity and minimise supply and price risk and the 
transportation services market where participants trade transportation services 
for shipping gas through the pipeline (Juris, 1998). This will call for the use of 




pricing and minimise transaction costs.  
According to one interviewee [Midstream-EC], two main concerns are 
raised supporting the implementation of unbundling in Ghana. Energy 
Commission’s Act 541 (2007) mandates that a Natural Gas Transmission Utility 
(NGTU) will be responsible for the operations of natural gas transmission 
pipeline services, and BOST is the licensed NGTU. The reasons according to 
the interviewee  are two in folds [Midstream-EC]:  
 To prevent pipeline access discrimination to third party and  
 To avoid monopoly power abuse and promote competitive pricing of gas 
by allowing more players into the market.  
GNGC, the owners of the GPP and transmission pipeline, is a 
subsidiary of GNPC; but the gas owners cannot be the infrastructure owners so 
BOST should operate the GNGC transmission pipeline. Again, the transmission 
pipelines will have to be unbundled from upstream operations and downstream 
consumers. Unbundling will mean separating pipeline operations from gas 
aggregation/ownership to processing and consumption; that is, separating 
GNPC and GNGC from the pipeline transmission business. 
WAGPCo will need to offer their pipeline services to two key markets: 
external shippers bringing gas from Nigeria into Ghana and the internal market 
of transporting gas between different consumers within Ghana. Haucap (2007) 
recounted two benefits of unbundling: decrease in the network operators’ 
incentives to discriminate between incumbents and new entrants and increase 




An unbundled gas industry structure is illustrated on Figure 14. 
Multiple upstream gas buyers and multiple gas supply sources include domestic 
production, LNG and Nigerian Gas. The role of GNPC as an upstream 
aggregator will be unbundled from the midstream infrastructure, i.e. GNGC 
transmission services. BOST will in turn, be the NGTU and an independent 
operator of GNGC pipeline and other pipeline networks. 
 From Figure 14, the proposed structure has three issues that will 
emerge in Ghana: allowing multiple gas owners, unbundling gas transmission 
from production and diversifying downstream gas consumption. By this, the 
GNPC-GNGC-VRA single buyer model and the N-Gas-WAGP-VRA model 
will be completely unbundled.  Several gas owners will, as a result, be 
introduced through bilateral and trilateral long-term and short-term contracts 
with short-term contracts being more prominent. 
The FSRU can serve multiple gas traders and suppliers. Gas consumers 
can, as well, arrange for their own LNG. Pipeline transmission will be 
unbundled from upstream production/supply and both GNGC & WAGP 
transmission pipelines will operate on open access basis. Additionally, the 
FSRU will operate as a tolling facility because it is also an essential facility 
(bottleneck facility) (von Hirshhausen, 2008).  
In addition, the spot market concept will emerge because of 
competition; a well-functioning spot market concentrates trading in a location 
(Juris, 1998). Even in the European markets, there are very few effective spot 




minimises supply and price risk in both short and long-term transactions.  
Figure 14: Unbundled the Natural Gas Industry in Ghana 
 
Source: Adapted from Juris (1998). 
The spot prices will reflect the economic value of natural gas in Ghana, 
which is a good signal to potential investors. Different duration of gas trading 
contracts such as short-term contracts for the supply of up to one month, 
medium-term contracts for the supply of one month to twelve months and long-
term contracts for the supply of more than one year will be introduced.  
Gas traders will be connected to gas producers and consumers or 
simply arrange gas sales and transportation deals among various parties.  Gas 
traders are not subject to any regulatory oversight (Cramer, 1991). In the 
wholesale gas markets, gas is purchased for resale among traders, suppliers, 




sales for end users with transactions occurring between suppliers and small and 
large-scale consumers (Juris, 1998).  
What are the transaction cost implications of unbundling the gas 
industry in Ghana? A concern to policy makers in the gas industry in Ghana 
is how to balance the structure of the gas industry to a sufficient degree of 
stability to bring about investments. The transmission pipeline segment is seen 
as a natural monopoly because of economies of scale and scope, the fixed costs 
of the pipeline construction and the relatively low variable cost of their 
operation, which are common pool or essential facilities (Hallack and Vazquez, 
2014; Correlje and Groenewegen, 2006). These assets need to be regulated to 
allow open access and avoid abuse of dominant market position (Correlje and 
Groenewegen, 2006).  
The evolution of the spot market concept through unbundling will see 
multiple gas buyers introduce shippers/traders and several downstream natural 
gas consumers. Since more buyers and sellers reduce the relationship specific 
investments, this can lead to lower transaction costs and reduce the chances of 
market power control (Arora, 2012). It will, also, prevent opportunistic 
behaviours of trading partners who are looking to take advantage of the 
relationship leading to the hold-up problem where parties are locked in the 
inefficiencies of their trading partners (Arora, 2012).  
In sum, unbundling will provide a very complex gas industry structure, 
which will require well-skilled personnel to regulate and manage. However, 




structure in Ghana will be difficult to implement as there is, still, a limited 
number of credible gas off-takers and a lack of sufficient infrastructure and 
regulatory credibility. Simply put, the nascent gas industry in Ghana is too small 
for unbundling. 
5.6.0 Structural Evaluation of the Gas Industry in Ghana 
Natural gas industry structural reform processes in all countries have 
been slow and tortuous and require tailoring to fit the current political and 
economic climate (Shell International and DRC, 2017). The debate of 
identifying the best-fit structural model for the nascent gas industry in Ghana 
concerning whether to proceed with the existing SBM or switch to MBM are 
evaluated based on the objectives of the industry. These objectives include 
reaching more gas consumers, making gas affordable to consumers, having a 
reliable supply of gas, having a viable supply chain, attracting investments and 
investors, reducing risks, being easy to implement, being easy to regulate, 
reducing asset specificity and reducing uncertainties (Eberhard, 2007). The 
variables for the evaluation criteria are compared to the structural models based 
on their impact and effectiveness on maintaining a viable gas industry in Ghana.  
The World Bank (2018) RISE project – Regulatory Indicators for 
Sustainable Energy –  evaluations criteria is based on three areas: energy access, 
energy efficiency and renewable energy, and provides the guiding evaluation 
principles for structural evaluation in the nascent gas industry in Ghana. RISE 
classifies countries into a green zone of strong performers in the top third, a 




bottom third. The nascent gas industry structural evaluation criteria for Ghana 
classifies the green zone as strong performances and effectiveness, yellow zone 
as middle performance and effectiveness and the red zone as weak performance 
and less effectiveness.  
The SBM maintains a weak viability of natural gas supply chain with 
limited number of gas suppliers. As a result, gas supply reliability is weak, 
especially when existing domestic gas production volumes are diminishing. 
There is, however, a strong gas demand certainty for gas in power generation, 
with potential demand in other small-scale to large-scale consumers. SBM 
presents high investment risks, which require high regulatory supervision in 
determining tariffs and gas prices indicating weak performance. Asset 
specificity is high with lower asset intensity and reuse and high frequency of 
transaction with recurrent exposure to a single buyer, which increases 
uncertainty in default rate indicating weak performance. As a result, gas 
affordability is high, indicating weak performance in the SBM.  
Nonetheless, the SBM has a strong appropriateness for the existing 
market maturity since this is a nascent industry, indicating middle performance. 
SBM is considered an appropriate industry structure for the maturity stage of 
the nascent gas industry in Ghana, which indicates strong performances in 
implementation. Nevertheless, it is an unsuitable structure considering business 
viability because of the hold-up and lock-in problems and the high inefficiencies 
indicated on the evaluation Table 29. SBM displays more red-alerts, which 




higher asset specificity, uncertainties and transaction frequency. 
MBM: A indicates middle performance throughout the evaluation 
criteria except in regulatory supervision which requires the selection of large-
scale wholesale gas buyers based on their ability to pay economic tariffs, size 
and consumption capacity; this indicates a weak performance. Aside that, the 
supply chain viability, supply reliability with additional gas suppliers, demand 
certainty to power plants and additional consumers and a complex structure to 
implement gas affordability is middle performance compared to SBM. This is 
because new suppliers depending on their cost introduce additional gas sources. 
MBM: A generally indicates middle performance compared to SBM, which 
indicates weak performance. 
Appropriateness for existing market maturity for MBM: A indicates 
middle performance because SBM is still on course. MBM: A provides more 
advantages to the nascent gas industry in Ghana compared to SBM. With 
multiple players, asset specificity will reduce, transaction frequency to single 
parties will reduce and uncertainties will remain low compared to SBM. 
MBM: B appears to be the most appropriate and suitable structural 
arrangement for the nascent gas industry in Ghana. MBM: B indicates a strong 
performance in viability of gas supply and reliability, a middle performance in 
gas demand certainty, investment risk and complexity of implementation and a 





Table 29: Industry Structural Models Evaluation 
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2018); Eberhard, (2007); Mckinsey (1993). 
Evaluation Criteria SBM MBM A MBM B Unbundled
Viability of supply chain Weak middle strong strong
Reliability of gas supply weak middle strong strong
Demand certainty strong middle middle middle
Investment risk weak middle middle middle
Complexity of implementation strong middle middle weak
Regulatory supervision Weak weak strong middle
Affordability of gas supply Weak middle middle middle
Appropriateness for existing market maturity strong middle middle weak
Asset Specificity weak middle middle middle
Transaction Frequency weak middle middle middle
Uncertainties Weak middle middle middle






MBM: B also indicates middle performance in investment risk due to 
higher certainty of matching gas supply with demand as gas affordability 
remains relatively low compared to MBM: A. the current SBM can be skipped 
completely to MBM: B since maturity appropriateness, asset specificity, 
transaction frequency and uncertainties are middle performance. This will 
support the argument of two interviewees for a more competitive gas industry 
structure for Ghana [Midstream-EC; IOC-ENI-Ghana]. 
Unbundling would have been the most appropriate structure since this 
indicates strong performance in viability and reliability of gas supply. Middle 
performance in investment risk, gas affordability, regulations, asset specificity, 
transaction frequency and uncertainties. However, complexity of 
implementation and appropriateness of existing market maturity of an 
unbundled structure in the nascent gas industry in Ghana indicates weak 
performance, making this structure inappropriate and an unsuitable structure. 
This notwithstanding, it can be considered at a later stage. 
In essence, SBM is less effective and less complex in implementation 
but as the industry matures and develops, MBM: A and B should be considered 
because of increases in effectiveness and implementation complexity until the 
final model structure of unbundling is reached when the industry fully matures 















Source: Adapted from Bhattacharyya (2011). 
In sum, selecting the best-fit industry structure for the nascent gas 
industry in Ghana requires a rebalancing act. MBM: B is considered more 
appropriate for the nascent gas industry in Ghana; in that, it is relatively 
effective and less complex to implement as indicated on Figure 15. It, also, 
prevents the hold-up and lock-in problems of the SBM with high investment 
risk and low viability of the gas supply chain and gas supply reliability. Besides, 
MBM: B displays low asset specificity whilst increasing asset intensity 
promotes shorter-term contracts to reduce frequent transactions to single buyers. 
This reduces uncertainties; thereby, reducing overall transaction cost in the 











5.7.0. Chapter Summary 
In conclusion, three structural models are considered but none of the 
models will be able to offer a one-size solution to the structural problems facing 
Ghana: encouraging investment upstream and mid-stream, providing cost 
effective gas supply to consumers, ensuring supply chain viability and 
managing risks. SBM causes hold-up and non-payment issues but can offer 
cheap supply through cross-subsidies. This, in turn, can attract investments 
upstream through long-term contracts. MBM: A, on the other hand, reduces 
hold-up issues but non-payment issues remain. In this module, small consumers 
are likely to get high cost supply and suppliers may become opportunistic – 
selling gas to high price markets causing supply reliability issues.  
MBM: B, as well, offers flexibility to suppliers but the lack of long-
term credible contracts will not allow upstream investments to materialise. Gas 
prices are likely to go up, particularly for small users. The market balancing 
issue will appear and the market can become risky. Non-payment by consumers 
of gas will remain until IPPs and large users can have access to own markets. 
However, MBM: B is suitable as a structural model for the nascent gas industry 







BUSINESS VIABILITY OF THE GAS INDUSTRY IN GHANA 
6.0. Introduction 
Chapter six (6) discusses the second objective of the study: to examine 
the business viability of the supply components of the gas industry for 
infrastructure investment decisions in Ghana. The chapter is divided into three 
parts. The first section considers the integrated cash flow model and the input 
data and assumptions of the study, the second section focuses on the static 
analysis of the study while the third section looks at simulation and sensitivity 
analysis and the conclusions. 
Establishing the viability of the various supply components of gas-to-
power value chain is part of a systematic and an all-encompassing analytical 
framework and risk-reward approach to assert the attractiveness and financial 
viability of the nascent gas industry in Ghana (Razavi, 2007). Netback analysis 
established the power sector in Ghana with the highest economic and strategic 
value in the domestic utilisation of natural gas (Ministry of Energy - Ghana Gas 
Master Plan, 2015). Fritsch and Poundineh (2016) identified unfavourable 
investments climate as a major challenge in attracting infrastructure investments 
into the nascent gas industry in Ghana.  
The integrated cash flow model generates net present values (NPVs) 
which are key measures of the financial viability of the four natural gas supply 
components (Leuch, 2012). The NPV measures the actualised net revenues of 




2007). Simulation and sensitivity analysis are performed on the various project 
components to reveal and ascertain the project risk and the variability of the risk 
impacts. The integrated model is built on these four gas supply components of 
the cash flow model in Microsoft Excel as indicated in Appendix 3: 
 Component 1: Upstream production of natural gas (PSC terms)  
 Component 2: Natural Gas Processing Plant (GPP) 
 Component 3: Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline 
 Component 4: Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) 
6.1.0. The Integrated Cash Flow Model 
Integrated gas value chain analysis consist of linking an upstream gas 
production project through a processing plant or directly to a transmission 
pipeline network to a downstream consumer (a CCGT plant). This was used to 
develop an analytical framework (Herath and Malhotra, 1996; Leuch, 2012) for 
the study of the gas industry in Ghana. The following presents the technical and 
cost aspects of the integrated gas value chain. The cash flow components will 
generate a model to serve as a tool for the identification of risks/uncertainties 
and the opportunities in the gas industry in Ghana (World Bank, 2004). 
6.1.1. Upstream Natural Gas Production: The Sankofa Gas Project 
The four integrated cash flow components are built around upstream 
natural gas production such as the Sankofa Gas Project (SGP). The SGP 
produces small volumes of associated gas and large volumes of non-associated 




consumption in electricity generation. The associated gas requires the Gas 
Processing Plant (GPP) to separate lean gas (methane) from the other gases such 
as ethane, butane and propane into Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) for household 
consumption. The methane (lean) gas is transmitted through a pipeline network 
to the CCGT plant. The total cost of the SGP is estimated at US$7.9billion 
(World Bank, 2015). 
6.1.2. Natural Gas Processing Plant: GNGC 
Upstream produced associated gas requires treatment to remove 
impurities to meet the quality standards for transmission and downstream 
consumption (Melton, 2015). The Gas Processing Plant (GPP) separates the raw 
gas into lean gas (methane) for the CCGT consumption and LPG (ethane, butane 
and propane) for household consumption (World Bank, 2004).  
The lean gas is transmitted through a 114km GNGC pipeline and LPGs 
are sold and transported via loading trucks to meet 60% of domestic demand in 
Ghana [Midstream-GNGC]. The GPP is part of the Western Corridor Gas 
Infrastructure Development Project consisting of a 45km offshore pipeline, 
150,000MMBtu/d capacity GPP, a 114km onshore pipeline and a Natural Gas 
Liquids Export System [Midstream-GNGC]. The Infrastructure Project is 
funded by a US$1billion loan facility (part of a US$3billion loan facility) 






6.1.3. Natural Gas Pipeline Company: The case of BOST 
The GNGC gas transmission pipeline is a 114km pipeline with a 
20inch inside diameter and consists of pressure stations, a gas distribution 
station, a terminal station, and two set of block valve stations. This pipeline is 
part of the “Western Corridor Gas Infrastructure Development Project” and is 
estimated to cost US$310million (GNGC, 2011). The pipeline is to convey both 
processed gas from the GPP (all associated gas) at Atuabu34 and the non-
associated gas from an Onshore Receiving Facility (ORF) point from Sanzule35 
to CCGTs at the Takoradi-Aboadzi power enclave in the Western Region of 
Ghana. It is assumed that the transmission pipeline is operated as a separate gas 
supply component and a separate business unit. The NGTU is assumed as the 
independent operator of the GNGC pipeline.  
6.1.4. CCGT Power Plant: The Takoradi International Company  
The natural gas from the SGP upstream is slated for CCGT utilisation 
in electricity generation. Electricity can be produced from generators driven by 
gas turbines or steam turbines with heat from natural gas (World Bank, 2004). 
It is assumed that the Takoradi International Power Company (TICO), an IPP 
in Ghana, generates electricity using CCGT with the upstream gas on an 
installed capacity of 1100MW. This is a GE (General Electric) gas turbine and 
steam turbine generator [Downstream-VRA]. The TICO plants currently 
account for about 11.6% (330MW) [TICO-IPP] of installed thermal electricity 
                                                          
34 Atuabu is a town in the Western Region of Ghana where the gas processing plant is located 




generation capacity but with the 1100MW capacity, this will be the largest 
thermal plant in Ghana.  
The plant has a dual fire capacity, which can run on Light Crude Oil 
(LCO) or gas. World Bank (2013) noted that, usually, small power producing 
units between 250-5,000kW have overall efficiencies of 25%-35% while larger 
power plants may have overall efficiencies in excess of 50%. But a combined 
cycle producing heat and power at such a large plant with capacity of 1100MW 
would have a total energy efficiency of about 48% (World Bank, 2013). 
6.1.5. Objectives of the Integrated Cash Flow Model 
The objective of building the integrated cash flow model for the 
nascent gas industry in Ghana is to determine the business viability of the 
various supply chain components of the gas industry, perform static analysis on 
the projects NPVs and undertake simulation and sensitivity analysis on the 
projects risk factors. This section seeks to answer the following questions: 
 How viable is upstream production of natural gas? 
 How viable is the GPP?  
 How viable is the Transmission pipeline?  
 How viable is the Combine Cycle Gas Turbine?   
6.2.0. Input Data and Assumptions for the Integrated Cash flow Model 
Non-associated gas prices as agreed in the Gas Sales Agreement (GSA) 
from the World Bank (2015) report is US$9.8/MMBtu. The gas royalty rate is 




SGP total capital cost of US$7.9billion for 20years is assumed and it is the same 
as the World Bank estimated SGP capital cost. The GPP processing tariff of 
US$3/MMBtu and LPG sales price of US$320/mt are obtained from 
[Midstream-GNGC] with methane gas volumes of 97% and LPG, 3% received 
from the upstream. The transmission pipeline tariffs of US$2.28/MMBtu are 
also obtained from [Midstream-GNGC] as indicated on Table 30. 
Table 30: Assumptions and Output Data for Integrated Cash Flow  
Upstream Natural Gas Production   
Total Project 
Cost 
Non-associated natural gas prices US$9.8/mmbtu US$7.9billion 
Gas Volumes/per annum 54BCF   
Gas Royalty Rate 7.50%   
Gas Processing Plant 
 
  
Gas Processing Tariffs US$3/mmbtu US$733.3million 
LPG Selling Price US$320/mt   
Methane Gas Quantities 97%   




Transmission Tariffs US$2.28/mmbtu US$390.8million 
Estimated Transmission losses 5%   
CCGT Power Plant 
 
  
Gas Prices US$8.7/mmbtu US$1.045billion 
Electricity Prices 0.09cent US$/kWh   
Plant Efficiency 48%    
Plant Load Factor 90%    
Gas Requirement 43.95BCF/year   
Discount Rate  10%   
Source: Data from Interviews. 
The GPP has a capital cost of US$385.4million as obtained from 
(GNGC and SINOPEC, 2011). A US$374.4million operating cost assumed for 
the GPP [Midstream-GNGC]. A total cost of US$733.3million is estimated for 
the 20years GPP lifespan. GNGC and SINOPEC (2011) contract documents 




US$110.8million operating cost estimated for the 20years operating period of 
the pipeline [Midstream-GNGC]. Therefore, an estimated US$390.8 million 
pipeline cost is assumed for the transmission pipeline project. 
The 1100MW Combined Cycle Gas Turbine is constructed to fully 
utilise the domestically produced natural gas. The plant cost is US$1.045billion. 
The 1100MW plant capacity could be separated into four smaller unit plants 
(275MW each) but is assumed as a single unit plant. Current wholesale 
electricity prices of US$0.09cent/kWh [Downstream-PURC] is assumed for the 
CCGT and an average domestic gas purchase price of US$8.7/MMBtu are used 
[Downstream-VRA]. A discount rate of 10% is assumed for the integrated cash 
flow analysis, as was the case for the World Bank (2015) economic and 
financial analysis for the SGP as indicated on Table 30.  
6.3.0. Static Analysis of the Gas Industry in Ghana 
The static analysis considers the investment costs of each of the various 
supply components of the natural gas value chain (Zhu et al., 2016). This section 
takes a static analysis approach to understanding the financial interconnection 
between the various components through an integrated cash flow model 
(Weijermars, 2010) to formulate hints for identification of unfavourable 
conditions and opportunities in the gas industry in Ghana.  
There is a difference in cost between the production of upstream 
associated and non-associated gas, and the total cost of gas-to-power integrated 
system depends on the price of gas, which is the primary influencing factor (Zhu 




financial analysis (Razavi, 2007). Besides gas prices, there are some other 
important factors that affect the cost of gas-to-power system. These include the 
price of electricity, capital and operating cost, operational methods, annual 
utilisation hours, sources of funds for construction, alternative cost of fuels, 
transmission tariffs and other factors (Zhul et al., 2016). 
6.3.1. Component 1: Static Analysis of Upstream Gas Production 
The Sankofa Gas Project is a Production Sharing Contract between 
GNPC, ENI-Ghana and Vitol Plc to produce associated and non-associated gas 
from two gas fields. The estimated total recoverable gas reserves from these 
fields are 1TCF [Upstream-GNPC]. Initial upstream Investments are meant to 
commercialise gas production in Ghana for electricity generation. The SGP cost 
components are captured in the extract on Table 31. 




































Tax  35% 
44% ENI 104,646,196.57 
 Vitol  
   
239,730,025.61 
    
36% Vitol 83,905,508.96 
 GNPC  
   
134,679,789.67 
    
20% Total  188,551,705.54 
 Total  
   
673,398,948.34 
    
100%     




The SGP static analysis from the integrated cash flow analysis in 
Appendix 3 has a project cost of US$7.9billion, which generates a revenue of 
US$10.5billion. The SGP attracted a fiscal charge of US$793.8million in gas 
royalties and income tax of (35%) US$188.5million to the Ghana government. 
SGP earned an NPV of US$673.3million. The share of project partners include 
ENI-Ghana (44%) US$298.9million, Vitol (36%) US$239.7million and GNPC 
(20%) US$134million. The SGP is a viable business and should be accepted. 
However, upstream deep-water projects require high capital costs considered 
very expensive and risky (Wright and Gallun, 2008). As a result, non-associated 
gas production is considered risky for investments in Ghana. 
6.3.2. Simulation Analysis for the Gas Industry in Ghana 
The static analysis above assumed that all the variables are constant 
over the 20years projects duration and generate all the revenues and NPVs, 
making the project a viable business. The gas industry operates in a dynamic 
global and local energy industry with changing conditions, which may alter the 
viability of the proceeding projects. Probabilistic analysis through simulations 
are performed considering several iterations of the changing dynamics in the 
gas industry. A normal distribution graph is selected for the probabilistic 
distribution from the @RISK software. 
6.3.3. Component 1: Upstream Gas Production Simulation Analysis 
The SGP simulation analysis includes the following input variables: 
gas production volumes of an average of 54BCF per annum, upstream gas price 




on the integrated cash flow model (see Appendix 3). The @RISK software 
generates a normal distribution simulation graph for upstream gas production as 
indicated on Figure 16.   
Figure 16: Simulation Graph for Upstream Gas Production  
 
Source: Based on @RISK v7.5. 
 As indicated on the normal distribution simulation graph Figure 16, the 
NPV for SGP is US$673million with a 84.3% probability of the project breaking 
even and generating positive NPVs above the US$673million. There is a 10.7% 
probability of the project NPV going below the breakeven point and generating 
negative NPVs. The simulation graph shows that SGP has a higher probabilty 
of being a viable business and should be accepted with a 10.7% risk exposure. 
6.3.4. Component 1: Upstream Gas Production Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis relates the impact of the various identified risk 
factors to the projects’ NPVs and show how they affect the viability of the 




the input variables (see Appendix 3). From Figure 17, gas prices, discount rate 
and royalty rates are identified as the most sensitive risk factors affecting the 
viability of the Sankofa Gas Project. 








Source: @RISK v7.5.  
Non-Associated Gas Prices: There is a positive correlation between the 
project NPV and upstream non-associated gas prices. The profitability of the 
SGP depends on non-associated gas prices (EIA, 2016) since the 
US$9.8/MMBtu upstream price is considered high. The higher non-associated 
gas prices, the higher the project NPV and vice versa as indicated on Figure 18. 












For example, a 10% reduction of upstream wellhead gas prices from 
US$9.8/MMBtu to US$8.82/MMBtu will lead to a reduction in the SGP NPV 
from US$673million to US$282.7million, which will still keep the SGP a viable 
business as indicated on Table 32. However, a further reduction in gas prices to 
below US$8.2/MMBtu, which is the breakeven point, will result to the non-
viability of the project. 
Table 32: Non-Associated Gas Prices Vs. Upstream SGP NPV (US$) 
Natural Gas Prices 
(mmbtu) 
% of change NPV US$(m) 
9.8 Current price 673.3 
8.82 10% 282.7 
8.2 Break-even Price 0 
Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK. 
For the viability of the SGP, a wellhead gas price of US$8.2MMBtu is 
the lowest possible price the SGP requires to break-even, any price below the 
breakeven point will result in the non-viability of the project. This implies that 
the SGP is very risky, and non-associated gas prices must be maintained at least 
above US$8.2/MMBtu for the SGP to remain a viable business.  
Discount Rate: the policy rate from the Bank of Ghana is 20% (Bank 
of Ghana; 12/02/2018); however, this is not what is used for the SGP because 
the finances of the SGP are not generated internally. The IOCs are generating 
funds from the international capital market so a different discount rate is applied 
to the SGP, which is assumed to be equivalent to the World Bank rate of 10%. 
Discount rates are negatively correlated to the SGP NPVs as indicated on Figure 












Source: @RISK v7.5. 
For instance, if the discount rate increases to 22%, the project NPV 
decreases to US$200million and if the discount rate decreases downward to 5%, 
the project NPV increases to US$1billion as indicated on Table 33. However, 
at a discount rate of 37%, the SGP breaks even. All things being equal, the SGP 
needs lower discount rates to remain viable. 
Table 33: Discount Rate Vs. Upstream Gas Only Production NPV US$ 
Discount Rate %Change in Discount rate NPV US$ (m) 
SGP Rate 10% 673 
Policy Rate in Ghana 22% 200 
  20% 249 
  15% 413 
  5% 1000 
Breakeven Point 37% 0 
Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK. 
Ensuring lower discount rates for gas projects in Ghana will require 
facilitating lower investment risks in oil and gas exploration activities and 
promoting guaranteed returns on investments through appropriate structural 




Royalty Rate: the Model Petroleum Agreement (MPA) for Ghana has 
7.5% royalty rate for gas production compared to 12.5% for crude oil production 
as incentives to enhance the viability of domestic gas projects in Ghana 
[Upstream-GNPC]. The royalty rate is negatively correlated to the SGP NPV. 
Increasing royalty rates indicate a decreasing project NPV and vice versa as 
indicated on Figure 20. 







Source: @RISK v7.5. 
For instance, a decrease in royalty rates from 7.5% to 5% will result in 
an increase in the SGP NPV from US$673million to US$778million. Royalty 
rates at 24% is the break-even rate and above 24% will lead to the non-viability 
of the SGP, whilst a 7.5% and a decrease to 5% royalty rate increases the project 
viability to US$778million as indicated on Table 34. That is, SGP needs lower 
royalty rates to remain viable. 
A reduction in the royalty rate or elimination of the royalty rate on gas 
production as a government of Ghana fiscal policy will increase the business 
viability of non-associated gas production in Ghana. If the royalty rate is 




from US$9.8/MMBtu to US$7.6/MMBtu and the SGP will still remain viable 
at a positive NPV of US$42million. 
Table 34: Royalty Rate Vs. Upstream SGP NPV US$ 
Gas Royalty Rate %Change NPV US$ (million) 
Current Rate 7.50% 673 
  6.50% 715 
  5% 778 
  20% 145 
Break-even Point 24% 0 
Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK. 
 
Consideration can be given to gas production royalties meant for 
domestic consumption to promote further upstream investments in gas 
production to reduce investment risk and reduce the downstream cost of natural 
gas in Ghana. Royalty rates can be reviewed, reduced or eliminated aimed at 
ensuring the viability of the SGP.  
6.4.0. Component 2: Gas Processing Plant (GNGC) 
The gas that is produced upstream is different from the gas that is 
consumed by the thermal plants (Younger, 2004). The gas must be processed 
into methane and made available to a transmission pipeline to be delivered to 
the CCGT. GNPC is the upstream gas aggregator, which delivers gas to the GPP 
under the SBM of which Ghana National Gas Company (GNGC) as a subsidiary 
of GNPC operates the GPP.  
GNPC aggregates upstream gas from the SGP at a price of 
US$9.8/MMBtu to be delivered to the GPP operated by GNGC. The GPP is 




methane/lean gas as feedstock for the CCGT and LPG for household 
consumption. GNPC is considered as the gas owner according to the three 
interviews [Upstream-GNPC; Midstream-GNGC; Min-Energy] responsible for 
the cost of delivering upstream gas to downstream consumers. It is assumed that 
97% of the gas received from upstream (54BCF/annum on average) is processed 
into methane/lean gas while 3% is processed into other products (ethane, 
propane and butane) sold as Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). The Table 35 
indicates the static analysis of the GPP. 
Table 35: Gas Processing Plant Static Analysis 











Methane (97%) and 
LPG (3%) 
733million 2.9billion 10% 566million 
Upstream gas cost US$9.8/mmbtu    
Processing Tariff US$3/mmbtu    
Products Selling 
Price US$320/mt    
Products Volumes 
3% of upstream 
gas    
Methane Gas 
Volumes 
97% of upstream 
gas    
Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK. 
GNGC invested US$733million of total cost on the GPP, which 
generated revenues of US$2.9billion. The GPP generated a positive NPV of 
US$566million at a 10% discount rate, which indicates that over the 20years 
duration, the GPP is a viable business, which significantly depends on the prices 
of products (LPG), sold at US$320/mt. The viability of the GPP significantly 




6.4.1. Component 2:  Simulation Analysis of the GPP 
The GPP is assumed to be operating as a separate business entity and 
receives natural gas from Component 1: SGP. The input variables include gas 
volumes from upstream of an average of 54BCF/annum, upstream gas prices of 
US$9.8/MMBtu, gas-processing tariff of US$3/MMBtu and products (LPG) 
selling price of US$320/mt as contained in the Excel Sheet (Appendix 3). 
Figure 21: Simulation Graph for the Natural Gas Processing Plant 
 
Source: @RISK v7.5. 
The normal distribution graph of the GPP on Figure 21 generated 
US$566million in NPVs and indicates a 44.9% probability of generating 
negative NPVs and 55.1% of generating positive NPVs. The GPP is, therefore, 
a viable business from both the static and simulation analysis. However the GPP 
has a 44.9% risk exposure which affects its viability.  
6.4.2. Component 2: The GPP Sensitivity Analysis 
What risk factors affect the viability of the GPP? Upstream raw gas 




volumes and methane gas volumes), gas processing tariffs and discount rates as 
indicated on Figure 22 are the risk factors affecting the viability of the GPP.  
Figure 22: Sensitivity Graph for the GPP  
 
Source: @RISK v7.5. 
Upstream natural gas prices:  the GPP depends on the upstream 
production of gas so the viability of the GPP depends on upstream gas prices. 
Upstream price of raw gas is identified as the most sensitive risk factor affecting 
the viability of the GPP as indicated on the sensitivity graph Figure 22.  
Figure 23: Correlation Graph for GPP NPV vs. upstream raw gas prices 
 





There is a negative correlation between the GPP NPV and upstream raw 
gas prices as indicated on the correlation graph Figure 23. Higher raw gas prices 
negatively affect the viability of the GPP. For instance, a 10% increase in raw 
gas prices from US$9.8/MMBtu to US$10.78/MMBtu will result in the 
reduction of the GPP NPV from US$566million to US$144.5million. Upstream 
raw gas price of US$11.10/MMBtu is the break-even point for the GPP 
viability. At prices above US$11.10/MMBtu, the GPP records negative NPVs 
and becomes non-viable as indicated on Table 36. 
Table 36: GPP NPV vs. Upstream Raw Gas Prices 
Upstream Raw Gas Pries  % Change  GPP NPV (US$m)  
9.80 Current price 566.80 
10.78 10% 144.50 
11.10  Break-even  0 
Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK. 
Natural Gas Processing Tariff: these are not very sensitive to the 
profitability of the GPP compared to upstream raw gas prices. Even though pure 
methane is the main reason for building the GPP, its processing tariffs are not 
very sensitive to the GPP viability. A lean gas-processing tariff of 
US$3/MMBtu is charged. There is positive correlation between gas processing 
tariffs and GPP NPV as indicated on Figure 24. Increasing processing tariffs 




Figure 24: Correlation Graph for GPP NPV vs. Gas Processing Tariffs 
 
Source: @RISK v7.5. 
For instance, a 50% reduction in the GPP processing tariff from 
US$3/MMBtu to US$1.7/MMBtu keeps the GPP a viable business but reduces 
NPV drastically from US$566million to US$23million as indicated on Table 
37. However, reducing methane gas processing tariffs lowers domestic 
downstream final gas tariffs, which positively affects the viability of the CCGT. 
The question then is “why not reduce methane gas processing tariffs?” 
Table 37: Natural Gas Processing Tariff vs. GPP NPV (US$) 
Natural Gas Processing  
Decreasing NPV US$ (million) 
Tariff US$/mmbtu 
3   566 
2.7 10% 441 
2.1 30% 190.8 
1.7 50% 23 
Break-even Price 1.5 0 
Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK. 
The GPP break-even tariff is US$1.5/MMBtu. Any reduction in tariff 
to below US$1.5/MMBtu will result in the non-viability of the GPP; this is the 
lowest tariff the GPP can charge. The GPP viability is dependent on charging 
fair tariffs for processing lean gas. The activities of the GPP should, therefore, 




is because even at a GPP tariff of US$1.7/MMBtu, the project still generates 
positive NPVs. This indicates that the current US$3/MMBtu GPP tariff is high 
and inappropriately set.  
Production Volumes: volumetric risk is considered a major risk factor 
to the viability of the GPP. The ratio of methane/LPG productions is dependent 
on the content of the associated gas from the SGP. The more condensates 
volumes there are, the higher the LPG content and vice versa.  
Figure 25: Correlation Graph for GPP NPV vs. Methane Gas Volumes 
 
Source: @RISK v7.5. 
The higher pure methane gas production volumes from upstream to the 
GPP, the lower the viability of the GPP. From the Figure 25, Methane gas-
processing volumes lowers the production of associated gas products (LPG). 
Methane gas processing volumes are negatively correlated to the viability of the 
GPP. From Figure 26, the viability of the GPP is highly dependent on the 
processing of products (LPG). The product sale values provides significant 
revenues for the GPP. The higher the products (LPG) processing volumes, the 




correlated to the viability of the GPP. Products volumes (LPG) are the most 
significant component of the GPP viability.  
Figure 26: Correlation Graph for GPP NPV vs. Products (LPG)  
 
Source: @RISK v7.5. 
For instance, a slight reduction in product (ethane, butane and propane) 
volumes from 3% to 2% whilst pure methane volumes increase to 98% from 
97% sees the GPP recording negative NPVs. The GPP will not be viable without 
significant products (LPG) volumes as indicated on Table 38. LPG has higher 
market value in Ghana at US$320/mt; it is a source of fuel for household 
cooking and vehicles (Suleman et al, 2017). 
Table 38: Lean Gas and LPG Quantities Ratios vs. GPP NPV (US$) 
Methane Gas 
Volumes (%) Products (LPG) Volumes (%) NPV US$ million 
          97%        3%       566 
          98%        2%        0 
Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK. 
Should the GPP operate under the SBM or as a separate entity under 
the MBM?  The more associated gas the GPP processes, the higher the GPP 




150,000MMBtu/d [Midstream-GNGC] and currently processes marginal 
volumes. Additional volumes from other gas fields will see full optimisation of 
the GPP. The GPP should be allowed to operate on open access and non-
discriminatory third party basis even if GNPC remains the upstream aggregator 
for the current production fields (Jubilee, TEN and SGP).  
This will mean that several sources of natural gas would be made 
available to the GPP from other production fields to enable the GPP operate at 
the 150,000MMBtu full capacity. When the GPP exceeds full capacity, 
expansion and new GPPs could be considered. Other risk factors that may affect 
the viability of the GPP include force majeure, regulatory risk, credit risk, 
liquidity risk and many more. 
6.5.0. Component 3: The Natural Gas Pipeline: the case of BOST 
The integrated cash flow model treats the transmission pipeline as a 
separate business entity operated by the selected NGTU (BOST) and as another 
cost unit to final gas prices charging a transmission tariff of US$2.28/MMBtu 
[Midstream-GNGC]. This is separated from the GPP and are not considered as 
a bundled service. The transmission pipeline operates as a pipeline service 
company offering transportation services in extra available pipeline capacity to 
multiple users. The Transmission Pipeline is connected to the GPP to transport 
methane/lean gas to consumers (CCGTs at the West). The current capacity of 
the pipeline is 150,000MMBtu/d with the potential of being increased to 





Table 39: Transmission Pipeline Static Analysis 
Component 3: 
BOST Pipeline 








 NPV US$ 
(million) 
BOST Pipeline 537.7  2.26billion  10% 552.9 
Transmission 
Tariffs US$2.28/mmbtu    
 Estimated 
Transmission 
losses   5%    
Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK. 
The transmission pipeline generates US$2.26billion in revenues at a 
transmission tariff of US$2.28/MMBtu transmitting, on average, 54BCF/annum 
of gas over a 20-year period. Five percent (5%) of the gas received from the 
GPP is lost to heating and leakages leaving 95% to be finally delivered to the 
CCGT. The transmission pipeline operators invested US$537.7million and 
generated positive NPVs of US$552.6million at a 10% discount rate indicating 
business viability which is 100% return on investments whilst upstream gas 
producers are getting less than 10% return on investments as discussed above. 
The transmission pipeline business, thus, indicates very high business viability. 
Operating the pipeline in the SBM will mean GNPC has monopoly 
power on the transmission pipeline and that only GNPC’s gas will have priority 
access to the pipeline. In an MBM, multiple gas owners will require access to 
the pipeline. This will require that the pipeline operate on an open access and 
non-discriminatory basis. Even though the pipeline can operate on an open 
access system under the SBM, non-discriminatory access cannot be guaranteed.
 Essentially, the pipeline is exposed to volumetric risk similar to the GPP. 




full capacity of 442,000MMBtu/d with additional compressors. Multiple gas 
sources under the MBM will mean that the pipeline will have additional 
revenues with extra capacity to transmit other users’ gas.  Adding another user 
to the pipeline will require capacity management as to whose gas should be sent 
first, and this will mean operating the pipeline as an unbundled structure through 
a regulated open access regime. 
6.5.1. Component 3: Transmission Pipeline Simulation Analysis 
The transmission pipeline receives processed gas from the SGP 
through the GPP. The input variables for the transmission pipeline’s normal 
distribution graph simulation analysis include transmission tariffs of 
US$2.28/MMBtu, discount rate of 10% and the estimated loss rate  of 5% as 
captured on the Excel Spreadsheet Appendix 3. 
Figure 27: Simulation Graph for the BOST Transmission Pipeline  
 





The transmission pipeline indicates a 90% probability of generating 
positive NPVs within the range of US$383million and US$749million. The 
transmission pipeline displayed limited risk exposure on the normal distribution 
simulation graph. The risk factors identified as affecting the viability of the 
transmission pipeline are volumetric and transmission tariff risks. 
Operating the transmission pipeline under third party access and 
unbundling the gas transmission pipeline from GNPC to operate as a separate 
business entity [Midstream-EC] will ensure adequate multiple user access and 
may increase gas transmission volumes which will generate extra cash flow 
from the other users.  
6.5.2. Component 3: Transmission Pipeline Sensitivity Analysis 
According to an interviewee [Midstream-GNGC], a combined charge 
of US$5.28/MMBtu is required for the GPP processing and transmission of gas 
tariff under the SBM. The GPP tariff of US$3/MMBtu is charged for gas 
processing and US$2.28/MMBtu for the transmission tariff. From the 
sensitivity graph Figure 28, transmission tariffs, discount rate and estimated loss 





Figure 28: Sensitivity Graph for the Transmission Pipeline NPV (US$)  
 
Source: @RISK v7.5. 
Transmission Tariffs: increasing transmission tariffs indicates higher 
NPVs and decreasing transmission tariffs results to lower NPVs. There is a 
positive correlation between transmission tariffs and the transmission pipeline 
NPVs as indicated on Figure 29. 
 Figure 29: Correlation Graph for the Pipeline NPV vs. Tariffs 
 
Source: @RISK v7.5. 
For instance, a 50% reduction in transmission tariffs from 
US$2.28/MMBtu to US$1.14/MMBtu maintains the pipeline NPV as a viable 




be reduced further by 50% and the pipeline will remain viable. The lowest 
possible tariff the pipeline can charge is US$0.9/MMBtu and this is the break-
even tariff, as any tariff below this will result in negative NPVs. Why then are 
transmission tariffs so high in Ghana? This, as well, indicates that transmission 
tariffs are inappropriately set and require regulations. 
Table 40: Scenario One: Transmission Tariffs Vs. Pipeline NPV (US$) 
Transmission Tariffs 
US$/MMBtu 
Decreasing %  NPV US$ million 
2.28   552.9 
2.05 10% 461.6 
1.6 30% 282.8 
1.14 50% 100.2 
0.9 Break-even Point 0 
Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK. 
Volumetric risk is identified as the major risk factor affecting the 
viability of the transmission pipeline. Rate-of-return and incentive or 
performance based regulatory systems can be combined to regulate the pipeline 
capital cost recovery since pipelines usually have lower operation costs with 
multiple users. Additional volumes will need to be added and transported to 
optimise the current underutilised pipeline capacity of 150,000MMBtu/d. 
Compressors could also be used to increase the existing capacity to 
440,000MMBtu/d to fully utilise the pipeline capacity. This may result in lower 
average cost and lower transmission pipeline tariffs as well as lower 





6.6.0. Component 4: Combined Cycle Gas Thermal Plant (CCGT): TICO 
To utilise the natural gas from the SGP for power generation, a 
1100MW combined cycle gas thermal power plant is required. Either this can 
be a single plant or four smaller thermal plants summing to 1100MW of 
275MW, each connected to the integrated gas system of which TICO-IPP is 
assumed to be the operator and downstream receiver. 
6.6.1. Component 4: CCGT Power Plant Static Analysis 
The integrated cash flow framework has the CCGT power plant as the 
final point of the gas industry value chain. The SGP gas is delivered to the GPP 
to be processed and condensed. The transmission pipeline then receives this gas, 
which is transmitted to the TICO-IPP CCGT plant located at Takoradi-Aboadzi 
thermal power plant enclave (Western Region of Ghana). Table 41 discusses 
the major features of the CCGT power plant. 
Table 41: CCGT Thermal Plant Details 
Plant Capacity (MW) 1100 
Capital Cost 950$/kW 
Plant Cost US$ million 1045 
Plant Life 20years 
Plant Load Factor 90% 
Plant Efficiency 48% 
Heat Rate 7120BTU/kWh 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
The CCGT is assumed to have a construction cost of US$1.045billion 




2013). It is to operate for 325days with 40days for downtimes, repairs and 
maintenance in a year for 20years. Gas or LCO are the main fuels for the plant 
and a wholesale electricity tariff of US$0.09cent/KWh is charged for electricity 
sold to VRA, the wholesale bulk electricity buyer in Ghana. 











TICO CCGT 10.3billion 12.6billion 10% 388.4million 
Gas Required  49.95BCF    
Gas Prices US$8.7/mmbtu    
Wholesale 
electricity tariff US$0.09/kWh   
 Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK. 
The total capital cost of the CCGT is US$10.3billion, generating 
revenues of US$12.6billion discounted at 10% to generate a positive NPV of 
US$388.4million. This shows the business viability of the CCGT plant. The 
CCGT plant will take gas from the transmission pipeline at prevailing 
downstream domestic gas prices averaged at US$8.7/MMBtu to produce 
electricity which is to be sold at current electricity wholesale market prices of 
US$0.09kWh for the project duration of 20years [Downstream-VRA].  
6.6.2. Component 4: CCGT Simulation Analysis 
Electricity generation has the highest netback value for the SGP. The 
input variables for the simulation analysis are annual electricity generation 
capacity, gas prices (US$8.7/MMBtu), electricity tariffs (US$cent 0.09/kWh), 
heat rate (7120BTU/kWh), plant efficiency (48%) and load factor (90%) (World 




Figure 30: Simulation Graph for the CCGT Plant 
 
Source: @RISK v7.5. 
The CCGT, generated a positive NPV of US$388.4million and shows 
a 69% probability of generating positive NPVs and a 31% probability of 
generating negative NPVs below the breakeven point (0). The CCGT is 
considered a viable business; however, with a higher risk exposure of 31% 
probability of generating negative NPVs. 
6.6.3. Component 4: CCGT Sensitivity Analysis 
How sensitive are the various identified risk factors affecting the 
viability of the TICO CCGT plant? Heat rate, electricity prices, gas prices and 
plant capacity are identified as the most sensitive risk factors affecting the 
viability of the CCGT power plant. Electricity and gas prices are the risk factors 
in the remit of the gas industry in Ghana. The other factors, such as heat rate, 




Figure 31: Sensitivity Graph for the Transmission Pipeline NPV (US$)  
 
Source: @RISK v7.5. 
Gas Prices: there are two price components of domestically produced 
natural gas in Ghana: the commodity price, which is the cost of production on 
one hand and the cost of processing, transmitting and distributing to final 
consumers on the other hand (EIA, 2017).  In essence, GNPC aggregates 
upstream gas and provides an average downstream final gas price taking into 
consideration the commodity price differentials and adding the processing and 
transmission tariffs as well as regulatory levies and taxes. 
 Domestically produced gas is priced at US$8.7/MMBtu to the thermal 
power plant. This includes the upstream associated gas prices and non-
associated gas prices from three different production fields with different prices. 
These prices are aggregated to provide an average price of US$8.7/MMBtu to 
thermal plants. However, there is a negative correlation between the CCGT 
power plant and gas prices. The higher the gas price, the lower the CCGT NPVs 




Figure 32: Correlation Graph for the CCGT NPV vs. Gas Prices 
Source: @RISK v7.5. 
There are different gas prices available in Ghana. The price of LCO, 
which is a competing fuel for power generation, and the possibility of importing 
LNG to supplement domestic gas consumption are presented on Table 43. The 
integrated cash flow model will give a combined gas price of 
US$15.08/MMBtu, generating negative NPVs for the CCGT. The CCGT NPV 
is sensitive to fuel prices, and gas presents the cheapest fuel source.  
Table 43: Natural Gas Prices to the CCGT vs. CCGT NPV (US$) 
Gas Prices US$/MMBtu36 NPV US$ million 
Domestically Produced Gas Average Price 8.7 388.4 
WAGPCo 8.6 428 
Break-even price 9.6 30 
Levelised Gas Prices 6.6 1.2billion 
LNG 10.5 -326 
Imported Light Fuels 12 -922 
Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK. 
Domestic gas prices (US$8.7/MMBtu) and WAGP gas price 
(US$8.6/MMBtu) (Ministry of Energy Gas Master Plan, 2015) make the CCGT 
a viable business. The break-even gas price is US$9.6/MMBtu so any price 
                                                          




above this makes the CCGT non-viable. LNG and LCO equivalent prices are 
non-competitive alternative fuels for the CCGT compared to domestic and 
WAGP gas prices. The LNG from the FSRU and LCO will require higher 
wholesale electricity tariffs to be increased from US$0.09cent/kWh to 
US$0.2cent/kWh to remain viable. LNG can be sourced from very competitive 
markets with much lower prices.  
Electricity Prices: Power generation in Ghana has shifted from 
hydropower to depend on very expensive fuels such as gas or LCO. The high 
domestic and WAGPCo gas prices means electricity tariffs must increase to 
support the cost of generation and investments required. There is a positive 
correlation between electricity prices and the viability of the CCGT. Regarding 
this, higher wholesale electricity tariffs indicates higher CCGT NPVs and vice 
versa as indicated on the correlation graph Figure 33. 
Figure 33: Correlation Graph for the CCGT NPV vs. Electricity Prices 
 
Source: @RISK v7.5. 
The CCGT needs wholesale electricity tariffs above US$0.09cent/kWh 
to remain viable. For instance, electricity tariffs below US$0.09cent/kWh will 




10% reduction in electricity tariffs to US$ 0.081cents /kWh will lead to negative 
CCGT NPVs. 
Table 44: Electricity Prices Vs. CCGT NPV (US$) 
Electricity Prices  
%Change NPV US$ million 
US$ cents /kWh 
0.09   - 388.4 
0.081 10% (-113.6) 
Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK. 
It is reported that wholesale electricity tariffs in Ghana are the highest 
in the West African Sub-region above the average price of US$0.04cent/kWh 
(African Centre for Energy Policy, 2017). Electricity tariffs set in Ghana at the 
current sub-regional average of US$0.04cent/kWh will see the CCGT record 
negative NPVs (of US$2billion), which is a drastic loss. Wholesale electricity 
generated from natural gas in Ghana cannot be sold at the possible lowest price 
of US$0.09cent/kWh as indicated in this study, and this accounts for the high 
cost of electricity in Ghana.  
The gas produced at the SGP, if dedicated to power generation, can 
sustain 1100MW plant and this will be sufficient to significantly transform 
power supply dynamics and accelerate the much-needed economic growth in 
Ghana. However, this will required guaranteed economic gas and electricity 
tariffs. As indicated in Chapter Two (2.4.1. Challenges in the Electricity Sector 
in Ghana), to guarantee that the electricity sector is able to pay for the 
sustainability of the nascent gas industry there should be able to pay economic 
tariffs for electricity. The mining sector indicates higher ability and willingness 




offer 1100MW of power.  
This will require downstream electricity consumption segregation in 
Ghana’s electricity sector. Whereby high consumers who are willing and able 
to pay for economic tariffs such as the mining companies are separated from 
low consumers such as residential and public sector consumers who are unable 
and unwilling to pay economic tariffs on time especially at this point where 
cheap electricity cannot be guaranteed from existing thermal plants. These high 
consumers such as the mining companies can be segregated and tied into 
thermal plants power generation option to be guaranteed secured and reliable 
electricity at economic tariffs. 
 For the lower consumers, which require cheap power, are unable and 
unwilling to pay economic tariffs sees electricity as a public good37 to be 
provided to all Ghanaians, requiring government subsidies to survive. Cheaper 
generation sources such as the hydrogenations from Akosombo, Kpong and Bui 
dams and renewable energy sources can serve such vulnerable consumers with 
limited constraints to the thermal generation sector.  
In the long-term renewable energy from especially solar PVs in large 
and small scales can be offered as alternatives to low income consumers and as 
pro-poor government of Ghana energy subsidy program. Mini-solar PVs can be 
offered to the very low income and poor consumers especially to urban and rural 
                                                          
37 Public good has the following characteristics; it is non-rival and non-excludable and is valued 
by individuals. Many of the ‘classic’ public goods involve massive infrastructure and 





poor consumers as Ghana government targeted subsidies program at relatively 
cheaper rates. The era of cheap electricity is getting to an end in Ghana and the 
industry can only survive when consumers are able and willing to pay economic 
tariffs for electricity. It is imperative to direct SGP gas to IPPs to generate 
electricity, which will be sold to mining companies to guarantee the 
sustainability of the SGP and the overall gas industry. Credible consumers who 
are able and willing to pay reliable and secured gas and electricity tariffs are 
important for the sustainability of the SGP (World Bank, 2015). 
In a MBM: B industry structure, upstream gas investors will be able to 
transact gas trades directly with downstream consumers such as IPPs, which are 
able and willing to pay economic tariffs. IPPs can then serve as credible off-
takers for gas supply contracts instead of GNPC or VRA. At the same time, IPPs 
can sell their electricity directly to these mining companies for guaranteed 
economic electricity tariffs to enable full cost recovery of the electricity and gas 
value chain. New gas and electricity transaction contracts such as upstream gas 
producers/suppliers-IPPs-Mining Companies instead of the highly contested 
existing state structure of GNPC-GNGC-VRA structures known for its hold-up 
and lock-in problems will emerge to avert the existing non-payments issues and 
inefficiencies. If these challenges are solved adequately IPP investments 
confidence will increase in power generation in Ghana. 
6.7.0. Risk Factor Evaluations 
In sum, the integrated cash flow analysis identified several risk factors 




gas industry value chain and the various projects NPVs. The SGP is affected by 
the changing upstream gas prices, discount rates and royalty rates. The GPP, as 
well, is exposed to upstream gas prices, gas processing tariffs and volumetric 
risk. The transmission pipeline faces volumetric risk and lower transmission 
tariffs risk. Finally, the CCGT is affected by lower electricity tariffs and higher 
gas prices. To mitigate these identified risk factors on the nascent gas industry 
in Ghana is to improve regulations and promote competition however possible. 
Table 45: Risk Factors Summary Table 
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Source: Based on Integrated Cash Flow Model using @RISK v7.5. 
6.8.0. The World Bank Benchmarked Sankofa Gas Project 
The World Bank performed both financial and economic analysis for 
the Sankofa Gas Project (SGP). A US$9.8/MMBtu gas price, a discount rate of 




20years duration. This generated total revenues of US$14billion and NPV of 
US$4billion as indicated on Table 46. 













SGP 9.8$/mmbtu  7.9billion   14billion  10%  4billion  
Source: World Bank (2015). 
The World Bank Sankofa Gas Project is a confirmation of the fact that 
non-associated gas projects are high-risk investment projects in Ghana and will 
require higher commodity prices of US$9.8/MMBtu to remain viable. There is 
an interconnectedness between the four components of the integrated gas 
system. Whilst upstream gas production is dependent on gas demand of the 
CCGT, the GPP and the transmission pipelines are required to process and 
transmit associated gas to the CCGT.  
The GPP is to process the associated gas and is a cost component to 
final gas prices. The transmission pipeline will be financially and economically 
efficient when transmitting multiple sources of gas at full capacity. Lower 
downstream gas prices are also important to the viability of the CCGT. There 
are four benefits of linking upstream gas to downstream power plants.  
1. The Ghana government will get revenues from their share of oil, gas, 
and condensates royalties/taxes from private investors.  
2. Supply of LPG to households and the local market.  
3. Contributing to cheaper energy supply to ensure energy supply 




4. Additionally, domestic gas will displace LCO importation cost and 
investments into LNG plants in the short term. It is, therefore, 
cheaper to rely on domestic gas (World Bank, 2015).  
The availability of sufficient fuel supply sources including gas, even 
though expensive, means the existing power crisis will be solved. This means 
there will be macroeconomic stability and a higher potential for economic 
growth in Ghana as each percentage point of economic growth in the economy 
is worth US$500million to the economy (World Bank, 2015; IMF, 2015). 
6.8.1. Alternative Gas Consumption: A Fertilizer Plant 
A major challenge common in the nascent gas industry in Ghana is 
getting large and small-scale gas consumers able and willing to pay economic 
tariffs for reliable and adequate gas supply. The power sector demonstrated 
consistency in serving as a large-scale end consumer of gas. However, 
credibility problems, increasing inefficiencies, mounting debt liabilities of 
wholesale gas and electricity buyers are raising serious concerns effecting the 
viability of the gas value chain.  
As indicated above, the era of cheap power is ending in Ghana. The 
power sector alone cannot sufficiently meet the market requirements of the gas 
industry since a monopsony structure is created in the existing SBM of GNPC-
GNGC-VRA firm structural model with its inherent challenges. MBM: B will 
require multiple large to small-scale downstream gas consumers which are able 
and willing to pay economic tariffs to avert the existing market concentration 




 Why a fertilizer plant in Ghana? Agriculture contributes about 
18.9% of Ghana’s GDP as of 2016 and employs about 44.7% of the population 
especially rural communities and women as indicated in Chapter Two (Structure 
of Economic Growth Rate in Ghana). The crops sector being the leading 
contributor of 14.5% to agriculture (Ministry of Finance Budgetary Statement, 
2017). The application of fertilizers mostly for cereal production including 
maize, rice, millet and sorghum and other crops accounts for 66.2% of the total 
agriculture subsector contribution to GDP. The production of these cereals 
requires the application of fertilizers mostly NPK and urea for higher yields 
since soils are increasingly losing their fertility (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture, 2010).  
To achieve this, a fertilizer plant utilization is considered because the 
other monetisation options are not viable in Ghana in the short-term considering 
the volumes of gas available. For example, an LNG export market requires large 
volumes of gas reserves and a destination market and possibly a non-existent 
domestic market for the gas. However, there is a domestic demand for gas in 
Ghana; yet, the gas reserves are not sufficient to meet this domestic demand or 
an LNG export project.  
The Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) and Methanol Production are not priorities 
to the Ghanaian economy as studies from Nexant (2010), ECA (2014), Emos 
(2010), World Bank (2013) and the Ghana Gas Master Plan (2015) have 
suggested. The gas-to-power project has been the top priority followed by use 




option for Ghana’s gas utilisation (Gas Master Plan, 2015). For the different gas 
utilisation options, methanol production, LNG exports and GTL projects would 
require significant gas reserves. In Ghana, nonetheless, these reserves are 
marginal. A fertilizer plant, on the other hand, with the increasing domestic 
demand, requires relatively small gas reserves.  
Additionally, fertilizer products have a guaranteed domestic demand 
for agriculture purposes. A fertilizer plant would replace or eliminate fertilizer 
import bills on the government of Ghana budget. This will make available funds 
for other equally important government expenditures. It is, also, a priority area 
of investment for government to increase the contribution of the agriculture 
sector to the overall GDP growth rate of Ghana.  
6.8.2. Viability of Fertilizer Plant Investments in Ghana 
The Ghana government has a fertilizer policy aimed at developing a 
competitive fertilizer subsector of quality, affordable and adequate fertilizer 
production and importation. The policy framework would be achieved mainly 
by providing appropriate incentives for investments into fertilizer production 
through effective funding mechanisms for fertilizer manufacturers and 
importers. The Ghana government intents to encourage domestic production of 
fertilizers through appropriate targeted tax reliefs, and tariff regimes. The policy 
is envisaged to be consistent with regional and international prevailing 
Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), Africa Union (AU) 
and other international policies on fertilizer. 




fertilizers in Ghana. Majority of the fertilizers consumed in Ghana are imported, 
blended and distributed through a network of wholesale and retail agro-dealers. 
These imports come from 10 main countries including Morocco (29%), Russia 
(17%), Estonia (16%) and Italy (15%) as indicated on Figure 34.  
Figure 34: Fertilization Importation Countries into Ghana  
 
Source: AfricaFertilizer.org (2017). 
 In 2016 there have been about 239,884 Million Tonnes of fertilizers 
imported into the country as indicated on the Table 47. The top five fertilizer 
imports into Ghana include NPK, 55% of all fertilizer imports, Urea 16%, 
Ammonia sulphate 10%, MOP (Muriate of Potash) 6%, TSP (Triple Super 
Phosphate) 6% and other fertilizers 7%.  
Table 47: Fertilizer Importation into Ghana (000-Million Tonnes) 
Fertilizer Name 2013 2014 2015 2016 
NPK's 117,047 44,880 138,140 132,632 
Urea 36,104 202 18,348 39,035 
Ammonium sulphate 54,863 6,282 64,015 23,268 
MOP 19,849 22,715 18,707 13,842 
TSP 47173 21258 32052 13802 
Other fertilizers 23051 15746 18895 17305 
Total fertilizer for agric (MT) 298,087 111,083 290,157 239,884 




How can Ghana develop a domestic fertilizer production plant? 
Essentially some viability questions are asked: it is known that there is a 
domestic demand for fertilizers but if fertilizer would be produced in Ghana, 
would local fertilizer prices be competitive with imports. Are there adequate 
availability of raw materials? Government policy on fertilizer intents to support 
domestic fertilizer production through tax incentives but will these be 
competitive with other regional competitors such as Nigeria. Can a Ghana 
Government fertilizer subsidy support a local fertilizer industry? 
The fertilizer plant will require relatively cheap gas prices to be viable. 
However, existing downstream gas prices in Ghana are relatively expensive at 
an average price of US$8.7/MMBtu under the SBM where GNPC is the 
aggregator of upstream gas and buys from IOCs. Domestically produced gas 
cannot be sold below the benchmarked WAGPCo gas prices of US$8.6/MMBtu 
according to one interviewee [Downstream-PURC]. These prices are 
unsustainable for a viable fertilizer plant. Sen (2015), confirms more 
appropriately that gas prices are set by allowing price formation mechanisms 
and providing subsidies directly to eligible consumers. Under certain 
circumstances, the prices of upstream gas are intentionally kept low to provide 
incentives and subsidy for the viability of some industries (Sen, 2015), therefore 
a fertilizer plant in Ghana can benefit from government intended gas price 
subsidy. FAO (2015) noted that, the Ghana government spends US$63million 
annually on fertilizer subsidy and this amount can serve as leverage for 




Ghana is producing natural gas from other gas fields such as the 
Greater Jubilee fields and TEN. To this end, a dedicated natural gas reserve for 
a fertilizer plant is not farfetched. TEN is an oil and gas project for which 
associated gas can be offered at a relatively cheap and competitive price to a 
fertilizer plant in Ghana whilst waiting on the gas industry to offer lower 
downstream gas prices in the long run. As indicated in Chapter Four (Table 23) 
for a typical Ammonium plant to be viable, requires gas prices not more than 
US$2/MMBtu in Ghana. A combined Ghana government initiative of 
subsidizing upstream associated gas prices with a dedicated project such as TEN 
can support a viable domestic fertilizer plant. 
As it is the case in India gas prices to a fertilizer plant are regulated by 
the state (Sen, 2015). Gas is used as an input to urea production; alternatives to 
domestic gas supply are LNG imports, naphtha, fuel oil/Low Sulphur Heavy 
Stock (LSHS) and urea imports. Out of these substitutes, domestic gas has 
exhibited the least price volatility as prices are controlled at low levels. The 
India fertilizer sector accounts for 36% of domestic gas consumption and 20% 
of the consumption of LNG imports. Ghana as well can dedicated a proportion 
of domestic gas production and LNG importation as feedstock to a fertilizer 
plant to guarantee secured gas supply to the plant. 
The Indian fertilizer industry case is based on the government “self-
sufficiency” policy, which required all naphtha and fuel oil/LSH urea-
manufacturing plants to be converted to gas-based plants with the view of 




manufactured urea have been linked with the price of domestic price of gas. 
However, the retail prices of urea (to farmers) are subsidized by about 50%, 
which are paid directly to eligible consumers (Sen, 2015). The demand for gas 
in fertilizer production is currently being constrained by inadequate domestic 
supply. However, the question remains as to whether customers in this category 
would be willing and able to pay economic prices, which could incentivise new 
gas exploration and production (Sen, 2015). 
Fertilizer subsidise: The Ghana government subsidizes 50% of final 
NPK and Urea prices to farmers in Ghana. This amounts to US$63million yearly 
(FAO, 2015). Sen (2015), however, concludes that, this subsidy could be 
managed if the amount of money used for fertilizer importation are instead used 
to invest into a local fertilizer plant. Alternatively, government could use 
revenues from gas royalties and taxes to finance the higher subsidy bill required 
for domestic fertilizer production (Sen, 2015). Ghana government can use 
royalties and taxes from gas projects to subsidize domestic fertilizer plant cost 
or as incentive to lower downstream gas prices intended to a fertilizer plant. 
LNG supply sources can supplement fertilizer plant requirements in 
Ghana. Transnational gas pipelines such as WAGP can feed into a fertilizer 
plant in Ghana. However, Sen (2015), noted that a Ghana government gas 
pricing policy reform will be required to provide an appropriate gas price to a 
fertilizer plant either through a government gas subsidy price or rationing more 
cheaper gas to the fertilizer plant since the current cost of gas from current 




6.8.3. Fertilizer Plant Viability-African Perspective 
Agriculture in Africa accounts for 15 percent of GDP or more than 
US$100billion annually. In Sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture accounts for over 
one-third of GDP and exports earnings and employs over 60 percent of the 
population (Khemka, 2018). However, Africa’s natural gas and fertilizer 
consumption levels are modest relative to its size of population. Uneven wealth 
distribution, lack of creditworthy off-takers to support large-scale gas-based 
projects, political instability and the uneven distribution of indigenous energy 
resources are some of the factors that have hampered the uptake of natural gas 
in the energy mix of the region (Khemka, 2018). 
Improved natural gas supply and availability are essential for Africa to 
develop economically. Political and regulatory stability are critical for the 
development of the fertilizer sector (Khemka, 2018). Natural gas outputs in 
Africa originates from Egypt and Algeria, which account for 70% of production. 
Nigeria has the largest gas resources base. Nigeria gains in gas production will 
depend on the establishment of bankable commercial structures for the gas 
sector. The Nigerian government needs to redefine the role of public companies, 
improve regulations and reform gas prices to enable adequate investments into 
gas-to-fertilizer plants (Khemka, 2018). 
Urea demand in Africa is estimated to be close to 5million tons in 2017, 
with around 90 percent consumed in direct fertilizer use for food production. 
There is low use of fertilizer in Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2006, the 




Saharan Africa from less than 10kg/hectare to at least 50kg/hectare by 2015 as 
fertilizer application rates per hectare in Sub-Saharan Africa are the lowest in 
the world at an equivalent of 3% of Asia and 9% of North America’s application 
rate (Khemka, 2018). 
Figure 35: Fertilizer Consumption by Region 
Source: Khemka (2018). 
Sub-Saharan Africa represents about 15 to 20 percent of fertilizer 
consumption which presents an enormous opportunity for fertilizer growth 
given the below average nutrients application rates. The uncultivated land in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which is close to 50% of the global uncultivated land 
available, will support the cultivation of crops. The power sector consumes half 
of Africa’s gas resources and there is room to add fertilizer capacity, especially 
in Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria and on the west coast (Ghana) where 
there are increasing interest to monetize new gas finds. There are examples of 
fertilizer production plants in operation or developmental stage in Africa as 




Table 48: Africa Ammonia/Urea Capacity Development 
Company Location Capacity 
Start-up/Expected 
Start-up 




650kton urea, 400kton 
ammonia (MOPCO-2) Dec-16 
    
650 kton urea, 400 kton 







1.4million tons per year 
urea, and 820,000 tons 





1.5 million tons 





430,000 tons per year 
ammonia plant, 576,000 
tons per year urea Post 2021 




1.3 million tpy 
urea/770tpy ammonia Post 2020 
Source: Khemka (2018). 
Egypt is keen to develop integrated ammonia/urea production facilities 
despite the diversion of its natural gas supply for electricity generation. 
Fertilizer plants competes for natural gas in LNG and power projects in Africa 
and it is therefore more difficult to secure financing for fertilizer projects in 
Africa. As more urea capacity are commissioned in the next few years, Africa 
may make the switch from being a net importer to a net exporter of urea and not 
to rival the giant Middle East producers such as Qatar (Khemka, 2018). African 
urea will be applied to African farms. Fertilizer plants operating cost are 
expected to vary from country to country, but Africa as a region will have 
relatively low operating rates due to feedstock supply issues and low production 





A fertilizer plant is viable in Ghana; however, this will require support 
from the government in developing a “self-reliant” fertilizer policy where 
domestic gas production are used as feedstock to a fertilizer plant. The Ghana 
government needs a gas pricing policy reform to dedicate lower priced gas 
projects such as TEN to the fertilizer plant. Government intended subsidies 
could be provided as investment advantage to build integrated gas-to-fertilizer 
plants in Ghana.  
Finally, the Ghana government can enter into long-term contracts as 
Sen (2015) suggested with some of these African countries (Egypt, Nigeria and 
South Africa) to procure raw materials such as urea or natural gas for integrated 
gas-to-fertilizer plants in Ghana. Additionally, the government through joint 
venture fertilizer plant project financing partnerships with private investors can 
secure long-term gas supply contracts through LNG and long distance pipeline 
(WAGP) for integrated gas-to-fertilizer plants to take advantage of vast gas 
resource base in a country such as Nigeria. These arrangements could offer 
cheaper gas prices and raw material cost to Ghana compared to the international 
fertilizer markets. 
6.9.0. Chapter Summary 
In conclusion, natural gas production cost is high in Ghana; hence, 
cannot support any use requiring cheap gas. The government could reduce its 
tax and royalty burden to reduce the cost of gas production to some extent; but, 
even then, local gas will be costly. Imported gas is likely to compete with local 




market. Transport and processing tariffs are inappropriately set and are adding 
to the overall local gas supply cost; this needs to be revised to make gas more 
affordable. Ghana cannot expect low cost electricity using gas supply as the 
wholesale purchase tariff cannot be priced less than US$0.09cents/kWh. The 
bulk power purchasers (VRA and ECG) will have to be prepared to pay at least 
this price. Besides, the gas sector is a risky business and any hold-up at the 















REGULATING THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY IN GHANA 
7.0. Introduction 
Chapter seven (7) focuses on the third objective of the study: to 
develop suitable regulatory and governance arrangements for the gas industry 
in Ghana. The chapter is divided into four parts: the first section identifies the 
various stakeholder problems in the gas industry regulations, the second 
considers developing effective regulations for the gas industry, section three 
focuses on regulatory governance arrangements while the final section looks at 
how to develop gas industry regulatory policy and presents the conclusion. 
7.1.0 Regulatory and Governance Arrangements  
Lack of effective regulations is considered a major problem in 
attracting infrastructure investments into the nascent gas industry in Ghana 
(Fritsch and Poundineh, 2016). The nascent gas industry in Ghana requires 
effective regulations to enhance sufficient infrastructure investments (Poudineh 
and Jamash, 2014). Contrarily, the Energy Commission argues,  
‘We don’t need a new Gas Sector Law’ [Midstream-EC].   
Currently, no specific law governs the electricity industry in Ghana. The 
Energy Commission Act regulates the electricity and gas industries. Therefore, 
a new law will mean changing the Energy Commission Act, passing a new Act 
all together or removing the corporate clauses in the Energy Commission Act. 





7.1.1. Regulatory and Governance Problems in the Gas Industry in Ghana  
The structural and business viability analysis in chapters five (5) and 
six (6) identified three (3) important regulatory lapses in the nascent gas 
industry in Ghana: 
 Regulating upstream aggregation of gas, especially with the current 
monopoly structure of GNPC. 
 Regulating the transmission pipeline on open access and third party 
basis for multiple users and establishing the Natural Gas Transmission 
Utility (NGTU). 
 Regulating the gas processing plant and transmission pipeline tariffs to 
reflect final downstream gas prices. 
Additionally, the stakeholder consultation identified three (3) major structural 
and regulatory issues in the nascent gas industry in Ghana. They are as follows:  
 Inappropriate tariff setting;  
 Lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities and;  
 Lack of regulatory independence and effectiveness 
The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Team, with core 
personnel from the power sector in Ghana, as well, identified lack of effective 
governance and regulatory framework as a major problem in the nascent gas 
industry in Ghana. Among the regulatory problems identified are the need for 
effective sector specific legal-framework for IPPs, the need for full cost 




allocation policies regulations and the independence of regulatory bodies.  
7.1.2. Theoretical Background 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) provides the lens through which 
regulation in the gas industry is analysed (Spanjer, 2009). In the nascent gas 
industry in Ghana, the main challenge is the hold-up and lock-in problems with 
downstream consumers (VRA and ECG) in non-payments of consumed gas, 
which is likely to affect the gas value chain. Long-term contracts between gas 
producers and the main aggregator (GNPC) have tied-in IOCs’ investments into 
government opportunism of ensuring energy security to the detriment of 
investor uncertainty in inefficient gas tariffs and non-payments. Governance 
structures capable of eliminating the hold-up and lock-in problem, therefore, 
must be created (Spanjer, 2009). 
Asset specificity of essential infrastructures such as transmission 
pipelines cannot be redeployed without loss of productive value (Williamson, 
2010). Moreover, there are existing open access regulations on the GNGC and 
WAGP transmission pipelines which are not effective. The uncertainties and 
complexities of transactions in the nascent gas industry, as well, have led to 
higher investment risks affecting the supply components of the gas industry and 
flaws in regulatory arrangements (Joskow, 2000; Newsbery, 2004).  
The SBM proves to be inefficient as the current structure of the gas 
industry in Ghana (Spanjer, 2009) due to the hold-up and lock-in problems 
created. New structural models: MBM: A and B will promote short-term 




gas suppliers/traders with the possibility of developing spot trading. These 
structures introduce new challenges of economic regulations in tariff setting, 
infrastructure access regulations and regulatory governance. The major concern, 
however, is the regulatory uncertainty/risk, which hampers investments 
(Spanjer, 2009).  
The interplay of asset specificity, investment uncertainty/risk and 
industry structure according to Spanjer (2009) will determine the regulatory 
regime and governance structures required for improving infrastructure 
investments in the nascent gas industry in Ghana. This proposition is based on 
the third objective of the study: How can an effective regulatory framework be 
developed for the nascent gas industry in Ghana?  
7.2.0. Governance Framework of the Gas Industry in Ghana 
Traditionally, the main actors involved in the regulatory framework of 
the gas industry as contained in Chapter Two (section: 2.5.3) are the Ministry 
of Energy, Petroleum Commission, Energy Commission, Public Utilities 
Regulatory Commission, GNPC, GNGC, BOST and VRA. There are IOCs 
including Tullow Plc, Anadarko, Kosmos, ENI and ExxonMobil as well. Also, 
there is the transnational pipelines, WAGP with WAGPCo as the service 
provider and WAGP Authority as the regulator as indicated on Figure 36 with 




Figure 36: Institutional Arrangements in the Gas Industry in Ghana 
 
 




The Figure 36 indicates the institutional arrangements of the various 
gas industry organisations and their areas of jurisdictions as well as duties and 
responsibilities. The Ministry of Energy is the overall policy formulator and 
monitors the entire energy sector. In the upstream, there is GNPC as the gas 
aggregator with the Petroleum Commission as the upstream oil and gas 
production regulator. The IOCs and other investors are the main investors and 
infrastructure providers for oil and gas production/suppliers.  
The midstream governance structure is dominated by government 
agencies: Energy Commission as technical regulator, PURC as the economic 
and financial regulator, BOST as the licensed NGTU and GNGC as the 
midstream infrastructure owner (gas processing plant and transmission 
pipeline). WAGPCo offers transmission services regulated by WAGP 
Authority. In the downstream, VRA currently dominates consumption but other 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and large-scale industrial consumers are 
expected to participate in the gas industry as alternative consumers. 
Figure 36 provides a clear demarcation of the current institutional 
arrangements of roles and responsibilities of state agencies and private players 
in the nascent gas industry in Ghana. These players, as already mentioned, are 
categorised into upstream, midstream and downstream operational jurisdictions 
with each player assigned their role and responsibility. However, according to 
the stakeholder consultations, an interviewee from the private companies, 
indicate that there are numerous gas industry state regulatory agencies with 




regulatory framework or a policy objective governing the development of the 
industry in Ghana as stated by one interviewee [IOC-ENI-Ghana].  
 The IEA (2012) recommended that there should be an independent 
regulator for the gas industry instead of the existing splitting of roles and 
responsibilities between different governmental agencies. There are too many 
players requiring an independent gas industry regulatory authority with a clear 
policy objective and a regulatory framework for the gas industry in Ghana. The 
rest of the chapter is, thus, dedicated to developing an effective and an 
independent regulatory authority for the nascent gas industry in Ghana.  
7.3.0. Independent Gas Regulator for the Gas Industry in Ghana 
Contrary to the various challenges identified in the gas regulatory 
framework and governance arrangements in Ghana, establishing an independent 
regulator for the gas industry is seen as an alternative regulatory process 
compared to the current regulatory structure involving several state agencies 
(Eberhard, 2006). An independent gas regulatory Authority would provide the 
solutions to the current regulatory challenges. This independent regulatory 
authority will focus on gas sector regulations. 
The government of Ghana currently holds a high commercial interest 
in the gas industry. The shift from the SBM to MBM models will involve the 
increasing role of other stakeholders in gas infrastructure investments, 
production/supply, trading and consumption. This will require an independent 
gas regulatory authority. The independent regulatory authority will preserve 




decisions and regulatory risks and maintain high standards of expertise and 
professionalism (Carpros, 2003).  
This independent gas regulator should be established on the premise of 
high regulatory commitment based on a gas sector law. The independent gas 
regulator would have a clear mandate and a set of specific objectives for the gas 
industry. It would be autonomous and accountable to the state and stakeholders, 
transparent in their activities and display a high level of integrity and 
participation from all the industry stakeholders (Eberhard, 2006). 
In addition, this independent regulator will require strong regulatory 
commitment, good governance arrangements and competent institutional 
capacity (Enerhard, 2006). The regulator must consider the needs of the poor 
and be able to develop quality regulations for the benefit of the very poor 
through pro-poor tariff and targeted subsidies for poor consumers (Baker and 
Tremolet, 2003) and gas-to-power lower tariffs for lifeline consumers. 
All these will be effective when an independent regulator is in place 
providing better monitoring and quality enforcement than the several 
governmental agencies (Baker and Tremolet, 2003) in Ghana. Tariff setting 
should be depoliticised to reduce cost recovery risks. Regulatory decisions, on 
the other hand, must protect consumers and ensure that pro-poor tariffs are 
whilst ensuring business viability (Eberhard, 2006).  
What is most needed to achieve effective regulation is a stable energy 
policy with a section on the gas industry or a gas law. The law or policy will set 




failure and possible solutions, giving authority to an independent gas industry 
regulator (Leuch, 2012; Eberhard, 2006). The independent regulator will, thus, 
need to develop effective regulations for the nascent gas industry.  
7.3.1. Effective Regulations for the Gas Industry in Ghana 
The independent regulatory authority should be concerned with 
designing effective regulations38 for the nascent gas industry and must recognise 
that these are similar to developing regulations for a fragile state. They should 
be guided by the following: preventing monopoly abuse of market power, 
expanding infrastructure access, improving management performance and 
restricting political opportunism (Body of Knowledge on Infrastructure 
Regulations, 2017).  
The concept of introducing a new structural formation will require a 
dense regulatory framework (Correlje, 2008). The choice of VIM/SBM or 
MBM will require slightly different regulations. Whilst VIM/SBM requires 
more regulations, a move towards MBM lessens regulations and allows the 
industry to self-regulate on economic terms. An effective regulatory system 
should be aimed at improving the overall gas sector performance and be able to 
reassure investors of full cost recovery and protection from unavoidable levels 
of price reduction (Newbery, 2004). The regulatory system should address the 
                                                          
38 Effective regulation is considered as a repeated game with periodic reviews and 
need for regulatory commitment, stability and simplicity, robustness and proof against capture 
and manipulation and public acceptability. Practical regulatory solutions prove more helpful 






most critical challenges in the industry and form a path towards the eventual 
development of formalised regulatory institutions (Body of Knowledge on 
Infrastructure Regulations, 2017).  
These should be guided by meeting the critical basic immediate needs 
in the industry and laying the foundation for a more effective future regulatory 
system. Such critical basic needs are to meet market fundamentals and provide 
the right incentives for infrastructure investments. The first step towards an 
effective regulatory system is stakeholder engagement where the exact needs of 
the regulated bodies and interested parties are considered to inform policy 
formulations. Regulations are considered effective with sound regulatory 
governance when the regulatory institutions are strengthened, there is in 
existence a rule of law and regulatory credibility of the regulatory agencies, able 
to attract and sustain infrastructure investments (Body of Knowledge on 
Infrastructure Regulations, 2017). 
The new gas industry regulatory framework will involve breaking 
down the current regulatory structure into three main precepts discussed below 
and indicated in Figure 37.  
 Upstream gas production/supply regulations, which include domestic 
wellhead gas production and other supply sources such as LNG, and 
transnational pipeline regulations/negotiations.  
 Midstream/downstream regulations including infrastructure investment 
regulations (rate- of-return and incentive regulations), infrastructure access 




gas price regulations (IPPs, small/large scale gas consumers, vulnerable 
and low-income gas consumer prices). 
 Independent gas regulations to include providing a sound regulatory 
governance system aimed at developing independent gas regulator. 
Poor institutional arrangement was identified as another challenge in 
the nascent gas industry in Ghana. Institutionally, the gas industry value chain 
should be divided into three major sectors: upstream exploration, development, 
and supply of gas, midstream processing and transportation and downstream 
distribution and consumption (Dong et al., 2017). The current gas industry 
structure of VIM/SBM allows an integrated/single gas supplier controlled by 
the state. A regime/structural change of MBM will involve the separation of 
potentially competitive segments such as upstream gas production/supply and 
trading activities from transmission and distribution activities (Correlje, 2008). 





Figure 37: Effective Regulations for the Nascent Gas Industry in Ghana. 
 
 




7.3.2. Upstream Gas Production/Supply Regulations 
The upstream production/supply of natural gas regulation/negotiation 
will involve domestic wellhead prices, transnational transmission pipeline 
supplies, LNG and the regasification units. 
7.3.3. Upstream Natural Gas Commodity Price in Ghana 
There are disparities in the commodity prices of upstream gas produced 
in Ghana. There is a price differential between associated gas and non-
associated gas. Upstream gas commodity prices are negotiated between GNPC 
and upstream producers (IOCs). There are two streams of upstream gas with 
different cost structures: associated and non-associated gas. GNPC acts as the 
single national gas aggregator, which is a monopsony. The role of the 
aggregator according to one interviewee is:  
‘Is to ensure the commercialisation of upstream gas 
resources by providing the right commercial securities 
and arrangements for gas to be sold to credible 
customers. To ensure continuous supply of gas to power 
plants. Ensure that upstream gas producers are 
incentivised. GNPC is also involved in LNG 
commercialisation in the country’ [Upstream-GNPC]. 
How is the gas commodity price determined? Natural gas is 
produced deep-offshore in Ghana from two main fields: Jubilee and Sankofa 
Gas Project. TEN and Greater Jubilee are other marginal deep-offshore fields. 




drivers include water depth, well depth, reservoir pressure and temperature, 
field size and distance from shore (EIA, 2016).  
There are substantial cost differentials between offshore associated and 
non-associated gas production. The commodity price of gas is dependent on the 
upstream production cost and crude oil prices (EIA, 2016). Lower production 
cost and higher crude oil prices will see the exploration and production of 
several fields and enhanced production techniques and vice versa.  
The cost of bringing gas from upstream to downstream depends on 
each production field’s contracts and third party midstream infrastructure 
providers. Dry gas (non-associated gas) which does not require processing 
incurs the lowest cost (EIA, 2016). Wet gas (associated gas) which includes 
NGLs that require fees for processing tend to have higher cost. Dry gas incurs 
a cost of US$0.35/Mcf for gathering and transportation whilst wet gas requires 
fees for processing, fractionation and transport. Gathering and processing fees 
often range from US$0.65 to US$1.30/Mcf while Fractionation fees range from 
US$2 to US$4 per barrel of NGLs recovered. These are the costs from deep-
water operations in the Gulf of Mexico in the USA (EIA, 2016).  
The case is, however, the opposite in Ghana. Non-associated gas 
production costs are much higher compared to associated gas because of the 
shared cost recovery with oil production. In some instances, associated gas is 
flared in Ghana and in neighbouring Nigeria. More than 60% associated gas is 
still flared (IEA, 2016), and when produced, these are sold at very low prices. 




Fields to be delivered at zero cost. This volume belongs to Ghana, GNPC is 
acting on behalf of Government to receive the gas. One interviewee noted that: 
‘The need to incentivise upstream associated gas 
production by placing an economic value on it even 
though the contractual agreements says that if the 
contractor has no use for the associated gas it should be 
given to GNPC at zero cost. But let’s reconsider this law 
properly’ [Upstream-GNPC]. 
There was virtually no exploration for gas in Ghana just as in Nigeria. 
Most of the gas discovered came from exploring for oil (Anothny and 
Anyadiegwu, 2013). As a result, oil was seen as the main aim in the Jubilee field 
production although 50% of new deep offshore wells drilled in 2011 and 2012 
produced both oil and gas (EIA, 2013).   
Associated gas was, therefore, flared or re-injected into wells to 
maintain pressure and enhance crude oil production in Ghana. However, flaring 
natural gas is harmful to the environment (World Bank, 2015), the Ghana 2016 
Petroleum Bill (Act 919) prohibits flaring except on technical basis and allows 
reinjection for technical and operational reasons. Associated gas has a no/lower 
production cost as in this instance, crude oil revenues are used to fully cover the 
cost of these fields. Nonetheless, both oil and gas produced together are now 
considered in arriving at the viability analysis for developing a field (EIA, 
2013). Field development costs are recovered from the sale of both crude oil 
and associated gas.  




and TEN field partners at US$2.8/MMBtu to give an economic value and to 
serve as an incentive for further gas exploration and production in Ghana 
[Upstream-GNPC]. Associated gas contains other rich gas liquids (NGLs) from 
which Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) can be produced (EIA, 2016). The non-
associated gas projects, on the other hand, need different commercial 
arrangements to be viable. Unlike associated gas, non-associated gas needs to 
be sold at an economic value that will fully recover all cost of production. As 
one interviewee noted: 
‘For non-associated gas, GNPC needs to pay full cost 
because of the high investment cost, and nobody will 
come put about US$7.9billion and won’t get 
paid’[Upstream-GNPC]. 
This raises the question of what factors GNPC considers in arriving at 
the non-associated gas commodity price. Full cost - capital expenditure- 
recovery factors must be considered. The cost of capital and the operating 
expenditure are the basic factors used in arriving at the commodity price as 
indicated by the same interviewee: 
‘In Ghana, it is quite clear that it is the cost of investments: the 
CAPEX cost of capital and OPEX. These are broadly the basis. 
Including the securities put up for the payment of the gas and 
country risk insurances. The price is indexed to either oil, 
replacement fuel or to a jurisdiction gas industry for example 







What is done to ensure an appropriate upstream gas commodity 
price in Ghana? The CAPEX for the SGP is US$3.9billion (World Bank, 
2015). The OPEX is estimated at US$4billion according to the World Bank 
estimates. Total project cost from the SGP, thus, amounts to US$7.9billion. 
Why then is the SGP commodity price so expensive at US$9.8/MMBtu? 
According to the interviewed expert: 
‘In the price determination, capital expenses, 
operational expenses, the rate of return that we need to 
give the contractor to incentivise them to operate the 
field and other costs. Therefore, in the end we have 
US$9.8/MMBtu’ [Upstream-GNPC]. 
Obviously, the answer lies in the higher capital cost for SGP, the higher 
securities required, contractor incentives and government fiscal policy. Non-
associated gas production is essentially more expensive compared to associated 
gas in Ghana. Close to half of the revenues from the sales of gas from the SGP 
are taxes and royalties to the Government (World Bank, 2015) and this has, 
obviously, been added to the final downstream price to reach US$9.8/MMBtu. 
The fiscal policies of the government, also, have an impact on the SGP gas price. 
The project is expected to generate US$3billion in only royalty payments to the 
government, and these are direct costs added to the final SGP gas price. 
The securities provided for the SGP are many, consisting of several 
layers of interventions and recourses. These include the payment of designated 
GNPC receivables into segregated accounts; liquidity reserves in the forms of 




(International Development Association) payment Guarantee, a notional 
amount of IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) 
Enclave Loan Guarantee and a limited Sovereign Guarantee. Additional to the 
securities is MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) guarantees 
which are expected to support termination payments for financiers and private 
equity partners at the partner company level (World Bank, 2015).  
The cost of these securities are considered very high and are 
contributing to the high cost of the SGP gas price. This is due to the liquidity 
risk associated with downstream consumers such as VRA and ECG non-
payment problems and the need to de-risk the gas industry via debt and political 
risk insurance securities. Some of the risk identified by the World Bank (2015) 
group include Country level risk (political and governance risk, 
macroeconomics risks), energy sector risk (downstream power sector payment 
risk) and project risk (sankofa gas off-taker capacity risk, project preparation 
and implementation risk, and Sankofa/GNGC facility interconnection risk). A 
reduction in some of these risks, would lead to lower final SGP prices. 
To reduce the SGP commodity price requires reducing the risk 
associated with the project and this will require reviewing the SGP project cost 
and implementing incentive regulation mechanisms to monitor project cost 
reductions as well as reviewing the government’s fiscal policy on gas 
production. In designing a regulatory framework for upstream gas commodity 
price in Ghana, considerations can be given to combining the different cost 




In the MBM, regulating wellhead price of gas will be incompatible 
since each supplier will be allowed to negotiate their selling price with various 
buyers. However, in the SBM, there is a monopsony, which requires GNPC as 
the single gas aggregator to be regulated to ensure effectiveness of arriving at 
economic commodity gas prices. Ghana government can further reduce taxes 
and review fiscal policies on non-associated gas production to reduce the cross-
subsidised commodity prices.  
7.3.4. Regulating Transnational Transmission Pipeline Supplies 
The main cross-border natural gas transmission pipeline in Ghana is 
the West African Gas Pipeline, which is owned and operated by the West 
African Gas Pipeline Company (WAGPCo). This transmit gas from Nigeria into 
the West African Sub-region and currently delivers gas to Benin, Togo and 
Ghana. In Ghana WAGPCo delivers gas at Tema and Takoradi thermal power 
plants enclaves operated by the VRA. 
WAGP is in response to ECOWAS treaty on energy (article 28) which 
aims at ensuring effective development of energy resources in the sub-region 
through establishing appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure regular 
supply of hydrocarbons through interconnected transmission pipelines. The 
West African Gas Pipeline Authority is established to enforce the regulations 
governing the pipeline. The West African Gas Pipeline Treaty between the State 
Parties (Ghana, Benin, Togo and Nigeria) and private partners (Chevron Nigeria 
Limited, Volta River Authority of Ghana, Shell Petroleum Development 




Gas S.A) establishes the principles and operations of WAGP. These transit 
countries of Benin and Togo are participants of the WAGP Treaty and therefore 
reduces pipeline transit risks. 
The delivered WAGP gas price into Ghana is US$8.6/MMBtu set by 
WAGP Authority in consultation with all the stakeholders. This is the 
benchmark price for gas in Ghana. One of the reasons for higher domestic gas 
prices in Ghana is that, gas cannot be sold below the WAGP benchmark prices 
(US$8.6/MMBtu). WAGPCo charges a transmission tariff of US$5.03/MMBtu. 
WAGP has operated over a decade in Ghana and should be able to recover much 
of its capital cost. The WAGP Authority should as well be able to offer rate-of-
return and incentive/performance regulatory mechanisms to deliver lower 
transmission services charge and lower gas prices in Ghana. 
WAGP has operated over a decade without major political risk; 
however, there are several economic risk (World Bank, 2003). WAGP has been 
unable to meet its contractual gas supply obligations of 120,000MMBtu/d of 
gas to Ghana due to several reasons. The interviewee in this company noted that 
lower upstream prices in Nigeria is discouraging private producers; delays in 
passing the Petroleum Bill, which slowed investments in upstream gas projects 
[Midstream-WAGPCo]. Changes in market dynamics for gas demand in 
Nigeria due to emerging political dynamics where the government is investing 
into power generation. Vandalism of the transmission pipeline in Nigeria and 
pirates activities directly affecting offshore pipelines and inadequate 




There are discussions on the re-utilisation of WAGP in Ghana for 
domestic transmission of gas from Takoradi (West) to Tema (East). This 
back/reverse flow technology is promulgated to reverse the flow of gas from 
West to East instead of the initial East to West flow. It is projected that, domestic 
gas supply to the West enclave will have excess supply and the East can benefit 
from these excess supplies. When domestic gas production begins to decline the 
LNG regasification plant at the East can equally use WAGP to supply gas to the 
West. However, access regulations, tariffs, and regulatory jurisdictions between 
WAGP Authority and regulators in Ghana need urgent clarification. 
WAGP as an international transmission line, the best option would be 
to allow GNPC to take delivery of its gas and then use its own network to 
distribute it domestically. Involving an international pipeline in domestic 
distribution requires agreement at the ECOWAS level, which is not easy and 
will not remain within the jurisdiction of the local regulator. Clear role of 
WAGP as a supplier of foreign gas will make it easy to deal with this case. All 
domestic transmission and distribution networks should be the responsibility of 
the licensed NGTU. The regulator can then set the appropriate tariffs and 
monitor the performance. 
7.3.5. LNG Supply and Regasification in Ghana 
Global LNG markets are undergoing significant changes because of 
slowed demand in Asian Pacific: lower oil prices and American shale gas boom. 
These conditions have resulted in increased LNG spot trading; shorter-term 




2017). LNG receiving terminals are considered gas supply sources (US 
Department of Energy, 2005). Ghana is taking advantage of global LNG 
markets to invest in FSRU infrastructure to regasify LNG as domestic gas 
supply option. 
Ghana is currently under a stressed gas demand. Even with increased 
production from domestic reserves and transnational transmission pipeline 
supplies, gas demand in Ghana will outstrip supply. LNG is expected to play a 
major role in meeting future imbalances in demand and supply. Ghana will need 
to develop as a matter of agency new regulations for the supply of LNG and 
regasification. There are infrastructure investments led by public-private 
partnership in constructing Floating Storage Regasification Units39 (FSRU) to 
receive LNG. 
Developing a regulatory framework to integrate LNG supply is 
important to the development of the gas industry in Ghana. LNG is 
internationally traded and traders who need to import LNG must be licensed as 
LNG importers. LNG importation will provide flexibility to gas consumers 
(EIA, 2017). In the MBM, LNG supplies can be considered as another source 
of gas, which traders will negotiate prices between buyers and sellers. However, 
the FSRU is an essential cargo handling facility and any LNG ship has to use it 
before gas can be delivered locally. This facility has to recover its costs of 
                                                          
39 FSRUs are gaining rapid global growth in investments due to their lower cost, faster schedule, 
commercial flexibility and reusable asset features of FSRUs compared to land based terminals, 




operation and investment and the independent gas regulator can set its tariff. 
In regulating the FSRUs to recover their cost of investments and 
promote more investments, a summary report on LNG terminal regulation in 
France (2008) made the following LNG receiving terminals regulatory 
notifications: LNG FSRU investors, terminal operators and shippers expressed 
concerns for long-term price visibility. They also expressed interest in the rules 
governing the use of the facilities with the view to providing steady revenues to 
the operators, access by smaller shippers and ensuring the emergence of a 
secondary capacity market to improve gas supply flexibility and responses. 
In regulating the FSRUs, the report made the following 
recommendations: establishing a long-term view for LNG tariffs (15-20years) 
and establish a tariff methodology to provide commitments to investors. Tariffs 
should be reviewed more frequently (4-5years) to ensure risk and reward 
sharing among players. Setting interest rates for the entire duration of the tariff 
and depreciation rates that encourages investments, which can balance between 
the debt payback periods and the economic life of the infrastructure.  
Provisions should be made for exempted and regulated FSRUs, which 
are guided by rules regarding transparency and “Use-it-or-Loss-it 
mechanisms”40. There should be case-by-case studies for consideration of third 
party access exemption given the high financial risk. 
                                                          
40 Use-it-or-lose-it (UIOLI) mechanism is intended to ensure the optimal use of the FSRU by 
giving shippers access to the infrastructure when capacity is physically available but usage by 
the primary holder. These are classified as ex-post and ex ante mechanisms (Summary Report 




End-user gas are usually different from the LNG imported because of 
the heat content of the imported LNG may be different from the local market 
requirements and some of the LNGs may contain additional gas liquids (ethane, 
propane and butane) which must be stripped off methane before transmission to 
major consumers. The final consumer gas from LNG FSRU must be compatible 
with local consumer appliances and pipelines. Regulations should be able to 
address LNG interchangeability and quality standards in light of different LNG 
importations (USA Department of Energy, 2005).  
The jurisdiction of the FSRU location as either upstream or midstream 
should be decided to ascertain the governmental agency responsible for the 
regulation of LNG regasification infrastructure in Ghana. The FSRU is located 
offshore within the remit of Petroleum Commission. However, Energy 
Commission is responsible for technical regulations of midstream and 
downstream gas infrastructure. The roles of these two agencies on the FSRU 
needs clarification. Energy Commission is however the midstream 
infrastructure regulator. 
The Ghana Maritime will be required to provide security and ensure 
safety of the FSRU facilities and ships delivering LNG to Ghana. Energy 
Commission will regulate the design, construction and operation of the FSRUs, 
LNG pipelines, and storage facilities. Standards for operations, maintenance, 
fire protection and security at the facilities (USA Department of Energy, 2005). 
The Environmental Protection Agency of Ghana will provide safe-guide 




regulator could provide all-inclusive LNG FSRU regulations in Ghana. 
7.4.0. Midstream and Downstream Gas Sector Regulations 
The need for infrastructure investments into the energy sector in Ghana 
is vast which the Millennium Challenge Account team estimated a total of 
US$4billion required into the power sector and US$200-280million/year. 
Ghana requires about 12,500MW of installed power capacity to industrialise 
according to the MCA team. Attracting infrastructure investments into power 
utilities will be forthcoming if investors can be guaranteed returns, which 
commensurate with their level of perceived risk (Alexander and Harris, 2005).  
7.4.1. Gas Infrastructure Investment Regulations in Ghana 
Four sources of capital are identified for infrastructure investments into 
developing countries: government own capital, capital from donor agencies and 
the private sector and revenues from the infrastructure operators (Body of 
Knowledge on Infrastructure Regulations, 2017). Each of these funding sources 
has its challenges and are mostly addressed by effective regulatory institutions. 
Largely government resources in developing countries such as Ghana are 
limited and are competed for in other priority areas such as in providing clean 
drinking water, health services and facilities and limits the role of government 
investments in providing energy sector investments. With the recent policy 
reforms in the energy sector, private sector capital is mostly relied upon in 
providing such infrastructures (Body of Knowledge on Infrastructure 
Regulations, 2017). 




recovering their sunk cost, setting commercially viable prices and tariffs that 
are sufficient to attract the right level of service quality and how their cash flows 
can cover their investments, operating cost and capital cost (Body of Knowledge 
on Infrastructure Regulations, 2017). 
What regulatory framework can Ghana implement to attract and 
sustain infrastructure investments into the gas industry? PURC is 
responsible for economic regulation of the gas industry. One interviewee noted 
that, in setting gas prices and tariffs, three cost factors are determined: 
investment cost, rate-of-return, operating cost and volumetric risk 
[Downstream-PURC].  
‘PURC uses a combination of rate-of-return and 
incentive/performance base regulatory mechanisms in setting 
gas tariffs’ [Downstream-PURC]. 
 
PURC is developing a ‘PURC Gas Transmission Guideline’, which is 
a regulatory framework for infrastructure investments for pipelines and in this 
framework; the rate-of-return and incentives based mechanisms are used 
[Downstream-PURC].  
The overall regulatory framework within which a private investor 
operates is an important determinant of the incentives for infrastructure 
investments and the broad parameters include return on capital, which 
regulators allow, treatment of depreciation, and incentives for efficiency 
provided for operating and maintenance cost and investment (Alexander and 




base infrastructure investment regulatory mechanisms? 
7.4.2. Effectiveness of the Rate-of-Return Regulatory Mechanism 
Rate-of-return (ROR) regulations enable firms to recover their 
investments cost with risk-free fixed rate-of-return (Cullmann and Nieswand, 
2015). This is a cost plus regulatory mechanism whereby the regulator (PURC) 
sets the rate of return the utility can earn on its assets. Prices are fixed to allow 
the utility to recover all major cost and allow it to earn a specified rate of return 
(Canbini and Rondi, 2010). 
The regulator (PURC) stipulates rules that determined the allowed 
revenues (Alexander and Harris, 2005). Rate-of-return or cost of service 
regulation has been the dominant regulatory mechanism regulators seek to 
maximise social welfare of consumers in natural monopoly markets (Aas, 
2016). With the rate-of-return regulations, utilities have two goals: 1. to identify 
a fair rate-of-return on capital expenditures (CAPEX) for utilities so that, they 
can attract large amounts of investments needed to fund high fixed cost projects 
and; 2. To ensure that utilities investments are prudent (Aas, 2016).  
The merit of these mechanisms are that, it creates a stable business 
environment in which large capital investments can be identified, financed and 
built (Aas, 2016). This is much recommended at the developmental stages of 
the gas industry where infrastructure requirements are high. A critic of the rate-
of-return regulations holds that, the information asymmetries between utilities 
and regulators makes it difficult to accurately assess whether firms are 




effectiveness in performing their regulatory oversight over utilities. 
The Rate-of-return regulation is also criticised for its inefficiencies 
(Newbery, 1997) due to the Averch-Johnson effect when the rate-of-return 
exceed capital, companies are tempted to substitute capital for labour which 
reduces the employment of innovative talented personals increasing 
inefficiency (Cullmann and Nieswand, 2015). Rate-of-return regulations 
provide incentives for companies to overinvest in infrastructure and do not 
provide adequate incentives for productivity improvements (Aggarwal and 
Burgess, 2014). Empirical and theoretical evidence (Cullmann and Nieswand, 
2015; Cambini and Rondi, 2010) confirmed that rate-of-return regulations are 
replaced by incentive/performance based regulations.  
7.4.3. Performance/Incentive based Regulatory Mechanisms 
One interviewee confirmed that, Rate-of-return regulations are 
replaced by incentives regulations [Downstream-PURC], as stated also by 
Joskow (2008). Incentive regulations are considered superior to traditional rate-
of-return regulation (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007; Joskow, 2014). Regulations have 
moved from simple cost recovery towards value addition (Aas, 2016).  
Incentive/performance based regulation mechanism refers to targeted 
performance incentive mechanism (Aas, 2016) where emphasis is placed on 
efficiency improvement and cost reduction (Joskow, 2008). These have been 
implemented in many monopolised industries as risk/reward mechanisms to 
incentivised utilities to achieve both economic and non-economic policy 




Performance based regulations give the regulated body the incentives 
to innovate and drive efficiencies and in return are rewarded with some of the 
opportunities for upside benefits (Aggarwal and Burgess, 2014; Sirasoontorn, 
2008). This involves the use of targeted performance incentives mechanisms to 
motivate performance against specific outcomes (Aggarwal and Burgess, 2014). 
It is important to note that tying the financial health of the utility to 
outcomes that society cares about can be a very powerful tool to reveal new 
potential for cost savings and efficiency. The most widely adopted incentive 
based regulation schemes are; price-cap, revenue-cap, yardstick regulation, 
targeted-incentive regulation, sliding scale, menu contracts and partial cost 
adjustments (Joskow, 2008; Jamasd and Pollitt, 2007). 
Performance based regulations can work efficiently in a MBM or in a 
more competitive and restructured system with many third party service 
providers (Aggarwal and Burgess, 2014) and can be aligned with the transition 
into a MBM. Utilities are already described as “standard driven” industries, 
meaning that companies are always driven to meet a minimum requirement or 
face a penalty performance based regulations which can give companies the 
benefit of exceeding the minimum requirements.  
7.5.0. Price Regulation Principles for the Gas Industry in Ghana 
PURC is in the process of developing a tariff setting guideline for the 
gas industry [Downstream-PURC]. The need for gas price regulation will vary 
for the different structural models. The SBM requires regulations but transition 




parties to negotiate.  
In the SBM where gas prices are to be regulated by PURC what will 
be the composition of the Automatic Tariff Adjustment Formula (ATAF) for 
gas prices? This should be able to account for the real value of gas through 
adjustments based on variations in competing fuel prices (LCO and heavy 
fuels), inflation, and indexation to a hub price and generation mix. Cost recovery 
for the investors and improvement in efficiency linked to cost reduction for the 
benefit of consumers including lower cost margins for lower income consumers 
such as small-scale industries, agro-businesses and lifeline consumers. 
7.5.1. Tariff Setting for Different Stages of the Chain 
How are natural gas tariffs determined in Ghana? Natural gas 
tariffs setting present a challenge in the nascent gas industry in Ghana. Current 
downstream gas prices are considered expensive at US$8.7/MMBtu for 
domestically produced gas and US$8.6/MMBtu for WAGPCo gas.  
Natural gas prices are made up of the following components: 
commodity price; pipeline tariffs; (gathering tariff, transmission tariff and 
distribution tariffs; Gas processing tariffs) and; levies, margins and taxes 
(Ghana Gas Master Plan, 2015). Upstream gas commodity prices determination 
are discussed above in section (7.3.3), this sections discusses the determinations 
of tariffs in transmission pipelines, the GPP, infrastructure access charges and 





7.5.2. Setting Pipeline and Gas Processing Tariffs 
Pipeline and gas processing tariffs are a part of the cost components to 
final gas prices in Ghana. These services are still provided as a bundled service 
under SBM. There are two tariffs components of the gas transmission pipeline: 
fixed (reservation) tariffs and variable tariffs (EIA, 2015). Both GPP and 
transmission tariffs are determined based on a regulated scheme under PURC. 
PURC regulates gas transmission and the gas processing infrastructure 
tariffs, whilst the WAGP Authority located in Abuja (Nigeria) regulates the 
WAGP transmission tariffs. PURC do not interfere in the regulation of 
WAGPCo services and tariffs [Midstream-EC; Midstream-WAGPCo; 
Downstream-PURC]. 
The WAGP operates as a natural monopoly, transmitting N-Gas Ltd 
(Nigeria Gas) gas (the only shipper using WAGPCo services) into Ghana. 
Natural gas pipeline and processing tariffs are subjected to regulations even in 
liberalised markets (World Energy Council, 2001). However, regulators are 
moving towards performance based regulatory mechanism rather than cost 
based or rate-of-return regulatory mechanisms (Aggarwal and Burgess, 2014). 
WAGPCo charges a US$5.03/MMBtu tariff, which reflects full cost 
recovery and profitability margin plus the N-Gas current commodity price of 
US$2.5/MMBtu and a WAGP Authority regulatory levy and taxes of 
US$1.07/MMBtu which adds up to the US$8.6/MMBtu as WAGP gas prices 
delivered in Ghana [Midstream-WAGPCo].  




operating for about a decade in Ghana and still charges a transmission tariff of 
US$5.03/MMBtu. Have WAGPCo not recovered their full/partial capital cost? 
Why such high regulatory levies and taxes? Transmission pipelines have lower 
operating cost, so why the higher tariff charge from WAGPCo?  
GNPC and GNGC charges a combined transmission tariff and gas-
processing tariff of US$5.28/MMBtu [Midstream-GNGC]. What is the basis for 
combining the GPP and transmission pipeline tariffs? Under the SBM, GNPC 
provides the processing and transmission services as a bundle, so these are 
operated as a single company. From the integrated cash flow analysis (see 
Chapter Six), the GPP and the transmission pipeline are making significant 
profits at their given tariffs of US$3/MMBtu and US$2.28/MMBtu and there is 
room for a 50% tariffs reduction to US$1.7/MMBu and US$1.14/MMBtu 
respectively. These challenges in arriving at appropriate tariffs for the GPP and 
transmission pipeline calls for designing the best set of regulatory mechanism 
for natural gas tariff setting in Ghana. 
The Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) set out a 
process to determine their gas processing and transmission pipeline tariffs. It 
was considered that, all users irrespective of distance would pay the same tariff. 
The overall principle in calculating the tariff has been first to determine the cost 
involved in the construction and operation of the facility with an appropriate 
return on equity and secondly to determine the volume of the gas demand that 
the facility can handle on annual basis during the project life.  




processes for consideration. Allocation of risk between regulated firms and 
consumers: pipeline and GPP investors must be compensated with higher 
returns and infrastructure owners should be protected from risk that’s out of 
their control such as volumetric risk and tariffs charge at any given time should 
reflect this risk (European Commission, 2015); 
Benchmarking and standard costing: provides information on efficient 
tariffs on the cost of new or replacement infrastructure. Availability of sufficient 
information on the pipeline or GPP can inform the regulators the appropriate 
rate of return and incentive scheme to introduce (European Commission, 2015). 
Balancing optimal investment decisions and trade-off between 
operating cost and capital cost: this allows the investors to select the optimal 
investment path and ratio between operating and capital cost and could depart 
from the CAPEX/OPEX ratio in favour of other lower cost alternatives 
(European Commission, 2015). 
Incentive based mechanisms: are implemented to induce the regulator 
to reduce operating cost. These are based on standard costing of comparing 
operating cost from different pipelines or GPPs and predetermination of allowed 
revenues for a certain number of years, irrespective of the actual operating cost 
(European Commission, 2015). Natural gas tariffs setting regulations in Ghana 
can therefore consider balancing rate-of-return and incentive based regulations. 
7.5.3. Pipelines and Essential Infrastructure Access Regulations in Ghana 
The Energy Commission developed natural gas transmission pipelines 




(NGITS). The access code governs how a shipper interconnects with the 
pipelines, terms, and conditions for the provision of transmission services. The 
access codes are aimed at promoting the development of competitive gas 
markets by establishing uniform principles for owners and users and allow 
transparent and non-discriminatory access to the gas transmission system. The 
access codes aims at preventing abuse of power by the NGTU. There are 
legislatives instruments that supplement the access code including: 
 LI 1911: Natural Gas Distribution and Sales (Technical and operational) 
Rules, 2007 
 LI 1912: Natural Gas Distribution and Sales (Standard of Performance) 
Regulations 2007 
 LI. 1913: Natural Gas Transmission Utility (Technical and operational) 
Rules, 2007 
 LI. 1936: Natural Gas Transmission Utility (Standard of performance) 
Regulations 2008 
 LI. 2189: Natural Gas Pipeline Safety (Construction, Operations and 
Maintenance) Regulations, 2012. 
On the other hand, the WAGP treaty establishes WAGP in fulfilment 
of the ECOWAS treaty article 28 to promote harmonised hydrocarbon 
utilisation among member states. WAGP International Project Agreement 
guided the construction of WAGP. WAGP Authority commences open access 
regulations on WAGP by issuing two access codes: A and B, which guarantees 




These are ex ante infrastructure access rules as defined by a third party 
regulatory body which allows every gas owner/shipper/trader to access the 
infrastructure (pipelines/FSRU) following a regulated set of procedures and 
paying a regulated tariff only when there is excess capacity and less safety risk 
(Hallack and Vazquez, 2013) and these are compatible with the SBM.  
However, access tariffs can be negotiated between pipeline owners and 
shippers and the rules of network use are defined in the contract between the 
shipper and the pipeline owner and supervised by the independent gas industry 
regulatory authority (Hallack and Vazquez, 2014). Other users outside the 
contract can apply to use the pipeline and can be included or excluded based on 
available capacity and if the exclusion is not justified the independent gas 
regulatory authority may intervene (Hallack and Vazquez, 2014) and these are 
compatible when there are multiple gas owners in bilateral asset specific 
transactions in the MBM. However, no third parties apart from the original 
owners of both parties attempted using these pipelines, which leaves the rules 
and regulations untested and difficult to determine their effectiveness.  
7.5.4. Final Consumer Gas Tariffs 
Downstream natural gas consumption is mostly for power generation 
and there are opportunities for industrial demand. Natural gas prices in Ghana 
has been reported to be very expensive by downstream consumers (IPPs) 






‘Gas prices are very high now, especially with current 
falling LCO prices. It is not economical to produce 
electricity from gas because the break-even price is 
US$85/barrel of LCO to US$8.7/MMBtu of gas. Below 
US$85/barrel makes producing electricity from gas at 
US$8.7/MMBtu uneconomical’ [Downstream-VRA]. 
This interviewee recounted that, because of the asset specificity and 
the nature of contractual agreements between gas consumers and producers, it 
would have been more economical to use LCO instead of gas for electricity 
generation in Ghana at LCO prices below US$50/barrel (Brent crude: 
US$74.45/barrel) (Bloomberg, 26/04/2018) [Downstream-VRA]. However, 
two interviewees confirmed that, in the long run and for some of the CCGT 
plants in the short-term, it is technically, environmentally and economically 
efficient to rely on gas instead of LCO [Downstream-VRA; TICO-IPP]. The 
challenge is on how to price downstream gas to reflect alternative CCGT fuels 
such as LCO. 
How can PURC include alternative fuel prices in gas tariff 
determination? In the SBM, consumer gas prices are regulated and PURC will 
be responsible for including alternative fuel indexation in gas prices. However, 
natural gas prices are better set when they reflect market and economic 
fundamentals (EIA, 2015; Stern and Rogers, 2011) which is the price of gas 
compared to the price of substitutes and the cost of developing and delivering 
domestic or imported gas to end-users (Stern and Rogers, 2011). 
 In the MBM, downstream consumer gas prices will be negotiated 




the gas tariff and these are bulk traders, negotiated gas prices can be determine 
which reflect market fundamentals without much intervention from the 
independent gas regulatory authority.   
7.6.0. Gas Sector Regulatory Governance Arrangements in Ghana 
Regulatory governance is aimed at designing a legal regulatory system, 
institutional arrangements and the process of regulatory decision-making, 
which includes clarity of roles and responsibilities and demarcation of 
jurisdictions and functions among regulatory entities (Eberhard, 2007). The 
World Bank (2013) report recognised poor regulatory governance in the nascent 
gas industry, which makes it difficult to attract investors.   All stakeholders in 
separate interviews identified: 
‘Lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities and poor 
demarcation of areas of jurisdiction of players in the 
natural gas industry in Ghana’ [Stakeholders 
Consultation]. 
Sovacool and Jarvis (2011) conceptualised that, regulatory governance 
arrangements are based on the following assessment criteria: autonomy; clarity 
of roles and objectives; accountability and transparency; predictability and 
stability; participation; integrity; credibility and legitimacy. These are used to 
assess regulatory governance arrangement in the gas industry in Ghana.  
Clarity of roles and objectives: there should be separation of regulation 
from policymaking (Eberhard, 2007). There exist a gas utilisation plan and a 




specific gas industry policy for Ghana.  
There are overlapping and conflicting roles between the Petroleum 
Commission and Energy Commission in midstream as to who should regulate 
the activities of the FSRU. Energy Commission is contesting the role of GNPC 
as the aggregator as operating without a license. There are conflicting roles 
between GNGC and BOST on the NGTU licence. There is lack of clarity and 
conflicting roles and responsibilities between these governmental agencies and 
as Table 49 indicates. A much clearer policy objective is required for the gas 
industry involving a link between gas and electricity industries; a gas industry 
policy framework which clearly demarcates all roles and responsibilities among 
the various players in the industry from upstream, midstream to downstream.  
Table 49: Overlapping Roles in the Natural Gas Industry in Ghana 
Organisation Role Jurisdiction Area of Conflict 
Petroleum 
Commission 
Upstream regulator of 
natural gas production fields  
Upstream Who regulates GNPC’s role 
as a gas aggregator? 
GNPC Aggregates upstream gas 
and LNG importation  
Midstream & 
downstream 




Gas Infrastructure regulator Upstream & 
Midstream 
Who regulates the activities 




GPP and transmission 
pipeline infrastructure 
owner 
Midstream Between GNGC and BOST 
who should be the NGTU 
Source: Data from Interviews. 
Regulatory bodies such as Petroleum Commission, Energy 
Commission and PURC activities need to be properly coordinated to operate as 
a single unit regulator for the gas industry. An independent gas industry 
regulatory authority with decision-making and institutional independence is 




Autonomy: where the regulatory body can make decisions without 
referring to another authority and can carry out its mandate and make decisions 
on its own. This agency will need to operate with autonomy without political 
interferences (Sovacool, 2011).  
Accountability and Transparency: Key concerns for the gas industry is 
transparency in setting gas prices and tariffs for the transmission pipelines and 
the GPP and setting tariffs for the upcoming LNG regasification unit and other 
infrastructure. The regulator should be accountable to all gas industry 
stakeholders including the parliament, Ghana government, the public, the 
regulated bodies and consumers.  
The regulated body should be able to appeal against the regulators 
decisions and the possibility of legal redress if the regulator fails to perform 
their functions (Eberhard, 2007). Transparency requires that the regulator have 
clearly defined published procedures under which they make and announce 
decision in setting gas prices and tariffs (Eberhard, 2007).  
Predictability and stability:  the Ministry of Energy needs to come out 
with the gas industry policy objective, define the roles and responsibilities of 
each of the sectors’ players and these must be consistent with the national 
energy policy. These objectives, roles and responsibilities should be predictable 
and stable for all the industry players. An independent gas regulatory authority 
can be mandated with regulatory responsibilities of the gas industry to bring 
stability to the gas industry in Ghana. 




undermined, impaired or diminished by external factors. This requires 
personnel and individuals working in the industry committed to the objectives, 
values and principles of the regulatory and structural system through abiding by 
ethics and code of conduct.  This requires the action of the independent gas 
regulator to ensure and enforce integrity on all the gas industry agencies. The 
regulatory system must be credible ensuring that the regulatory body honours 
their commitments to other players in the gas industry. For example, the setting 
of gas prices and infrastructure tariffs should involve all stakeholders. They 
should be some credibility in determining and negotiating upstream wellhead 
gas prices between GNPC and IOCs. 
To improve governance arrangements in the gas industry in Ghana will 
require creating an independent gas regulatory authority free from the influence 
of the Ministry of Energy and the private sector. The regulator will be 
responsible for consolidating all the roles and responsibilities currently held by 
the various governmental agencies into a single entity. The new gas regulatory 
authority will then be responsible for the regulation and formulation of policies 
for the entire gas industry value chain in Ghana.  
7.7.0. Natural Gas Industry Policy and Sector Act for Ghana 
A solution to all the confusion in gas regulations in Ghana is a sound 
regulatory governance arrangement and passing a natural gas sector law that 
will define the powers of the independent regulatory authority to provide 
infrastructure regulatory framework. Such a law would define the gas industry 




participants and thus ensure private investor confidence. It would ensure 
aggressive consolidation throughout the gas value chain and high cost-
efficiency and security of gas supply in Ghana. 
The natural gas law will be different from the E&P Bills and general 
Petroleum sector laws (e.g. Model Petroleum Agreements) and will focus on 
the gas industry (Leuch, 2012). One interviewee noted the confusion in pricing 
gas in Ghana and that PURC is arbitrarily setting gas prices. 
 ‘Some other person might soon find gas and they will 
also have to give their own price’ [IOC-ENI-Ghana]. 
 
Implying that there is no standard regulation or procedure for setting 
prices of existing and new gas supply sources in Ghana. Each natural gas 
producer or supply needs to negotiate with PURC for a different gas price. In 
SBM, natural gas prices are usually regulated and in the MBM prices are 
negotiated between the producer and the seller. The seller will usually require a 
price that covers his CAPEX, OPEX, risk and profit margin for shareholders 
and the buyer which is usually an electricity producer would agree to pay a price 
that allows a sufficient margin and sufficient profits to their shareholders 
(natgas.info, 2017). The buyer considers the price of other fuel substitutes in 
taking this final decision. The negotiated gas pricing approach given the limited 
number of gas producers in the nascent case proves difficult. A case-by-case 
pricing approach is convenient, particularly when production costs are 
significantly different. The negotiated price gives room for price manipulation. 




with traded prices, which reflects market fundamentals (natgas.info, 2017).  
However, the most efficient way of pricing gas is to consider the 
various supply cost components to arrive at an economic price and a diversified 
gas supply base means lower gas prices can easily be negotiated (Giziene and 
Zalgiryte, 2015). With the gas pricing policy there need to be a pricing 
methodology for the different gas supply sources between different buyers. One 
interviewee stated that, gas pricing policy and the methodology needs to be 
legislated into a natural gas law, which should clearly identify the role of the 
key stakeholders and state the processes on how each source of gas can be priced 
[IOC-ENI-Ghana]. These gas-pricing methodologies should be able to reflect 
lower prices for low-income earners and pro-poor tariffs for lower consumers. 
In Ghana different institutions regulates the different sectors of the gas 
industry leading to multiplicity and complexities of roles. There is the 
possibility of consolidating these rules to a single regulatory authority. A major 
duty of the authority will be to promote activities along the entire gas supply 
chain by target actions (Leuch, 2012). The Ministry of Energy is promulgating 
and developing instruments towards developing the gas law [Upstream-GNPC; 
Downstream-PURC] through the Gas Master Plan and a final gas law is 
envisaged for Ghana. To be effective the regulator or the regulatory system 
needs not to be set-up by only a legislation instrument (Sundar, 2001). Given 
the fact that, regulation is new to developing countries, it is perhaps best if the 
independent gas regulatory authority is set up by Ghana’s Act of parliament 




Box 10: Provisions of the Gas Sector Law in Ghana 
The gas sector law should set out the natural gas sector policy in relation to the overall energy policy 
of Ghana. The law should clearly define the gas industry policy, industry structure, regulatory 
arrangements and infrastructure investment plan and roadmap for the industry development to 
institutionalise the Gas Master Plan. The law should encourage the development of domestic gas and 
facilitate national interest in gas imports or exports. The law should focus on addressing peculiarities 
containing provisions for production/supply, transportation, commercialisation and utilisation in the 
natural gas industry.  
The law needs to define the roles and responsibilities between the different governmental agencies 
rather than splitting responsibilities arbitrarily (IEA, 2012). Pricing has been a major issue in the 
natural gas industry in Ghana and there is the need for reviewing the current gas pricing policy to 
include a pricing methodology for the different sources of gas. The law needs to clarify how gas 
should be priced in Ghana. 
The law needs to define clearly the provision of gas infrastructure. The law should be able to make 
provisions for longer appraisal and productions periods for domestic gas projects with the right to 
authorise a specific gas retention license for assessing the viability of a gas discovery and finding off-
takers. The law should provide for mandatory joint exploitation of gas discoveries between several 
licensees when such systems renders gas projects viable and otherwise non-viable and provide 
principles of constituting a national gas reserves and set conditions for authorising exports or imports. 
The law should define governance issues relating to transparency, accountability, integrity in 
publishing gas prices and tariffs, government revenues and related agreements in oil and gas and 
make provisions for a sovereign gas fund for revenue savings. The law should consolidate all existing 
legislative instruments into a single gas sector law. The law should decide whether to create an 
independent gas regulatory authority or an entity created under any of the governmental agencies 
responsible for gas regulations. Source: (Leuch, 2012). 
 
7.8.0. Chapter Summary 
In conclusion, ineffective regulation was identified as a major 
challenge in the nascent gas industry in Ghana and this chapter examined the 
processes involved in providing effective and appropriate regulations and 
governance arrangements. All the players in the gas industry agreed that, efforts 
should be made towards designing appropriate regulations. An alternative and 
independent regulator to the gas industry in Ghana is required to provide 
effective regulations. Regulatory emphasis is placed on attracting and sustaining 
infrastructure investments. Finally, a gas industry law is required to consolidate 







8.0. Conclusion and Recommendations  
The study developed an analytical framework, used to examine the 
three objectives of the study: to evaluate possible gas industry structures, assess 
the viability of each component of the gas supply chain and, develop suitable 
regulatory and governance arrangements to support business viability in the 
nascent gas industry in Ghana. The study agrees with the theoretical review 
combining SCP and TCE in structure, regulations and infrastructure investment 
decisions for integrated gas-to-power studies, which allows holistic analysis of 
the interconnectedness of the nascent gas industry in Ghana. 
Natural gas supply has become an important component of ensuring 
energy security and maintaining macroeconomic stability in Ghana. All the gas 
supply sources (domestic production, transnational pipeline transmission, and 
LNG) are needed to meet the increasing CCGT gas demand and penetration to 
other sectors such as small and large-scale industries in Ghana. Ghana requires 
a sustainable supply of energy: hydroelectricity generation capacity is 
exhausted, shifting focus on the dependence of thermal generation. LCO has 
proven to be more expensive while gas is considered economically, technically 
and environmentally efficient. However, the development of the gas industry 
faces structural, regulatory challenges and high risk.  




Unbundling, were considered; none of the structural models will be able to offer 
a one-size fit solution to the structural problems facing the nascent gas industry 
in Ghana: encouraging investment upstream and mid-stream; providing cost 
effective gas supply to consumers, ensuring supply chain viability and 
managing risks. SBM causes hold-up, non-payment issues but offers the 
cheapest supply through cross-subsidies and attract investment upstream 
through long-term credible contracts. MBM: A reduces hold-up issue but non-
payment problems remains. Small consumers are likely to get high cost supply 
and suppliers may become opportunistic – selling gas to high price markets, 
which may cause supply reliability issues.  
MBM: B offers flexibility to suppliers but lack of long-term credible 
contracts will not allow upstream investments to materialise. Gas prices are 
likely to go up, particularly for small users. The market balancing issue will 
appear and the market can become risky. Non-payment by consumers of gas 
will remain until IPPs and large users can have access to their own markets. 
MBM: B is considered most appropriate and suitable as a structural model for 
the nascent gas industry in Ghana compared to SBM, MBM: A, and unbundling. 
The business viability analysis of the supply components of the nascent 
gas industry in Ghana indicates that gas production cost is high and it cannot 
support any use that is looking for cheap gas. The government could reduce its 
tax and royalty burden to reduce the cost of gas production to some extent but 
even then, local gas will be costly. Imported gas is likely to compete with local 




Transport and processing tariffs are inappropriately set and are adding 
to the overall supply cost and need to be revised to make gas more affordable. 
Ghana cannot expect low cost electricity using gas supply – the wholesale 
electricity purchase tariff cannot be priced less than US$0.09cents/kWh and the 
bulk power purchasers (VRA and ECG) would have to be prepared to pay at 
least this price. The gas sector is a risky business and any hold-up at the 
consumer end will jeopardise the viability of the entire supply chain. 
A downstream large-scale gas consumer such as a fertilizer plant is 
recommended for strategic consideration to prevent downstream consumer 
concentration risk and market monopsony power abuse of the single consumer 
(VRA). MBM: B structure will diversify downstream consumers. Maintaining 
a viable commercial link between the various supply components is 
recommended for the development of the nascent gas industry in Ghana. 
Ineffective regulation was identified as a major challenge to the 
nascent gas industry in Ghana. All the players in the gas industry agreed that 
efforts should be made towards designing appropriate regulations for the 
nascent gas industry in Ghana. An alternative and independent regulator to the 
gas industry in Ghana is required to provide effective regulations. Moreover, 
regulatory emphasis is placed on attracting and sustaining infrastructure 
investments. Finally, a gas industry law is required to consolidate all existing 
regulations in the nascent gas industry in Ghana. This study contributes to the 





 1. Consider passing the Gas Sector Act to recognise the research and 
consultancy work undertaken by various individuals, international and 
governmental agencies. This will provide clear policy and comprehensive 
structural and regulatory framework for the gas industry in Ghana.  
2. The study confirms the need to incentivise gas-to-power investments 
through incentive-based regulations, provide economic incentives, cost 
recovery, pro-poor initiatives for gas tariffs and consider reviewing current 
fiscal policies such as reducing royalties on gas to promote domestic gas 
production. Transport and processing tariffs should be appropriately set and 
revised to make gas more affordable. The gas pricing policy needs to be 
specified and commercial agreements established for gas pricing to take into 
consideration all the sources of gas, pricing methodology and business viability.  
3. It is important to consider reforming the electricity sector to respond 
to the nascent gas industry in Ghana and this will take into consideration VRA 
and ECG inefficiencies. Gas demand penetration in other sectors of the 
economy should be encouraged in the agriculture and small-scale industries to 
reduce consumer monopsony. 
4. This study combines empirical and theoretical underpinnings to the 
study of the nascent gas industry in Ghana. The study will set the pace to lead 
the ongoing thinking of using theoretical underpinnings to help explain 
empirical evidence and vice versa. This occurrence will stimulate further 
research in the field of gas industry development in other Greenfields, serve as 




nascent cases such as Mozambique, Tanzania, and encourage further domestic 
development and gas utilization resources in Nigerian. 
8.1.0. Energy Policy Recommendations 
Natural gas supply is now recognised as an important component of the 
electricity generation system in Ghana. Adequate and reliable natural gas supply 
is important to meet the increasing energy requirements and sustaining 
macroeconomic stability. This requires keeping all the gas supply sources in 
Ghana viable. Delivering economically efficient gas prices and tariffs are 
important to keeping the gas industry viable and lowering gas prices is 
important to delivering lower electricity tariffs in Ghana. 
It is recommended for the Ghana government to reduce risk in the gas 
industry. The viability of the gas industry is highly dependent on reducing 
investment risk in the upstream, midstream and downstream segments of the 
industry and most importantly solving the inefficiencies in the electricity sector 
in Ghana. Strategically, developing large-scale gas consumers such as a 
fertilizer plant and penetration of gas demand in small-scale consumers are 
relevant to maintaining a functional gas industry in Ghana. 
Ghana government should promote the MBM: B, open access to 
transmission pipelines and other essential facilities and unbundle the SBM to 
maintain a viable gas industry in Ghana. Incentive/performance based 
regulation mechanisms to attract infrastructure investment and keeping a viable 




gas industry policy will be essential to promote an independent gas regulator, 
and consolidate the gas industry regulations into a sector law. 
8.2.0. Areas for Future Research 
The gas industry in Ghana is emerging and recommending for future 
study is to take each of the gas industry supply value chains (supply/production, 
processing and transmission, and the power sector) for further research. A 
detailed economic modelling of the effects of gas on Ghana’s economy could 
be done to see whether the benefits exceed the costs. 
Further research is required in the setting of gas pricing methodologies 
used by PURC and to advice on their efficiency and ability to serve the interest 
of all stakeholders especially poor consumers. Further studies should be carried 
out on the impact of LNG importation, interfacing the global LNG market 
dynamics into the nascent gas industry in Ghana and determine the preparedness 
of both governmental and private sector participating in the global LNG market. 
Producing electricity from an integrated gas framework delivers very 
expensive electricity tariffs in Ghana; a comparative study should be conducted 
in an integrated renewable energy project using solar PV technologies to 
establish the viability of a solar-to-power project in Ghana. Finally, the power 
sector poses several challenges to the viability of the nascent gas industry:  
especially the hold-up and lock-in problems of VRA and ECG. Further studies 
are recommended in power sector reforms in cost-effective tariff setting 
electricity to reflect cost recovery and margins for the gas industry viability and 
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Upstream Natural Gas Production: 
Module 1     
Input Data     Discount Rate Calculations 
1BCF           1,000,000.00  MMBTU Discount Rate  10.00% 
Gas Prices (US$/MMBTU) 9.8 $ 
Risk Free Rate(Treasury Bills 
Rate) 10% 
Gas Royalty Rate 7.5%   Market Risk Premium 10.00% 
Output Data     Beta 1 




    REVENUES         
Period Year Gas Production   Gas Revenues Royalty   
    Annual Production 
(BCF) 
Gas Annual Production (MMBtu) Revenues($) 
Gas Royalty Payable ($) Total Revenues Available ($) 
0 2015 0                                 -                                   -                                            -                                                 -    
1 2016 0                                 -                                   -                                            -                                                 -    
2 2017 0                                 -                                   -                                            -                                                 -    
3 2018                                   58               58,000,000.00            568,400,000.00                      42,630,000.00                         525,770,000.00  
4 2019                                   68               68,000,000.00            666,400,000.00                      49,980,000.00                         616,420,000.00  
5 2020                                   68               68,000,000.00            666,400,000.00                      49,980,000.00                         616,420,000.00  
6 2021                                   68               68,000,000.00            666,400,000.00                      49,980,000.00                         616,420,000.00  
7 2022                                   68               68,000,000.00            666,400,000.00                      49,980,000.00                         616,420,000.00  
8 2023                                   68               68,000,000.00            666,400,000.00                      49,980,000.00                         616,420,000.00  
9 2024                                   68               68,000,000.00            666,400,000.00                      49,980,000.00                         616,420,000.00  
10 2025                                   68               68,000,000.00            666,400,000.00                      49,980,000.00                         616,420,000.00  
11 2026                                   68               68,000,000.00            666,400,000.00                      49,980,000.00                         616,420,000.00  
12 2027                                   68               68,000,000.00            666,400,000.00                      49,980,000.00                         616,420,000.00  
13 2028                                   68               68,000,000.00            666,400,000.00                      49,980,000.00                         616,420,000.00  
14 2029                                   68               68,000,000.00            666,400,000.00                      49,980,000.00                         616,420,000.00  
15 2030                                   68               68,000,000.00            666,400,000.00                      49,980,000.00                         616,420,000.00  
16 2031                                   59               59,000,000.00            578,200,000.00                      43,365,000.00                         534,835,000.00  
17 2032                                   52               52,000,000.00            509,600,000.00                      38,220,000.00                         471,380,000.00  
18 2033                                   47               47,000,000.00            460,600,000.00                      34,545,000.00                         426,055,000.00  
19 2034                                   39               39,000,000.00            382,200,000.00                      28,665,000.00                         353,535,000.00  
20 2035                                     9                 9,000,000.00              88,200,000.00                        6,615,000.00                           81,585,000.00  
       
 
  
  Totals                                          
1080 
        1,080,000,000.00       10,584,000,000.00  





CAPITAL EXPENDITURE             
Facilities Construction Cost ($)   Facilities Renting Cost ($) Total CAPEX 
Exploration Cost ($) Constant Capex ($) Surface Rentals ($) Decommission Cost ($) FPSO Upfront Cost ($) FPSO Rents ($) CAPEX ($) 
                           83,000,000.00                              -               8,000,000.00                          -              2,000,000.00                             -            93,000,000.00  
                           15,000,000.00                              -    0                         -            13,000,000.00                             -            28,000,000.00  
                         176,000,000.00                              -    0                         -            49,000,000.00          56,000,000.00        281,000,000.00  
                         143,000,000.00                              -    0                         -            52,000,000.00        115,000,000.00        310,000,000.00  
           10,000,000.00  0                         -           115,000,000.00        125,000,000.00  
           33,000,000.00  0                         -           115,000,000.00        148,000,000.00  
           20,000,000.00  0                         -           115,000,000.00        135,000,000.00  
           56,000,000.00  0                         -           115,000,000.00        171,000,000.00  
         195,000,000.00  0                         -           115,000,000.00        310,000,000.00  
         446,000,000.00  0                         -           115,000,000.00        561,000,000.00  
         377,000,000.00  0                         -           115,000,000.00        492,000,000.00  
         121,000,000.00  0                         -           115,000,000.00        236,000,000.00  
                              -    0                         -           115,000,000.00        115,000,000.00  
                              -    0                         -           115,000,000.00        115,000,000.00  
                              -    0                         -           115,000,000.00        115,000,000.00  
                              -    0                         -           115,000,000.00        115,000,000.00  
                              -    0                         -           115,000,000.00        115,000,000.00  
                              -    0                         -           115,000,000.00        115,000,000.00  
         158,000,000.00  0                         -           121,000,000.00        279,000,000.00  
                              -    0                         -           115,000,000.00        115,000,000.00  
         277,000,000.00  0           400,000.00           26,000,000.00        303,400,000.00  
 
 
       
          




OPERATING EXPENDITURE     
 





Total Project Cost ($) 
 
  
Maintenance Cost ($) FPSO Running Cost ($) Onshore Facilities ($) OPEX($) 
 
CAPEX & OPEX ($) Net Income ($) Discounted Cash Flow 
                           -                                      -                                    -                                      -    
 
             93,000,000.00  -             93,000,000.00  -    101,000,000.00  
                           -                                      -                                    -                                      -    
 
             28,000,000.00  -             28,000,000.00   $   -25,454,545.45  
                           -                                      -                                    -                                      -    
 
           281,000,000.00  -           281,000,000.00   $ -232,231,404.96  
        24,000,000.00                 22,000,000.00                 2,000,000.00                 48,000,000.00  
 
           358,000,000.00               167,770,000.00   $   126,048,084.15  
      110,000,000.00                 99,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               220,000,000.00  
 
           345,000,000.00               271,420,000.00   $   185,383,512.06  
      119,000,000.00                 98,000,000.00               12,000,000.00               229,000,000.00  
 
           377,000,000.00               239,420,000.00   $   148,660,983.17  
      124,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               236,000,000.00  
 
           371,000,000.00               245,420,000.00   $   138,533,191.91  
      123,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               235,000,000.00  
 
           406,000,000.00               210,420,000.00   $   107,978,731.24  
      104,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               216,000,000.00  
 
           526,000,000.00                 90,420,000.00   $     42,181,597.32  
      104,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               216,000,000.00  
 
           777,000,000.00  -           160,580,000.00   $   -68,101,595.56  
      104,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               216,000,000.00  
 
           708,000,000.00  -             91,580,000.00   $   -35,308,054.45  
      104,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               216,000,000.00  
 
           452,000,000.00               164,420,000.00   $     57,628,206.95  
      104,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               216,000,000.00  
 
           331,000,000.00               285,420,000.00   $     90,943,607.99  
      104,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               216,000,000.00  
 
           331,000,000.00               285,420,000.00   $     82,676,007.26  
      104,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               216,000,000.00  
 
           331,000,000.00               285,420,000.00   $     75,160,006.60  
      104,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               216,000,000.00  
 
           331,000,000.00               285,420,000.00   $     68,327,278.73  
      104,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               216,000,000.00  
 
           331,000,000.00               203,835,000.00   $     44,360,434.89  
      104,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               216,000,000.00  
 
           331,000,000.00               140,380,000.00   $     27,773,434.62  
        12,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               124,000,000.00  
 
           403,000,000.00                 23,055,000.00   $       4,146,644.40  
      119,000,000.00               101,000,000.00               12,000,000.00               232,000,000.00  
 
           347,000,000.00                   6,535,000.00   $       1,068,524.72  
      109,000,000.00                 98,000,000.00               11,000,000.00               218,000,000.00  
 








   1,780,000,000.00            1,731,000,000.00             191,000,000.00            3,702,000,000.00  
 




Natural Gas Processing Plant: 
Component 2         
Input Data     Discount Rate Calculations 
1BCF 
            
1,000,000.00  MMBTU Discount Rate  10% 
Gas Processing Tariffs 3 $/MMBTU 
Risk Free Rate(Treasury Bills 
Rate) 10% 
Products (LGP) Selling Price 320 $/MMBTU Market Risk Premium 10% 
Methane Gas Volumes 97%   Beta 1 
Products Volumes(Propane, Butane,Ethane) 3% 
  
  

















    
Natural 
Gas 











Natural Gas Processing 
Revenues ($) 
         
0 2015 0                                             -                               -                               -                                                     -    
1 2016 0                                             -                               -                               -                                                     -    
2 2017 0                                             -                               -                               -                                                     -    
3 2018 58                          58,000,000.00         56,260,000.00            1,740,000.00                             168,780,000.00  
4 2019 68                          68,000,000.00         65,960,000.00            2,040,000.00                             197,880,000.00  
5 2020 68                          68,000,000.00         65,960,000.00            2,040,000.00                             197,880,000.00  
6 2021 68                          68,000,000.00         65,960,000.00            2,040,000.00                             197,880,000.00  
7 2022 68                          68,000,000.00         65,960,000.00            2,040,000.00                             197,880,000.00  
8 2023 68                          68,000,000.00         65,960,000.00            2,040,000.00                             197,880,000.00  
9 2024 68                          68,000,000.00         65,960,000.00            2,040,000.00                             197,880,000.00  
10 2025 68                          68,000,000.00         65,960,000.00            2,040,000.00                             197,880,000.00  
11 2026 68                          68,000,000.00         65,960,000.00            2,040,000.00                             197,880,000.00  
12 2027 68                          68,000,000.00         65,960,000.00            2,040,000.00                             197,880,000.00  
13 2028 68                          68,000,000.00         65,960,000.00            2,040,000.00                             197,880,000.00  
14 2029 68                          68,000,000.00         65,960,000.00            2,040,000.00                             197,880,000.00  
15 2030 68                          68,000,000.00         65,960,000.00            2,040,000.00                             197,880,000.00  
16 2031 59                          59,000,000.00         57,230,000.00            1,770,000.00                             171,690,000.00  
17 2032 52                          52,000,000.00         50,440,000.00            1,560,000.00                             151,320,000.00  
18 2033 47                          47,000,000.00         45,590,000.00            1,410,000.00                             136,770,000.00  
19 2034 39                          39,000,000.00         37,830,000.00            1,170,000.00                             113,490,000.00  
20 2035 9                            9,000,000.00           8,730,000.00               270,000.00                               26,190,000.00  
         




    REVENUES   CAPITAL EXPENDITURE OPERATIONS EXPENDITURE 
Products Revenues ($) Associated Gas Cost Net Revenues ($)  CAPEX Maintenance and Operating Cost 
          
                              -                                   -                                   -                         129,333,333.33                                                      -    
                              -                                   -                                   -                         128,333,333.33                                                      -    
                              -                                   -                                   -                         128,333,333.33                                                      -    
         556,800,000.00           568,400,000.00            157,180,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         652,800,000.00           666,400,000.00            184,280,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         652,800,000.00           666,400,000.00            184,280,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         652,800,000.00           666,400,000.00            184,280,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         652,800,000.00           666,400,000.00            184,280,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         652,800,000.00           666,400,000.00            184,280,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         652,800,000.00           666,400,000.00            184,280,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         652,800,000.00           666,400,000.00            184,280,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         652,800,000.00           666,400,000.00            184,280,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         652,800,000.00           666,400,000.00            184,280,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         652,800,000.00           666,400,000.00            184,280,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         652,800,000.00           666,400,000.00            184,280,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         652,800,000.00           666,400,000.00            184,280,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         566,400,000.00           578,200,000.00            159,890,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         499,200,000.00           509,600,000.00            140,920,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         451,200,000.00           460,600,000.00            127,370,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
         374,400,000.00           382,200,000.00            105,690,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
           86,400,000.00             88,200,000.00              24,390,000.00                                     19,300,000.00  
          
    10,368,000,000.00      10,584,000,000.00         2,926,800,000.00                        385,999,999.99                                347,399,999.99  
 




        CASHFLOWS   
Labour Cost Total OPEX  Total Project CAPEX & OPEX Net Income Discounted Cash Flows 
          
                                11,000,000.00                                  11,000,000.00                              140,333,333.33  -      140,333,333.33   $         -140,333,333.33  
                                11,000,000.00                                  11,000,000.00                              139,333,333.33  -      139,333,333.33   $         -126,666,666.66  
                                11,000,000.00                                  11,000,000.00                              139,333,333.33  -      139,333,333.33   $         -115,151,515.15  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          124,880,000.00   $             93,824,192.34  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          151,980,000.00   $           103,804,384.95  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          151,980,000.00   $             94,367,622.68  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          151,980,000.00   $             85,788,747.89  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          151,980,000.00   $             77,989,770.81  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          151,980,000.00   $             70,899,791.64  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          151,980,000.00   $             64,454,356.04  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          151,980,000.00   $             58,594,869.13  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          151,980,000.00   $             53,268,062.84  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          151,980,000.00   $             48,425,511.68  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          151,980,000.00   $             44,023,192.43  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          151,980,000.00   $             40,021,084.03  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          151,980,000.00   $             36,382,803.66  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          127,590,000.00   $             27,767,301.44  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00          108,620,000.00   $             21,489,887.94  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00            95,070,000.00   $             17,099,175.16  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00            73,390,000.00   $             11,999,851.45  
                                13,000,000.00                                  32,300,000.00                                32,300,000.00  -          7,910,000.00   $             -1,175,771.10  
          





Model 3         
Input Data     Discount Rate Calculations 
1BCF 
          
1,000,000.00  MMBTU Discount Rate  10% 
Estimated Loss Rate Due to Processing 5.0%   
Risk Free Rate(Treasury Bills 
Rate) 10% 
Transmission Tariffs 2.28 ($/MMBTU) Market Risk Premium 10% 
  %   Beta 1 
Output Data       
Transmission Pipeline NPV ($) 
      










     TRANSMISSION QUANTITIES   REVENUES 
Period Year Transmission Quantities (MMBTU)  Processing Losses (MMBTU) 
Transmission Pipeline Quantities 
(MMBTU) Transmission Revenues ($) 
        
0 2015                                  -                               -                                            -                                                   -    
1 2016                                  -                               -                                            -                                                   -    
2 2017                                  -                               -                                            -                                                   -    
3 2018               56,260,000.00            2,813,000.00                      53,447,000.00                            121,859,160.00  
4 2019               65,960,000.00            3,298,000.00                      62,662,000.00                            142,869,360.00  
5 2020               65,960,000.00            3,298,000.00                      62,662,000.00                            142,869,360.00  
6 2021               65,960,000.00            3,298,000.00                      62,662,000.00                            142,869,360.00  
7 2022               65,960,000.00            3,298,000.00                      62,662,000.00                            142,869,360.00  
8 2023               65,960,000.00            3,298,000.00                      62,662,000.00                            142,869,360.00  
9 2024               65,960,000.00            3,298,000.00                      62,662,000.00                            142,869,360.00  
10 2025               65,960,000.00            3,298,000.00                      62,662,000.00                            142,869,360.00  
11 2026               65,960,000.00            3,298,000.00                      62,662,000.00                            142,869,360.00  
12 2027               65,960,000.00            3,298,000.00                      62,662,000.00                            142,869,360.00  
13 2028               65,960,000.00            3,298,000.00                      62,662,000.00                            142,869,360.00  
14 2029               65,960,000.00            3,298,000.00                      62,662,000.00                            142,869,360.00  
15 2030               65,960,000.00            3,298,000.00                      62,662,000.00                            142,869,360.00  
16 2031               57,230,000.00            2,861,500.00                      54,368,500.00                            123,960,180.00  
17 2032               50,440,000.00            2,522,000.00                      47,918,000.00                            109,253,040.00  
18 2033               45,590,000.00            2,279,500.00                      43,310,500.00                              98,747,940.00  
19 2034               37,830,000.00            1,891,500.00                      35,938,500.00                              81,939,780.00  
20 2035                 8,730,000.00               436,500.00                        8,293,500.00                              18,909,180.00  
        
 
      






EXPENDITURE   CASHFLOWS   
CAPEX ($) OPEX ($) Total Project CAPEX & OPEX Cost ($) Net Income ($) Discounted Cash Flows ($) 
         
                       94,000,000.00                                             -                                    94,000,000.00  -                            94,000,000.00  -                     94,000,000.00  
                       94,000,000.00                                             -                                    94,000,000.00  -                            94,000,000.00  -                     85,454,545.45  
                       92,000,000.00                                             -                                    92,000,000.00  -                            92,000,000.00  -                     76,033,057.85  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             107,539,160.00                        80,795,762.58  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             128,549,360.00                        87,800,942.56  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             128,549,360.00                        79,819,038.69  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             128,549,360.00                        72,562,762.45  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             128,549,360.00                        65,966,147.68  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             128,549,360.00                        59,969,225.16  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             128,549,360.00                        54,517,477.42  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             128,549,360.00                        49,561,343.11  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             128,549,360.00                        45,055,766.46  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             128,549,360.00                        40,959,787.69  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             128,549,360.00                        37,236,170.63  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             128,549,360.00                        33,851,064.21  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             128,549,360.00                        30,773,694.74  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                             109,640,180.00                        23,860,897.62  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                               94,933,040.00                        18,781,995.87  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                               84,427,940.00                        15,185,107.12  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                               67,619,780.00                        11,056,374.37  
                         14,320,000.00                                  14,320,000.00                                 4,589,180.00                             682,152.36  
         




Combined Cycle Thermal Power 
Plant: Module 4         
Input Data   Units and Conversions Values   
Assumptions Values 
Heat Content of Gas (Btu/cu 
feet) 1030   
Plant Capacity (MW) 1100 1Megawatts 1kW10^3   
Capital Cost ($/kW) 950 Number of Hours/Year 8760   
Plant Cost ($M) 1045 1 Megawatts 1000 kilowatts 
Plant Life (Years) 20 1MMBTU           1,000,000.00  BTU 
Plant Load Factor (%) 0.9 1BCF 1000 MMcf 
Plant Efficiency (%) 0.48   2.087   
Heat Rate (BTU/kWh) 7120   0.48 Plant efficiency 
Operations and Maintenance Costs 
(OMC) 
$21million annual 
maintenance cost 1BCF           1,000,000.00  MMBTU 
       
Annual Electricity Generation 
(MWh) 8672400 MWh    
Energy required 6.17475E+13 Btu Discount Rate Calculations 
Gas Required 59.95 BCF Discount Rate  10% 
Gas Price $/MMBTU 8.7 15.08 
Risk Free Rate(Treasury Bills 
Rate) 10% 
Electricity Price cent/kWh ($/kWh) 0.09 
What is the contractual off-
take price? Market Risk Premium 10% 
      Beta 1 
1Megawatthour 1000 kilowatthour    
Output Data        
NPV                            388,387,277.18        




          REVENUES 
Period Year 
Transmission Pipeline Quantities 
(MMBTU) 
Gas Required (MMBTU) to 
run 1100 MW plant  
Power/Electricity Generated 
(MWh) with available gas 
Power/Electricity Sold 
($/kWh) 
        
0 2015                                     -                                -                                -                                  -    
1 2016                                     -                                -                                -                                  -    
2 2017                                     -                                -                                -                                  -    
3 2018                  53,447,000.00          61,747,488.00             7,506,601.12           675,594,101.12  
4 2019                  62,662,000.00          61,747,488.00             8,800,842.70           792,075,842.70  
5 2020                  62,662,000.00          61,747,488.00             8,800,842.70           792,075,842.70  
6 2021                  62,662,000.00          61,747,488.00             8,800,842.70           792,075,842.70  
7 2022                  62,662,000.00          61,747,488.00             8,800,842.70           792,075,842.70  
8 2023                  62,662,000.00          61,747,488.00             8,800,842.70           792,075,842.70  
9 2024                  62,662,000.00          61,747,488.00             8,800,842.70           792,075,842.70  
10 2025                  62,662,000.00          61,747,488.00             8,800,842.70           792,075,842.70  
11 2026                  62,662,000.00          61,747,488.00             8,800,842.70           792,075,842.70  
12 2027                  62,662,000.00          61,747,488.00             8,800,842.70           792,075,842.70  
13 2028                  62,662,000.00          61,747,488.00             8,800,842.70           792,075,842.70  
14 2029                  62,662,000.00          61,747,488.00             8,800,842.70           792,075,842.70  
15 2030                  62,662,000.00          61,747,488.00             8,800,842.70           792,075,842.70  
16 2031                  54,368,500.00          61,747,488.00             7,636,025.28           687,242,275.28  
17 2032                  47,918,000.00          61,747,488.00             6,730,056.18           605,705,056.18  
18 2033                  43,310,500.00          61,747,488.00             6,082,935.39           547,464,185.39  
19 2034                  35,938,500.00          61,747,488.00             5,047,542.13           454,278,792.13  
20 2035                    8,293,500.00          61,747,488.00             1,164,817.42           104,833,567.42  
        
  TOTALS                995,220,000.00     1,111,454,784.00         139,778,089.89      12,580,028,089.89  
 




CAPITAL EXPENDITURE     OPERATIONS EXPENDITURE     
CAPEX Fuel Cost  Total CAPEX Maintenance Cost Labour Cost Total OPEX 
           
                     348,333,333.33                               -           348,333,333.33                                                      -                                                        -                                                        -    
                     348,333,333.33                               -           348,333,333.33                                                      -                                                        -                                                        -    
                     348,333,333.33                               -           348,333,333.33                                                      -                                                        -                                                        -    
          464,988,900.00         464,988,900.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          545,159,400.00         545,159,400.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          545,159,400.00         545,159,400.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          545,159,400.00         545,159,400.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          545,159,400.00         545,159,400.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          545,159,400.00         545,159,400.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          545,159,400.00         545,159,400.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          545,159,400.00         545,159,400.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          545,159,400.00         545,159,400.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          545,159,400.00         545,159,400.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          545,159,400.00         545,159,400.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          545,159,400.00         545,159,400.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          545,159,400.00         545,159,400.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          473,005,950.00         473,005,950.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          416,886,600.00         416,886,600.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          376,801,350.00         376,801,350.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          312,664,950.00         312,664,950.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
            72,153,450.00           72,153,450.00                                  21,000,000.00                                  12,000,000.00                                  33,000,000.00  
          
                  1,045,000,000.00       8,658,414,000.00      9,703,414,000.00                                378,000,000.00                                216,000,000.00                                594,000,000.00  
 




  CASHFLOWS   
Total Project Cost Net Income Discounted Cash Flow 
     
                                        348,333,333.33  -        348,333,333.33  -     348,333,333.33  
                                        348,333,333.33  -        348,333,333.33  -     316,666,666.67  
                                        348,333,333.33  -        348,333,333.33  -     287,878,787.88  
                                        497,988,900.00            177,605,201.12         133,437,416.32  
                                        578,159,400.00            213,916,442.70         146,107,808.69  
                                        578,159,400.00            213,916,442.70         132,825,280.62  
                                        578,159,400.00            213,916,442.70         120,750,255.11  
                                        578,159,400.00            213,916,442.70         109,772,959.19  
                                        578,159,400.00            213,916,442.70           99,793,599.27  
                                        578,159,400.00            213,916,442.70           90,721,453.88  
                                        578,159,400.00            213,916,442.70           82,474,048.98  
                                        578,159,400.00            213,916,442.70           74,976,408.16  
                                        578,159,400.00            213,916,442.70           68,160,371.06  
                                        578,159,400.00            213,916,442.70           61,963,973.69  
                                        578,159,400.00            213,916,442.70           56,330,885.17  
                                        578,159,400.00            213,916,442.70           51,209,895.61  
                                        506,005,950.00            181,236,325.28           39,442,304.84  
                                        449,886,600.00            155,818,456.18           30,827,850.87  
                                        409,801,350.00            137,662,835.39           24,759,870.99  
                                        345,664,950.00            108,613,842.13           17,759,231.10  
                                        105,153,450.00  -               319,882.58  -              47,548.51  
     
                                   10,297,414,000.00         2,282,614,089.89         388,387,277.18  
 
